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GUARDIANS OF THE BODY POLITIC: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND HUMAN LIBERTY IN THE THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL

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READER

I would like to dedicate this work to my grandfather, Cornelius Vincent Shea. The elemental building block for politics is "man moving man through speech." As the owner of a tavern, a soldier, a politician, and father of nine, he made his living with his tongue.

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According to Jouvenel " a wise man knows himself for debtor." While I do not claim to be wise, I am aware of my debts.

Since man is born "a screaming bundle of flesh, the outcome of mating" let me first thank my parents. Maureen and Frank DesRosiers, Mom and Dad, thank you for giving me a world filled with love and nurturing support. I would not have taken this path if it were not for your general encouragement to pursue a path that would make me happy. Let me also thank my "Out-laws," John and Olinda Solari. At one point during the dissertation I lived at their house as in "All in the Family." From now on, please refer to me as "Dr. Meathead."

Which brings me to my better half. I call Fabiana my "liberating yoke" because through her art and love I have found purpose. I would never have finished this dissertation if was not for her countless efforts; she is my rock. With her I rediscovered my faith, made Ryan and Maggie, and in her eyes and arms I have found true happiness.

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Chapter One

Political Science and Human Liberty in *On Power*, *Sovereignty*, and *The Pure Theory of Politics*

Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-1987) is one of the most important and profound political thinkers of the twentieth-century. He is also among the most neglected. As Brian Anderson points out in an impressive reconsideration of Jouvenel's thought in the Spring 2001 issue of *The Public Interest*, Jouvenel's work has not been subjected to the same degree of sustained analysis as has the work of some of his contemporaries such as Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott, Isaiah Berlin, and Raymond Aron to whom Jouvenel has often been compared and with whom he enjoyed amicable intellectual relations.[1] These thinkers are now widely acknowledged to be among the greatest political thinkers of the twentieth century. In different ways, they revivified the "great tradition" of political reflection, and offered alternatives to the rather abstract and apolitical philosophizing of analytic thinkers and to the dogmatic historicism of the Hegelio-Marxist tradition. All tried to

[1] Brian C. Anderson, "Bertrand de Jouvenel's Melancholy Liberalism" in *The Public Interest* (Spring 2001): pp. 87-104, esp. pp.87-88.

defend liberal democracy but in full awareness of the "crisis" afflicting modern rationalism. Jouvenel shared these concerns. In my view, his thought deserves the closest analysis and scrutiny.

At one time in the late 1950's and early 1960's, Jouvenel was a serious presence in American political science and some of his articles even appeared in *The American Political Science Review.*[2] His work was competently analyzed by several contemporaries but never in detail or in book-length studies.[3] The best synoptic introduction to and overview of Jouvenel's thought is a short study by the French political scientist Pierre Hassner published in 1979 in the *Biographical Supplement* to the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*[4] Hassner, a student of Raymond Aron and Leo Strauss and a distinguished political analyst in his own right, marvelously conveys the literary grace and intellectual breadth of Jouvenel's project. He also highlights Jouvenel's effort to defend human freedom and excellence within the context of a "complex, open and

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[2] See for example the charming essay on political decision-making, "The Chairman's Problem", that originally appeared in *The American Political Science Review* (June 1961).

[3] For example, see the competent if uninspired essay by Carl Slavin, "Bertrand de Jouvenel: Efficiency and Amenity" in A. de Crespigny and K. Minogue eds., *Contemporary Political Philosophers* (New York: Dodd Mead,1975).

[4] Pierre Hassner, "Bertrand de Jouvenel" in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol.18: *Biographical Supplement*, New York: Free Press,1979), pp.358-363.

mobile"[5] society--that is, within modernity--a theme to which we will repeatedly return throughout this dissertation. Anderson suggests that the dominance in the academy of arid, abstract and ahistorical analytic political philosophy à lá Rawls and Dworkin on the one hand, and of the poststructuralist "nihilism" of Foucault and Derrida on the other accounts for some of the neglect of Jouvenel's work in the 1970's and 1980's.[6] In a moment, we will suggest some other plausible explanations. But Anderson adds another quite suggestive explanation: Jouvenel was only an occasional professor in British, French, and American universities. Unlike Strauss, Oakeshott, and Aron he never had the opportunity to shape a generation of students.[7]

Not surprisingly, Jouvenel's contemporary admirers are primarily, if not exclusively, students of Aron and Strauss. Fortunately, there has been an impressive revival of interest in Jouvenel's thought, especially in the United States. In recent years, *Transaction* has published two superb anthologies of Jouvenel's writings in political philosophy and political economy, expertly introduced by

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[5] Hassner, p. 361.
[6] Anderson, "Bertrand de Jouvenel's Melancholy Liberalism", pp. 87-88.
[7] Anderson, pp. 89-90.

Professors Dennis Hale and Marc Landy of Boston College.[8] *Liberty Fund* has reissued his "masterworks" in political philosophy, including *The Pure Theory of Politics*, the principal subject of this dissertation. Daniel Mahoney who has written a penetrating introduction to the new edition of *Pure Theory* is at work on a comprehensive study of Jouvenel's political philosophy. In addition, the French publisher *Fayard* has plans to release a single, authoritative edition of Jouvenel's major writings.

Regardless of the changing fortunes of his critical reception, Jouvenel remains one of the great political philosophers of the twentieth century. While his work does not fit neatly into received political and philosophic categories he is undoubtedly an heir to the French liberal tradition of Benjamin Constant and Alexis Tocqueville. He draws freely on the spirit of Aristotelian political science but his work is also marked by openness to the most salutary currents of contemporary political theory and social science. Jouvenel's learning bridges all the disciplines and capaciously explores the amplitude of the human world. His writing shows the eloquence and clarity of

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[8] See Dennis Hale and Marc Landy eds, *The Nature of Politics: Selected Essays of Bertrand de Jouvenel* (New Brunswick,N.J.: Transaction 1992), pp. 1-36 for the introductory essay and Hale and Landy eds., *Economics and the Good Life* (New Brunswick,N.J.:1999), pp. 1-15 for the introduction.

his great predecessors such as Montesquieu, Constant, and Tocqueville. But these remarkable virtues have paradoxically served to limit his influence on contemporary political philosophy. It is the case that in France, Jouvenel had been, until recently, largely overlooked in an intellectual climate dominated by Marxism, existentialism, and post-structuralism. However, in conjunction with Raymond Aron, Jouvenel helped revive interest in Tocqueville and French liberalism, a revival highlighted by Mark Lilla's 1994 collection *New French Thought: Political Philosophy* (Princeton, 1994). But even today he remains a somewhat marginal intellectual presence in his homeland. The French political philosopher Pierre Manent eloquently captures the reasons for the fact that Jouvenel has not obtained the full recognition due him. He locates it in our "habits of reading." Manent writes:

> *We do not know how to classify his books which mix all the disciplines without concern for academic distinctions. They are written with clarity, finesse and elegance but to these necessary qualities we prefer the superfluous apparatus of "scientificity." His works are sustained and ornamented by a classical culture which is less and less shared. This relative non-recognition is deplorable because Jouvenel's books are full of wisdom for those who take the time to follow these winding roads: at each turn, a view of a historian, a*

> *remark of a moralist, an instructive and charming notion.*[9]

It should be remembered that between 1870 and 1955 Alexis de Tocqueville's reputation was in near total eclipse in France. The domination of first positivism and then Marxism and existentialism displaced Tocqueville from mainstream French political discourse and inquiry as well. It took the philosophical and pedagogical labors of Raymond Aron to restore Tocqueville to his central place in the "canon" of political philosophy in France and to the role he now plays as the preeminent theoretical reference point in the political debates of our western societies.[10] It was the responsibility of twentieth-century lovers of liberty to remind the world of the profundity of Alexis de Tocqueville, and it is our twenty-first century responsibility to do the same for Bertrand de Jouvenel.

Jouvenel's wisdom and grace are on full display in his three master works of political reflection, *On Power* (1945), *Sovereignty (1957)*, and *The Pure Theory of Politics* (1963).[11] Together, these works articulate a political

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[9] Pierre Manent, *Les Libéraux*, vol. II (Paris: Pluriel-Hachette, 1987), p. 489.

[10] See Francoise Melonio, *Tocqueville and the French*, trans. Beth Raps (Charlottesville, VA: 1998).

[11] *Power: A Natural History of its Growth* (Indiana, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993); *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good*, with a Foreword by Daniel J. Mahoney and David DesRosiers (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty

science that effectively responds to what he called the modern "rationalist crisis." According to Jouvenel, modern political thought has freed Power[12] from the institutional and moral hedges that have traditionally limited, harnessed and moralized its practice. These three books, taken as a whole, outline a political science that can effectively re-limit, re-harness, and re-moralize Power. Jouvenel's thought provides an admirable model for bridging the chasm between ancient and modern political philosophy and empirical and normative political science.

This dissertation will focus primarily on *Pure Theory*, the final installment of the trilogy. However, in this chapter, we will delineate, in the broadest of outline, the dialectical movement of the trilogy in an effort to make sense of Jouvenel's project as a whole. Read together, with their connecting threads and subtle corrections and developments, they present an original political science rooted in the tradition of political reflection but attentive to the changes inaugurated by modern circumstances. If there exists such a whole, why focus on a part? In my view, *Pure Theory* offers the phenomenological

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Fund, 1998). *The Pure Theory of Politics*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963) reissued by Liberty Fund in 2000 with a Foreword by Daniel J. Mahoney. I will cite the first edition of *Pure Theory* throughout this text.

[12] By Power Jouvenel means the State or Governmental Authority, and not simply the capacity to command or move.

"grammar" that undergirds Jouvenel's previous master-works on political authority and ethics. Every prescriptive sentence of *Power* and *Sovereignty* builds upon the "elemental" grammar, or pure theory of man and politics, only fully articulated in the third volume. It is the thesis of dissertation that *Pure Theory* is the key to unlocking and defending the depths and grandeur of Jouvenel's dynamic notion of the common good, *Sovereignty*, and to mitigating the tragedy that surrounds *Power*'s presentation of the political. As with the development of language, Jouvenel's grammar is limned from the good speech of these two prior works. If the reader is threatened by the message of *Power*, or tempted by *Sovereignty*, *Pure Theory* offers a thoroughgoing explication of the framework that undergirds these conclusions.

Part I

On Power: A Natural History of its Growth

On Power sketches a political history of modern times that supplies an intellectual clearing ground for a new political science. As is often the case with original thinkers, a new language accompanies new modes and orders.

Therefore, it is necessary to begin by asking the meaning of "Power" and "natural history."

Power has a very rich and suggestive meaning. It certainly embodies elements of its general usage, the ability to move, but it includes much more. When Jouvenel speaks of Power, he is referring to government authority in states and communities, and the unparalleled ability of political bodies to move and be moved. A difficulty with Jouvenel's understanding of Power is that it appears to exist somewhere between the classical notion of regime or politeia and the modern notion of the state. The difficulty with this middle path is that Jouvenel's presentation of Power appears on first glance to be closer to the latter. I will argue that Jouvenel separates Power from the rich capaciousness that is associated which the classical conception of regime not in order to deny its political and social realities and aspirations but in order to separate Power's essence from its acquired characteristics. The means to this end is what he calls a "natural history" of Power. If the trilogy owes its insight to a generative discovery it comes from looking for Power's nature or essence by studying its growth as it moves through history. The strength of Jouvenel's natural history is that it is historical without being historicist, and attentive to the

arguments put forward by the tradition without becoming a prisoner of its categories. Jouvenel's understanding of natural history is essentially Thucydidean in character. The speeches of political actors are seen in the dynamic context of events. To understand Power one must view it "stereo-topically"--one must see Power in light of, but also separate from, the opinions men hold about it.[13,14]

When Power is stripped of its acquired characteristics, and is seen in its pure or naked form, one confronts the primordial human desire to command. "Power of this kind can make no claim to legitimacy. It pursues no just end; its one concern is the profitable exploitation of conquered and submissive subjects. It lives off the subject populations."[15] Political science must legislate in light of this essential reality. The nature or the essence of Power is revealed, at least metaphorically, at the outset of *On Power* with the chapter heading "The Minotaur Presented."

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[13] For Jouvenel, to understand an author as he understood himself is necessary but it is not an end itself. For example, to strive to understand Hobbes as he understood himself, will certainly contribute to an understanding of modern politics but it will not necessarily give you an adequate understanding of Power. For an example of Jouvenel's contribution to the interpretation of the tradition of political philosophy see his seminal introduction to Rousseau's *Du contract social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Geneva: 1947). See also Jouvenel, "Rousseau: the Pessimistic Evolutionist," *Yale French Studies* (Fall-Winter 1961-62): pp. 83-96.

[14] Wilson Carey McWilliams has noted that Jouvenel tried to make his students do rather than study political science, to study ideas in light of events and vice versa. See his "Foreword" to *The Nature of Politics*, pp. 37-41.

For Jouvenel, although opinions regarding Power change over time, its essential nature is unchanging. The aboriginal tribe, the classical polis, the Roman Empire, medieval Christendom, and the modern state are all defined by an understanding of what Power ought to do in order to be considered good or legitimate. These political oughts or ethics are primarily prescriptive and normative in purpose. The success or failure of these conceptions of the "good life" flow from their ability to legislate for and constrain Power's essence. The goal of *On Power* is to offer a Political Science, understood in the most architectonic sense, a "political metaphysic" that can guide and inform Power.

Jouvenel's highlighting of the extreme situation, of the ultimate propensity of Power, should not be construed as an endorsement of "Machiavellianism." Machiavelli trumpeted the dark underbelly of political life in order to "de-moralize politics," to create a new ought that finds its inspiration in mirroring the so-called "effectual" character of political life. This is not Jouvenel's purpose in the least. Rather Jouvenel's goal is to build a theoretically coherent and morally serious response to Power's "natural egoism." In his view, a normative political science is both possible and necessary, but if it

is to effectively limit Power it must have as its starting point a true understanding of the essence of Power. It must begin with a "pure theory" of politics.

For Jouvenel, the nature of Power is essentially grasping and rapacious but in no way essentially foolish. As a result, this desire to command is not always and everywhere closed to the guidance of reason. Pure Power can be shown the necessity of "forswearing" itself, of recognizing that its egoism to command can if overly indulged lead to its own destruction[16]. If political philosophy were to trace its genealogy back to its starting point it would begin here. Political philosophy enters the public stage offering political power advice on how it can better perpetuate itself. In this regard Jouvenel has not parted with the spirit of Machiavelli. Where he does depart from Machiavelli and Machiavellianism is his conception of lending power "credit." According to Jouvenel, "Force alone can establish power...habit alone can keep it in being, but to expand it needs credit." [17] This need for credit is political philosophy's opportunity to place the Minotaur within the labyrinth of what Jouvenel calls in *Sovereignty* the "regulated will." By showing Power the benefits that

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[16] *Power*, p. 113.
[17] *Power*, p. 28.

come from connecting its end to the proper end of the community as a moral entity, it lends to Power a social nature. But the political problem is that not all political ethics are created equal.

Rather than comment on the strengths and limitations of these various notions, a subject best discussed in the context of *Sovereignty*, I will focus on the limitations that Jouvenel saw intrinsic to political ethics generally. Political ethics appear to follow a general law of development that ultimately suits the expansion of Power. All notions, even those that do not suffer from the "rationalist crisis"--which he identifies as freeing Power from the constraints of a natural and divine order--have a tendency to become "water for Power's mill."[18] This consequence of historical reflection is what causes the most difficulty for the reader, and when coupled with his understanding of the essence of Power appears to suggest a somewhat pathetic reading of the inevitability of despotism in political life. But like the essence of Power, this general law of development, or better, dislocation, is in no way put forward in order to enervate man or cause him to despair. The pathetic and pessimistic character of *On Power* is based on a "probabilistic" understanding of the history

[18] *Power*, pp. 66-67.

of events and ideas. Jouvenel is moved to sadness, not because despotism is necessitated but because it is likely, or, probable, based on the character of Power and those whose responsibility it is to harness it awesome strength.[19] But Jouvenel's response is far from fatalistic or nihilistic. He instead appeals to the primary need to revitalize the tradition of political science.[20]

In Jouvenel's view, political ethics, if they are to be effective, must place certain things outside of Power's reach. It must put forward "verities" that stand above, restrain, and guide Power's activities. The problem that Jouvenel highlights is that not everything that goes by the name of truth is so:

> *But there is in law an immutable element, and we human beings are not, as I see it, alas, equal to the task of evolving a bubbling stream of ever new verities. Ideas are, more truly, like oases in the barren wastes of human thought; once discovered, they are forever precious, even though they are left to be silted up by the sands of stupidity and ignorance. Where is this stream of yours, that*

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[19] This general problem is radicalized by modern intellectual doctrines and ideological movements which idolatrize state power and collective action in the name of progress and human emancipation. *Power* was published in French in 1945, at the conclusion of a devastating world war and after the rise of two great anti-liberal totalitarian movements committed to the destruction of liberal western civilization. The prospects for political liberty were, from an objective point of view, rather bleak.

[20] Hans Morgenthau mistakes *Power* for a romantic apology for the medieval order rather than a call for a new political science alert to the self-aggrandizement of Power. See Hans Morgenthau, "The Evocation of the Past: Bertrand de Jouvenel" in *Dilemmas of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp.358-365.

> *should cause me to change direction? A mirage. There must be a return to Aristotle, St. Thomas, Montesquieu. In them is substance, and nothing of them is divorced from reality.*[21]

The partially false, that is partisan or "stupid" character of political ethics and law, provides the Minotaur the opportunity to break free from the labyrinth of laws, institutions, and manners that provide it with its social nature. Like Aristotle's partisan claimants, political ethicists put forward a partial truth as truth simply or finally and the political consequence of this is regime degeneration and the extension of Power.[22] What is needed is a political ethics that is based on a few permanent verities about the nature of man and the nature of politics.

Part II

Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Political Good

Next we turn to *Sovereignty* where the problem of political ethics is most directly confronted.[23] *Sovereignty* above all addresses the question of authority and its

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[21] *Power*, pp. 349-350.
[22] Aristotle captures this perennial political problem in Book V of his *Politics*.
[23] In the first part of this section I draw on the "Introduction" to The Liberty Press edition of *Sovereignty* that I have co-authored with Daniel J. Mahoney.

relationship to the common good. Jouvenel explains that every notion of legitimate government entails an implicit notion of the common good. He shows that the idea of a common good is not some abstract idea to be imposed upon the social order from above but rather a reflection arising naturally from the social character of human beings. Every man who has the responsibility to exercise authority is "bound to form some conception of the good which he hopes to achieve by the exercise of the power which is his." Following Aristotle, Jouvenel asks whether those in a position of authority will use that "authority" despotically or whether they will "use it properly in the name of a good which is in some way common." [24] The natural history of Power then is a necessary starting point but it's not the stopping point for political science and statesmanship.

The originality of *Sovereignty* is its effort to liberate the indispensable notion of the common good from the closed character of the classical city, from what he calls the "prison of the corollaries" identified by political philosophers such as Plato and Rousseau.[25] In the traditional view, the maintenance of civic affections and

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[24] *Sovereignty*, p. xxv.
[25] *Sovereignty*, pp. 147-153.

political virtue depends on certain corollaries: small size and population, cultural and social homogeneity, and resistance to innovation and foreign ideas. Jouvenel shows that these ideas, while compatible with a certain classical forms of public liberty, undermine the kind of social friendship available in modern circumstances.

In addition, he examines how the contemporary intellectual's disdain for the impersonality and relativism of the modern state and society, "Babylon", gives rise to a tyrannical desire to recreate community, an imagined "Icaria,"[26] freed from the emptiness of the life of Babylon. In fact these utopian longings and the irresponsible politics to which they give rise undermine those communities which are really available in modern circumstances and deny the only kind of good appropriate to a society of free men. Unlike Rousseau, Jouvenel believed in the possibility of a middle ground that existed somewhere between the most austere democracy and a most perfect Hobbesian tyranny.[27]

Yet while deeply suspicious of Rousseau-inspired political solutions to the "anomie" of modern life,

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[26] Icarus, the son of Daedalus, while escaping from Crete on artificial wings made for him by his father, flew so close to the sun that the wax that held his wings fastened were melted and he fell into the sea.

[27] See Rousseau's letter to Mirabieu of 1767, cited in Jouvenel, *The Nature of Politics*, ed. by Dennis Hale and Marc Landy, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1992) pp. 65-66.

Jouvenel freely draws on those classical dimensions of Rousseau's thought which address the need for statesmanship to kindle political affections as an alternate to the coercive use of state Power. *Sovereignty* contains one of the richest accounts of statesmanship written in this century. Drawing widely on examples drawn from the Bible, classical literature, history and political life, Jouvenel shows that the offices of "dux" and "rex," of founder and stabilizer, are permanent features of political leadership, rarely embodied in the same man.[28] The requirements of statesmanship are too often ignored by the anti-political currents of modern thought which deny the naturalness, and hence the goods as well as evils, inherent in social and political authority.

Following the historical presentation outlined in *On Power*,[29] Jouvenel shows in *Sovereignty* how modern doctrines of sovereignty undermine natural forms of human association. They typically give rise to an atomized society directed by an increasingly centralized state which usurps the responsibilities of civil society. In order to restore the preconditions of social friendship, it is necessary to reconceive the foundations of political

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[28] *Sovereignty*, pp. 48-66,
[29] *Power*, pp. 417-418.

authority. In a profound analysis, Jouvenel explores the unlimited willfulness inherent in the modern doctrines of sovereignty. Contesting the received opinions, Jouvenel shows that the French conservative liberals such as Guizot, Royer-Collard and Tocqueville, as well as the most important theorists of the "ancien regime," recognized and advocated the limited will of the sovereign, and hence the intrinsic and proper limits of human and political willfulness altogether.[30]

Jouvenel's "stereotopic" analysis of the speeches and deeds of the ancien regime paints a very different portrait of the principle and practice of absolute sovereignty than the received view. The very mention of monarchical or absolute sovereignty goes against our modern democratic grain. But however this notion rubs us, the arguments we produce in rejecting its yoke tell us much about ourselves. Of course, we all sing in unison that the only principle of political legitimacy is "popular sovereignty." To utter anything else is to find oneself outside the circle of respectable opinion. This is of less interest than our understanding of these words. For example, "to say that the sovereign will is subject to reason is one thing; to say

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[30] *Sovereignty*, pp. 239-257.

that it is subject to the people is another."[31] Jouvenel shows the "landslide of ideas" in favor of absolute willfulness came not from the mouths of monarchs and their "auxiliaries" but from the mouths and pens of democrats. Jouvenel does not deny that there were advocates of such notions within the ancien regime, but he points out that theirs was a decidedly minority voice. The majority opinion, forming a chain of command and affection from the exalted king to the lowly serf, is best summarized in the following set of statements: The King is a "Vicar of God," and "A Minor."[32] How are we to resolve this paradox? Jouvenel provides the key: the King "cannot wreck what God has built, the fundamental laws which regulate the course of things must then be placed beyond his reach. The general providential order is thus stabilized by reason of the 'fortunate powerlessness' of the vicar, who must be constrained to exercise his special providence reasonably and virtuously."[33] The sovereignty of the King was animated by the sovereignty of God and the reign of his reason in the nature of things. For the King to act in a manner not consistent with this naturally ordained order was to step outside the charge of his kingly office. It was the

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[31] *Sovereignty*, p. 254.
[32] *Sovereignty*, pp. 249-251.
[33] *Sovereignty*, p. 250.

responsibility of political philosophy and science to be "indispensable auxiliaries" to his royalty by helping craft laws, institutions and manners that "help him to remain everything a king should be."[34]

Do our modern democratic notions of popular sovereignty possess such an internal principle of "fortunate powerlessness"? What are the democratic equivalents of these "auxiliaries"? According to Jouvenel, "two preoccupations obsess the minds of men who reflect on politics:" 1.) that a supreme authority issues commands and 2.) that the authority commands nothing that is illegitimate.[35] What Jouvenel clearly shows is that the most thoughtful partisans of the ancien regime wanted the King and not the papacy to be that supreme or final repository of command, but that both the King and the Papacy were to be of one mind that the rule of reason and the rule of law are what constitute the true ground of legitimacy.

To many of the founders of modernity this common agreement was at the source of the premodern political problem, since church and state could not agree on the repository of these superintending principles. This provides an insight as to why the arguments put forth in

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[34] *Sovereignty*, p. 251.
[35] *Sovereignty*, pp. 240-242.

the name of the people lack such a shared notion. The consequences of this new trajectory are examined in two chapters of the concluding section of his book, "the political consequences" of Descartes and Hobbes. Jouvenel clearly establishes that neither prototypically modern thinker can provide a principled basis for human and political liberty because neither can account adequately for the social nature of man and the non-arbitrary character of moral life. Jouvenel brilliantly establishes an intimate link between the authoritarian conclusions of Hobbes and the premise of "absolute libertarianism" at the core of his thought. The conclusion of Chapter 14 of *Sovereignty*, "The Political Consequences of Hobbes," provides Jouvenel's clearest statement of the essential dependence of liberty upon individual self-restraint and the recognition of a natural moral order:

> *It looks as if the writings of Hobbes contain a serious lesson for our modern democracies. To the entire extent to which progress develops hedonism and moral relativism, to which individual liberty is conceived as the right of man to obey his appetites, nothing but the strongest of powers can maintain society in being. The idea of political liberty is linked to other suppositions about man and with the encouragement of quite other tendencies.*[36]

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[36] *Sovereignty*, p. 298.

But we are faced with a difficulty. The idea of political liberty, its suppositions, and tendencies are not systematically presented in *Sovereignty*. It would be a mistake to see Jouvenel as a proponent of either throne or altar. The fact that Jouvenel ends his discourse on sovereignty with a critique of our early modern architects, and that this criticism is preceded by a qualified defense of the notions of sovereignty under the old regime, should not be construed as a condemnation of modernity and endorsement of the latter.[37] *Sovereignty* does not challenge the legitimacy of modern liberty but rather notions of sovereignty that undermine human liberty by grounding it in unlimited willfulness. Against this landslide of ideas and the modern rationalist crisis which is its wake, Jouvenel joins the ranks of those who in the conclusion of *Power* he called "Jeremiahs" and "useless Cassandras," those liberals like "Benjamin Constant, Royer-Collard, Guizot and Tocqueville who trained the "artillery of ideas onto a new arbitrariness." [38]

What is Jouvenel's contribution on the level of political ethics to this "artillery"? *Sovereignty* as a whole articulates a dynamic notion of the common good, one

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[37] This is the error of Morgenthau's "The Evocation of the Past: Betrand de Jouvenel."
[38] *Sovereignty*, p. 255-256.

that steers effectively between the Scylla of Babylonian relativism and the Charybdis of "Icarian" inspired utopianisms. Rejecting the dogmatism of both, he builds a political ethic that rejects what he calls "the myth of the solution." For Jouvenel there are no solutions to political problems but rather only more or less precarious "settlements." The virtue of the classical city and the relativism of modern Babylon both try--albeit it with very different means--to put forward "solutions." The homogeneity of the classical city and the relativistic heterogeneity of the modern state are both attempts to mitigate the danger that is attendant to political life by denying its complexity. Jouvenel wants to mitigate the dangers that provide political life with its unique texture, while resisting the temptation to put forth a political ethic that tries to moralize or relativize this reality away.

Wilson Carey Mc Williams has said of Jouvenel that he brought "old gods to a new city." Less poetically, I would suggest that the "olds gods" that Jouvenel brought entail a non-arbitrary and non-relativitistic understanding of human and political things which is necessary for democracy to accomplish it humanizing possibilities. These "gods" are, in fact, less divinities than incommensurable goods whose

incommensurability need not be understood tragically. For Jouvenel the common good is neither groundless nor simply determinate, and it is the responsibility of political science and statesmanship to do justice to this reality by weighing, balancing, and mediating between the various goods of our human and social nature.

Part III

The Pure Theory of Politics

The Pure Theory of Politics traces the road that these "old gods" must take in order to enter the modern city. The argument of *Pure* Theory is that those who are concerned with the common good need to learn the "game" of politics if they hope to be successful. Whereas the goal of *Sovereignty* was to outline a political ethic, a "normative" response to Power, the aim of *Pure Theory* is to outline a purely "representative" or factually descriptive political science which lays forth the rules of the political game.

The reader who has followed the argument and logic of the first two books might be surprised and disturbed by the language and direction of this third book. The first impression the reader gets is that Jouvenel has fallen prey to the very currents of thought that he has until then so

effectively criticized. His language seems drawn less from the vocabulary of politics than from the vocabulary of science. Is not Jouvenel himself perpetuating the "myth of the solution" by using the language of science?

Again it is necessary to understand what Jouvenel understands by his principal terms. By "pure" Jouvenel understands this term in the same way it is used in chemistry. Pure chemistry is the study of the fundamental or elemental building blocks of chemistry. According to Jouvenel, for political life the elemental building block is the ability of "man to move man." [39] His understanding of "theory" draws it inspiration from the sciences as well. The object of the "theory" is to "simulate reality." A pure theory of politics is a representative science of man that captures how men move each other. Jouvenel is clear that such a notion does not deny the possibility of political ethics or political philosophy. Rather a pure theory is a necessary precondition for "An Inquiry Into the Political Good" and a means by which these verities are introduced and defended in the political life.

What is so interesting and paradoxical about Jouvenel's approach is that it denies the conclusions of those using this language who argue that man is reducible

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[39] *Pure Theory*, p. 10.

to laws of necessity and appetite. By following the scientific or representative meaning of these terms, Jouvenel finds a reality very to similar to the one sketched by Aristotle's political science. A pure theory of politics starts with the fundamental political reality of men moving each other through speech. The man discovered by means of a pure theory is, first and foremost, a political animal.

But a pure theory does stop not there. It discovers and lays forth for all--regardless of temperament--the ways men move one another. It is clear to the most naïve that such knowledge in the wrong hands could be quite dangerous in deed. If it is so dangerous then why formulate a pure theory? The short answer that Jouvenel gives is that the cat is out of the bag and unfortunately those with the weakest of moral constitutions are the ones who most fully understand the potential of Power. Jouvenel is very much aware and respectful of the arguments put forward by those who are critical of political science for descending from the "moral pulpit" by making the behavioral turn.[40] Jouvenel agrees with their concerns but believes that a proper

[40] Jouvenel sympathetically cites Leo Strauss and Irving Kristol as articulate representatives of this point of view. (*Pure Theory*, p. 34).

political reflection on this descent demands a different and more dialectical response.

In *Pure Theory* Jouvenel wants to expand our understanding of political behavior to include the study of "strong" behavior, the rare or extreme circumstances and actions, instead of "weak" or general behavior. Voting behavior is an example of "weak" behavioral studies. Such studies show that the electorate is apathetic. But such a reality begs the question: what opportunity does this apathy create? To the great distress of the moralists, Jouvenel shows the great opportunity that this creates for organized minority initiatives to push their will beyond what their numbers would seem to allow. For those who have an interest or will outside of established authority Jouvenel shows, in a step by step manner in a chapter aptly entitled, "The Team Against the Committee," how they are able to overcome the obstacles--physical as well moral as--that stand in the way of the actualization of their will.[41]

Jouvenel highlights and makes explicit the laws or science of moving men for the same reason Aristotle shows how tyranny is established and maintained in Book V of the *Politics*. Since the Perianderian[42] aspects of politics are

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[41] *Pure Theory*, pp. 176-186.

[42] In Book III and V of the Politics Aristotle discusses the advice that the tyrant Periander of Corinth had given his son Thrasybolous. When

only a secret to "those with finer feelings," *Pure Theory* forces those who have traditionally sought to moralize politics to confront all of the ways by which men move men. Politics has a certain integrity or nature that must be grasped if the moral art is to be successful. And again it would be a mistake to limit Jouvenel's remarks to his present: he does not only have contemporary totalitarianism in mind.

Jouvenel believes that classical political science does not begin from a sufficiently phenomenological starting point. As evidence of Jouvenel's importance for reflecting on classical political science. I will briefly comment on Chapter 2 of *Pure Theory* "Wisdom and Activity: The Pseudo-Alcibiades." As we have seen in *On Power* Jouvenel addresses what he sees to be the weakness of the tradition apart from the rationalist crisis that provides the background and urgency for his work. Jouvenel's "Pseudo-Alcibiades" is a critique of Platonic political philosophy presented in Plato's own terms, i.e. in the form of a dialogue. The dramatic backdrop for this exchange between Socrates and Alcibiades is centered in Athens immediately before Alcibiades is to enter the Athenian

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approached by a messenger form his son, he preceded to lop off the preeminent ears of grain in a neighboring field. Thrasybolous "understood that he must eliminate the preeminent men." (*Politics* BK 3, Chapter 13, 1284b 25-32, and BK 5, Chapter 13, 1311a 19-20).

Assembly and convince the Athenians of the necessity of the Syracusean expedition.

In summary Alcibiades' rejoinder to Socratic or Platonic rationalism is that it fails to understand the "game" or "sport" of moving men. Alcibiades does not deny--and here is where he departs from Machiavelli[43]--the integrity of the ought or "final" end of politics. Alcibiades denies Socrates, and those like him, is a real understanding of the "efficient" foundation on which this final end is built. Jouvenel shows this weakness or blind spot by having Alcibiades challenge Socrates to convince the Athenians of the imprudence of Alcibiades' recommendation. True to the Platonic corpus, Socrates says he lacks this knowledge and is incapable of convincing the assembly. But in a typical Jouvenelian fashion, the "pseudo-Alcibiades" lays out the consequences attendant on this lacuna. Not only will the political philosopher be unable to compete with those who possess this efficient knowledge, but their speech will be used to justify the extension of Power into "new pastures":

> *It lies in the nature of Politics that whatever is proposed as an end to be served, serves as a means to move men, and that the noblest dreams figure jointly with lower motives as the inputs*

[43] *Pure Theory* shows the possibility of an effectual or "representative" critique of classical and medieval political thought separate from Machiavelli's use and abuse of this starting point.

> *available to us movers of men. No matter that my imperial conception of Athens' good seems to you paltry, still it will do as an illustration. It is true that I regard the conquest of Syracuse as good to be sought, it is no less true that this image serves to build up my following: a goal but also a means; and there is nothing that does not become a means in our hands.*[44]

Although this is Alcibiades' final word it is not Jouvenel's. *Pure Theory* outlines two possible solutions to the problems posed by these "movers of men." The first is to wage war against these vigorous personalities and the second is to recruit them. One can see a version of the first route in the political thought of Hobbes and its war against the "vainglorious." But as Jouvenel shows in *Sovereignty* the "babylonian" prescription of *Leviathan* breeds "Icarian" responses: new forms of moral and political fanaticism which presuppose the "alienation" of Babylon.[45]

Unfortunately, the path of recruitment is not without its difficulties. As Lincoln points out in his *Lyceum Address* there are certain individuals whose ambition cannot be satisfied with being the caretaker of established Authority. Recruit such men and before you know it the Reichstag is on fire! What is needed is an authority that

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[44] *Pure Theory*, p. 28.
[45] *Sovereignty*, pp. 328-222.

exercises what Jouvenel calls the "law of conservative exclusion." The aim of this law is to identify ways that exclude those movers of men that would cause "conflict at the level of the set"[46] while allowing men and groups of regulated ambition to flourish.[47]

What is remarkable about Jouvenel's pure theory is it shows that a representative political science leads to a recognition of the centrality of manners.[48] Manners and political civility are shared concerns of political philosophy and a pure theory of politics. In fact, it is here that the reader sees the representative foundations for *Sovereignty*'s political ethics. For Jouvenel the common good is a notion of "indefinite content," indefinite and inexhaustible. And it is this indefinite content that leads to irresolvable disagreements about the common good and provides a dangerous texture to politics. The problem of Babylonian values and Icarean virtues is that each denies this indefinite content. Both claim to have discovered a solution to the political problem. Jouvenel lays out a political science that gives the indefinite or aporetic character of political life its due. By doing so, Jouvenel

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[46] By "set" Jouvenel is referring to any human aggregate or group. A crisis at the level of an aggregate or group is threat to its continued primacy and existence.
[47] *Pure Theory*, pp. 109-117.
[48] *Pure Theory*, pp. 187-203.

points to a path that exists somewhere above what Leo Strauss called the "pit beneath the cave, "a world almost closed to the light of political philosophy and common sense experience and evaluations, and somewhere below what Machiavelli called "imaginary principalities," conceptions of the human good divorced from the unsavory political realities.

In unfolding his dialectical political science, Jouvenel makes philosophy confront the nature of the city and he shows the city that it needs political science in order to preserve itself. Rejecting the nostalgic quest for a "lost treasure" of classical republicanism (Hannah Arendt) he shows that the old gods still rule but most do so in a new city. The challenge for a political science rooted in the phenomena of politics and open to the political good is to be an "effective guardian of civility." The final words of *Pure Theory* capture the nobility and fragility of this charge:

> *That this is no easy task, an image attests: the head and hands of the great guardian Cicero, nailed to the rostrum.*[49]

In the following chapters, I will examine Jouvenel's political science through a critical section-by-section

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[49] *Pure Theory*, p. 212

commentary on *The Pure Theory of Politics* with ancillary references to his other major works. This "difficult, chiseled"[50] book has never been the subject of sustained criticism or commentary. This dissertation will explore Jouvenel's phenomenology of the political world as presented in that ground-breaking book. As Dennis Hale and Marc Landy argue *Pure Theory* work admirably bridges the concerns of political science and political philosophy, antiquity and modernity.[51] It articulates the prospects, and the dangers that accompany, a true "science of society." It therefore provides help for overcoming some of the unhappy divisions that plague the academic study of politics. We will show that Jouvenel understood the strengths--and the considerable limits--of such intellectual approaches as behaviorism and what came to be called communitarianism. We will also show that Jouvenel's constitutionalism or liberalism is explicitly informed by the totalitarian experience: it has learned from the dangerous political experiences of the twentieth century the fragility of the political good and the vulnerability of liberal political communities. Tyranny, civic strife, and the erosion of civility and manners are ever-present political

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[50] Anderson, p. 103.

[51] Dennis Hale and Marc Landy, " Introduction" to *The Nature of Politics: Selected Essays of Bertrand de Jouvenel* (New Brunswick, NJ, *Transaction*, 1992) pp. 25-30.

possibilities that are the flip side of the same capacity that makes social friendship possible: the ability of men to move men. As Daniel Mahoney has written:

> *In our age of unprecedented political pathologies, marked by totalitarian ideologies, an excessive readiness to violence, and a general decline in personal restraint and political consensus, Jouvenel encouraged partisans of liberal democracy to come to terms with the full range of political experience.*[52]

As Jouvenel himself put it in his 1980 essay "Pure Politics Revisited," "I believe that one must return to elementary political phenomena in their raw state in order to learn how to polish them."[53] This work aims to show the fecundity of an approach that recognizes that the "influence of man upon man . . .is the elementary political process" and that this depends "upon their being, in the conscience of both parties, a common stock of beliefs and a similar structure of feelings."[54] Jouvenel bridges the gap between the ancients and the moderns by showing that Political Science is a "natural science dealing with moral agents."[55] As Gerhart Niemeyer wrote in a suggestive early review of the book, *Pure Theory* provides the "prolegomena" of a political

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[52] See Daniel J. Mahoney's Foreword to the Liberty Fund edition of *Pure Theory*, pp. xiii-xiv.
[53] Jouvenel, "Pure Politics Revisited," *Government and Opposition*, Summer/Autumn 1980 (Vol. 15, #314). p. 434. Cited in Mahoney, p. xiv.
[54] *Sovereignty*, p. 368.
[55] *Sovereignty*, p. 368.

theory that is capable of uniting the search for the political good with a hard-headed description of the often unsettling ways in which human beings behave in political settings.[56]

[56] Gerhart Niemeyer, "Political Theory for Whom? Review of *The Pure Theory of Politics* in the *Review of Politics*, Summer 1964, 426-427.

Chapter Two: A Useful Warning to those With Finer Feelings

Leo Strauss famously remarked that modern Political Science "fiddles while Rome burns." Adding insult to injury, he continued: "But it does not know that it is fiddling or that Rome burns." In his own way decidedly modern way Jouvenel agrees.

Strauss and Jouvenel shared the same political milieu, what another contemporary Raymond Aron, has called the "century of total war." Jouvenel came of age intellectually during the events leading up to and culminating in the Second World War. His three master works, what he himself called his "trilogy": *Power*, *Sovereignty*, and *Pure Theory of Politics*, offer the reader a political metaphysic, ethics, and a "representative" or descriptive political science respectively. The end result of these three works is nothing short of a complete rethinking of the tradition of political science.

Pure Theory of Politics, Jouvenel's final installment of the trilogy in political philosophy, offers, I will argue, the best introduction to the main contours of his intellectual project. Jouvenel always begins by stating

what he intends to accomplish with his works and he generally lives up to his promises. For example, Jouvenel says of *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good* that it is an exploratory and suggestive inquiry into the political good. Like Montesquieu, Jouvenel's intention was not to dot all the I's and cross all the T's of his "Inquiry into the Political Good," but to leave some work for his readers. In *Pure Theory* he takes on a much different task. No longer is he the pessimistic historian of *Power* or the aporetic philosopher of *Sovereignty*. Instead, he is the teacher of the political scientist in-the-making, laying forth the basic building blocks of serious political reflection and purposeful action.

A New Language of Politics

The title of the work explains its purpose. Jouvenel looks to the hard science of chemistry--and its distinction between "pure" and "organic" relationships--in order to provide a framework for his political inquiry. Organic chemistry, which is the study of complex relationships, presupposes an understanding of pure chemistry, the basic, the simple, and the elemental foundations of physical chemistry. The noun, "theory," that this adjective modifies

is to be understood in the same way. A theory is a "representative," non-normative model whose purpose is to simulate reality. Its purpose is not to fit our notion of justice but to explain how things happen. Jouvenel however makes clear from the outset that this representative approach does not deny the possibility of political ethics and political philosophy. Rather, for Jouvenel a pure theory is a necessary precondition for an inquiry into the political good and a means by which these goods are discovered, introduced, and defended.

From experience, I can confirm that those who have read *Power* and *Sovereignty* and look forward to the third and final installment, are initially shocked to find such "scientific" categories framing his discussion, and are disturbed that this idiosyncratic work somehow lays the foundation for his preceding, more "organic" political reflections. Initially and superficially it seems that the Thucydidian political historian of *Power*, and the modern day Aristotelian moralist of *Sovereignty*, fell prey to the behavioralist temptation and adopt fashionable and questionable social scientific assumptions that were in vogue at the time of writing of *Pure Theory* (1955-1963).

Fortunately, this initial suspicion is misplaced, and itself points to the very need for a pure theory. For

example, political theory as it exists in political science departments is often not judged by its ability to explain political behavior, but rather consists in competing, independent, and isolated "ideals." Rousseau's Social Contract, Hobbes' Leviathan, Nietzsche's planetary spiritual aristocracy, Aristotle's Best Regime, Christianity's City of God, and Weber's Rechstaat exist side by side and at war; there is no agreed upon and elemental language by which to judge these competing and contradictory normative prescriptions.

Without a common language, one might ask, is it possible to distinguish between ideology and the truth, subjective ideal and science? Jouvenel writes: "Whoever talks about politics calls to mind different listeners, different experiences and different doctrines, and therefore the same assemblage of words a variety of subjective meanings" [12]. What is so interesting to note--and of special importance to those used to seeing a such a description as the preparation for relativism--is that for Jouvenel, a pure theory--the study of fact--does not lead to nihilism. Unlike Weber, recognition of the seemingly

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[1] The book was originally published in English by *Yale* University Press in the United States and later by Cambridge University Press in the United Kingdom in 1963. I will cite references to the 1963 edition of *Pure Theory* internally in the text. A new edition, introduced by Daniel J. Mahoney, was published by Liberty Fund in early 2000.

[2] *Pure Theory*, p. xii.

subjective character of our "values" does not lead Jouvenel to produce a dichotomy of facts and values. Jouvenel focuses on the "unambiguous building blocks" not in order to deny but rather to discern what is true and demonstrable in our valuations.

Pure Theory traces a different path and articulates a new language from the more traditional, or even classically minded, approaches to political science as well as from typical behaviorist political science. Jouvenel's thought warrants the renewed interest and serious study by political theorist and political scientist alike.

The Structure

Jouvenel says that his discussion of the "elements" that compose a pure theory really begins with Part III, sixty-eight pages after he lays forth his principal terms. Part I, the first thirty pages of the book, outlines his reasons for taking this path. It is here that he engages traditional or classical and modern empirical political science, sketching his view of the weaknesses of both and pointing to a third alternative that is built on the foundations of "pure theory." The purpose of Part II is to place the basic element of "man moving man" in its proper

"social setting," the environment within which he is born, comes to age, and eventually acts.

Jouvenel says of Part I:

> *Readers who are impatient, or who are not political scientists, are advised to bypass part I: returning to it after going through the work may then explain the author's intention or help to track down the reasons for the reader's dislike of the treatment."*[3]

But with all due respect, I think his advice should be reversed. It would be best for political scientists to go straight to the third part, and the general reader to read the book from beginning to end. The first two parts engage the various intellectual currents that compose the discipline of political science, calling attention to what Jouvenel considers to be the weakness in each, and outlining the need for a complete restructuring of the discipline. The danger of Jouvenel's approach is that it sparks the pride of those with whom it is trying to convert. On the other hand, newcomers to the field who accept Jouvenel's invitation are given an unparalleled political and philosophic education.

The approach of *Pure Theory* is very much a reversal of *Sovereignty*. In *Sovereignty*, Jouvenel was reticent to put forward his final thoughts, because he wanted to win the

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[3] *Pure Theory*, p. *xii*.

"acceptance of group-building as a factor tending to unify the fields of sociology and politics." Jouvenel then opted against a frontal attack on members and partisans of the disciplines. This, it turns out, is a less exhaustive presentation of the argument of *Pure Theory*. With the final piece of the trilogy completed, *Pure Theory* offers a very clear and frank presentation of his thoughts and purposes.

Pure Theory's Reception

Roger Masters' 1964 review of *Pure Theory* reveals, I believe, the unfortunate reception that Jouvenel's pure theory is destined to receive from traditional-minded political theorists, especially within the Straussian camp[4]. This is unfortunate because--as I will argue--Straussians and their fellow travelers, who deplore the behavioral descent from the "moral pulpit" are the audience most in need of the knowledge that Jouvenel's "pure theory" offers. (We are among those with finer feelings that are in need of a useful warning.)

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[4] See Roger Masters' "Toward a Reunion in a Science of Politics" *Yale Review* (Autumn 1964) Vol. LIV, No.1. In the *Review of Politics* and the *American Political Science Review* respectively, the conservative political theorist Gerhart Niemayer and Rene de Visme Williamson also expressed perplexity with the book's oscillation between traditional and modern approaches. But their criticism was much more respectful and less dismissive than Masters'.

According to Masters, *Pure Theory* is a "disturbing book almost from the outset;" "lamentably weak" in its presentation of the classical view; informed by "a rather unfortunate formulation of man's essentially social nature." In his view its "shortcomings ...unfortunately outweigh its merits." In a word, Masters arrives at a very different judgment about the intellectual merits of *Pure Theory* than I do.

To give weight to Masters' conclusions it should be noted that he believes Jouvenel's objective to transcend the "sectarian controversy" that characterizes the discipline of political science to be a noble and necessary one, and he initially believed that Jouvenel had the necessary talent for the task. According to Masters: "behavioral political scientists tend to forget that their discipline is an ancient one, while the students of the great political philosophers, insofar as they cut themselves off from the study of current politics betray a component of the tradition they seek to maintain." Jouvenel would agree wholeheartedly.

Unfortunately, this agreement regarding the ultimate goal of bridging the differences between the normativist and empiricist approaches breaks down immediately, in large part because Jouvenel's pure theory calls for a major

overhaul of classical theory. In his preface of *Pure Theory*, Jouvenel says of Political Science:

> *The field has been settled by immigrants from philosophy, theology, law, and later by sociology and economics, each group bringing and using its own box of tools.*[5]

It should also be noted that Jouvenel's work is very much a critique of the behavioral approach as well. While the students of a more classical or traditional approach might see only Jouvenel's critique of their own school, it is also very different from anything the supposedly 'scientific' school would call their own. For example, how many empiricists look to the genius of Thucydides and Shakespeare to understand the "drama of politics" as does Jouvenel? The urbanity, grace, range and depth of Jouvenel's writing, which gave Masters such "high hopes" at the outset, have the opposite effect on the behavioral camp. While empiricists might like his description of the terms that frame his inquiry, as well as the critique he makes of what goes by the title "theory" in the discipline of political science, what Jouvenel's "representative" science discovers is a very different reality from what typical behaviorist see.

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[5] *Pure Theory*, p. 10.

Since one of Masters' charges is that Jouvenel is incapable of suspending "value judgments"--a habit of mind that Master's finds both praiseworthy but contradictory to Jouvenel's stated goal of achieving a description or "representative" starting point for political analysis, and a high sin among empiricists--it is important to see what Jouvenel has to say about what a factual approach to politics demands. According to Jouvenel, "Light can be cast on the matter [the nature of political science] only if we reject that the scientist can and should be soulless."[6] The political scientist cannot be an "ethical eunuch," because by doing so he closes himself off from understanding the nuanced ways in which men move one another.

Masters is right on one key point: Jouvenel's book is certainly "disturbing" from the outset. But it is so for only some of the reasons that he cites. In our view, *Pure Theory* is disturbing because it represents a complete rethinking of the tradition and by doing so it is destined to disturb the "dogmatic slumber" of all the respective partisans within political science.

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[6] *Pure Theory*, p. 34.

The Drama of Politics

In his opening essay, *Configuration and Dynamics*, Jouvenel outlines the focus and players in what he calls the "Drama of Politics."

To understand the drama of politics we need to look beyond the study of configuration, "where different things stand in relationship with each other," and focus on dynamic factors that build, push, circumvent and rip down political authority and dot the social scene. Jouvenel from the outset makes a distinction between the "practical" and a form of the "theoretical" that certainly is intended to provoke. While he sees the utility and continued importance of practical configurations--"practical politicians have ever need of accurate and detailed knowledge of the actual map, as a guide to efficient action"--he does denigrate "theoretical writers" and their "ideal" maps that are rooted in "some principle." [7] These ideal configurations contribute little to "efficient action." So, within the first two pages Jouvenel sides with the study of dynamics over the study of configuration, and those within the study of configuration who are practical against the more theoretical and principle-driven. In doing so, Jouvenel

[7] *Pure Theory*, p. 4.

appears to side with Machiavelli's "effectual" critique of "imaginary principalities."

Jouvenel takes these positions toward these "immigrants" because his starting point is not the political system or an ideal, but the "practical politician." For Jouvenel, while the "future is present in the mind of an acting man," the acting man and his concerns are not the focus of the discipline today.[8] *Pure Theory* is an attempt to refocus the study of politics along these lines. It is therefore not surprising that Masters would not like the conjugation that Jouvenel is putting forward. Those who want political science departments to include the study of "Great Books" seem to get squeezed out from the outset, and the utility of the political actor becomes the measure of all things.

It would be understandable but wrong to see Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* as putting the Machiavellian project back on track with its emphasis on the "effectual truth." While, like the *Prince, Pure Theory* is a short book, well-written, and useful to those who might like to a found a small group that had nefarious ambitions, its purpose is revealed in its title--to articulate a pure theory that can bring rigor and coherence to the study of politics. While the "acting

[8] *Pure Theory*, p. 10.

man" is the subject matter of pure theory Jouvenel does not "worship" such men and their deeds. In fact, he says at numerous times that he deplores many of them as men who are "better to meet in the pages of a history book than in person." The political actor is not then the measure of political history, but rather its cause.

While he deprecates the utility of "ideal maps," his use of Shakespeare and Thucydides tells us that he not a philistine and that great works figure into his political science. It also is some evidence that he is not a historicist. Jouvenel looks at these classical authors because there is a permanent "transhistorical" link between them and us. And not only can we learn from these great authors, but their very distance, the fact that they are old, frees us from the emotions that would rise from ripping one's subject matter from the headlines or from the ideological preoccupations of our time.

Shakespeare's and Thucydides' work provides a stage on which we can view this elemental human drama of "man moving man." In addition, much like the natural history of *On Power,* it allows the elemental activity of man moving man to be viewed stereotopically--in light of, but also separate from, the opinions men hold about it. To be sure, it allows us to hear Bolingbroke's, Brutus', or Nicias'

explanation of why they took a particular course of action. But more importantly, it allows us to witness the "long sequence of actions" they must deploy to bridge the "vast gap" that separates their goals and their actualization.

The common denominator of this science, which is "man moving man," is not reductionistic. Jouvenel makes a key distinction between his pure theory and other attempts at providing a simple key to unlock the complexity of politics:

> *The spirit of this study would be completely misunderstood if I were thought to offer a grand simplification of Politics considered globally. Such is not my intention, nor is it an intention that I sympathize with when it inspires other authors. Politics seems to me extraordinarily complex: attempts to reduce it to simplicity I regard as misleading and dangerous. It is precisely because political phenomena are so complex that I attempt to reach down to the simple components. But the picture that I shall try to offer of the elements should not be 'blown-up' to serve as a picture of the whole.* [9]

What are these "simple components" that are to be used to unpack complexity? We have already been introduced to the "smallest identifiable component of any political event," the moving of man by man. Jouvenel identifies three different kinds of "instigation" and "response."[10]

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[9] *Pure Theory*, p. 11.
[10] *Pure Theory*, p. 10.

The first, the man who enlists the contributory energies of another is called an "instigator." This notion of instigator is very broad and encompasses all of mankind. The very activity of life requires that we enlist the activities of others at every turn. "Pass the salt," "could you hold that for me," as well as "follow me" are examples of instigation.

He gives the name "operator" to those who enlist the contributory actions of others to bring about a future event of his choosing. The operator is an instigator with a plan, someone with a future event in mind, who then works backward and figures out what concrete steps he has to take and contributory actions he must enlist in order to achieve the object of his choosing.

Those "operators" who have a habitual following that are responsive to their instigations, Jouvenel tags "entrepreneurs." It is this latter type who is the creator of what Jouvenel calls in *Sovereignty* an aggregate, a group. The ability to create an aggregate he identifies as an "essential freedom" of mankind and its widespread presence a mark of a regime of political liberty. It is important to note that the instigator, the operator, and entrepreneur can refer to instigations that are not political in the ordinary sense of the term. The

entrepreneur can refer to the leader of a trade union, or Girl Scout pack, as well as the head of a political party. Jouvenel's notion of the "political" thus will be broader or more capacious than ordinarily thought.

Unlike other putatively scientific or natural starting points, Jouvenel's categories do not reduce the natural complexity inherent in politics but on the contrary prepare the mind both to recognize as well as order it. By being able to spot the simplest links, we are given a key to unlock the complex chains of human events. Such an approach not only prepares students to be attentive to the various forms of instigation, it breaths new meaning into the study of great books. In reading Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* we see Cassius as an instigator who, while he has designs for Caesar's death, must enlist an "entrepreneur' like Brutus because he lacks a group that is habitually responsive to his will. In the person of Marc Antony we see a rival entrepreneur who shows that even the best laid plans are fraught with danger.

Jouvenel employs great historians and playwrights for help in developing the habits of mind that make one attentive to the elemental forces at work in human and political life. The playwright and historian are "purer" reporters of the phenomena of politics. But the great works

of political philosophy also have an important place within Jouvenel's trilogy generally and *Pure Theory* specifically.[11] For example, while Masters thinks Jouvenel's writing on Rousseau is superb, he is less than satisfied--to say the least--with the treatment Rousseau gets in the pages of *Pure Theory*. [12] But *Pure Theory* is a self-conscious part of a larger intellectual project. For those who find Jouvenel's treatment of Plato and Rousseau superficial, they should look to Jouvenel's *Sovereignty* to see the breath and depth of Jouvenel's knowledge of the works of political philosophy. *Sovereignty* I would argue shows how a pure theory is put in the service of true inquiry into the nature of political good, whose product is factual in its composition. However, we should not let Jouvenel's fuller treatment of Rousseau elsewhere stand in the way of what he is saying about Rousseau and other philosophic writers. *Pure Theory* articulates the grammar by which these rival "ideals" that make up the discipline of political philosophy can be diagramed and studied.

Briefly, what can a pure theory bring to the study of human ideas and "ideals"? The essential link that connects

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[11] We are not suggesting that Shakespeare the poet and Thucydides the historian are political philosophers per se. But there is strong evidence that their more "stereo-topic" approach is close to the hallmark of good political philosophy.
[12] Masters' *Yale Review*, p. 131.

these ideals is "man moving men." Everywhere we find man, be he Rousseau's Hottentots, Thucyidides' Greeks, or Shakespeare's Romans or English, we find him conceiving designs and enlisting the energies of others towards their actualization. The man that Jouvenel builds his pure theory on is a social animal that possesses a tongue, a mind, a heart, and a stomach. This amalgam is very unique.

Jouvenel's project is certainly not modern in any recognizable sense of the term, since as an intellectual project modernity appears dedicated to ripping the tongues out of men's mouths and reduces our sociality to a product of convention. But it is not simply classical either. To be sure, for Aristotle man is a political animal who uses *logos*, reasoned speech, which Aristotle locates in a certain type of political formation, the City. Jouvenel's understanding of man is more general, emphasizing the social affections as well as man's capacity for rational political reflection, and it is not tied to any specific political form. One might even call it Thomistic or Christian but not without adding that it allows a place for more modern forms of compassion, not to mention man's desire for creature comforts and the fear of violent death. Thus one might say that nothing human appears alien to this elemental starting point, in part because his elemental

description exists as thoroughly independent from any ideal political form.

The Pseudo-Alcibiades

Jouvenel's "Wisdom & Activity: *Pseudo-Alcibiades*:"[13] is a critique of Platonic political philosophy presented in Plato's own terms, i.e. in the form of a dialogue. Unlike Plato's *Alcibiades*, Jouvenel's *Pseudo-Alcibiades* provides an apology or rejoinder to the Platonic apology for Socratic "wisdom" and critique of action. Jouvenel, while the author of the dialogue, writes the dialogue from the perspective of a "lieutenant" of Alcibiades' army. In doing so Jouvenel creates a dialogue between the partisans of wisdom and the partisans of "activity." The dramatic backdrop for this exchange between Socrates and Alcibiades, wisdom and activity, is Athens immediately before Alcibiades is to enter the Athenian Assembly and *convince* the Athenians of the necessity of the Syracusean expedition--the political event that precipitated Athens' slide from greatness. Jouvenel does not create this dialogue to put new words in Plato's Socrates' mouth--in fact his presentation of the Socratic criticism of

[13] *Pure Theory*, pgs. 14-28.

Alcibiades is true to the spirit of the Platonic original--a critique that Jouvenel for the most part agrees with. However, Jouvenel does give Alcibiades a powerful argument against classical rationalism and its understanding of the proper relationship of wisdom and activity. It is would be a mistake to confuse Jouvenel's understanding of this relationship with that of argument he puts in the mouth of his Alcibiades. Jouvenel uses Alcibiades to bring to light the challenge that activity poses to wisdom, a challenge that Jouvenel thinks the Platonic position did not adequately confront.

In summary Alcibiades' rejoinder to Socratic or Platonic rationalism is that it fails to understand the "game" or "sport" of moving men. Interestingly, Alcibiades does not deny the integrity of the *ought* or "final" end of politics of which Socrates has knowledge. With the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" we see a paring back of Wisdom and its "Ideals" by Activity without the Machiavellian transvaluation of values. Jouvenel's Alcibiades admits: "It may be true that you possess the most important part, but it is an inefficient part." [14] What he does deny Socrates and those like him, is the "efficient" foundation on which this final

[14] *Pure Theory*, p. 21.

end is built. As a result Alcibiades has an indispensable power and knowledge that Socratic rationalism lacks.

While both Alcibiades and Socrates are entrepreneurs, the groups that they habitually enlist are of two very different types. The dialogic community of Socrates operates on much different principles, and is occupied with much different types of men than that of the assembly. These are two very different types of dialogic communities, and Alcibiades is happy to show how they are different.

According to Alcibides, Socrates is half right when he compares the statesmen's art to weaving the "warp thread of individual lives and conduct" into a harmonious pattern. Certainly, Alcibiades is a master weaver but weaving men's actions is not like weaving warped wool. Men do not lend themselves passively to another's design--they are a special kind of warped wool that recoils and wiggles like "serpents." The political entrepreneur is a very unique artisan. To bind all these individuals in a common action takes a "spell binder, " of which Alcibiades, and not Socrates, is the prototype.[15]

Because this is not an easy activity, and because there are rival spellbinders with their competing patterns, the political entrepreneur does not have the luxury of

[15] *Pure Theory*, p. 24.

simply listening to the direction of reason. With the material of their enterprise wiggling about and with a tendency to always go with another weaver, it is a luxury one cannot afford. In addition, Alcibiades brings up the issue of the entrepreneur's pride. Why should an "entrepreneur" who possesses such skill that the philosopher lacks put his art in the service of the philosopher's design? Let the philosopher weave his own design.

According to the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" Socrates *could* acquire this efficient art of moving men if he wished. The dialogue explores Socrates' reasons for refusing to acquire it. According to Alcibiades, the life of Wisdom, the life of the "entrepreneur" Socrates, is dedicated to driving men through argument away from crude notions of the good. The life of Activity, of Alcibiades, see these incomplete, contradictory and partisan notions of the good as data to be used to move the people toward the political entrepreneur's advantage.[16]

While this seems to be an apology for Socrates, it is, in fact, shown to be a tragic one.[17] The "Pseudo-Alcibiades"

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[16] *Pure Theory*, p. 25.

[17] For Jouvenel, both Socrates and Alcibiades are tragic figures. Socrates' tragedy lies in his unwillingness to continue the turn that bears his name by examining the "efficient" prerequisites of how men move each other through speech. Rather than being an obstacle to the

ends with Alcibiades' challenge to Socrates to convince the Athenians of the imprudence of Alcibiades' recommendation. True to the Platonic corpus, Socrates says he lacks this knowledge and is incapable of convincing the assembly. But in a typical Jouvenelean fashion, the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" lays out the consequences that are attendant upon this lacuna. Not only will the political philosopher be unable to compete with those who possess this efficient knowledge, but their "inefficient" speech, their "ideals" will be used to justify the extension of Power into "new pastures:"

> *It lies in the nature of Politics that whatever is proposed as an end to be served, serves as a means to move men, and that the noblest dreams figure jointly with the lower motives as the inputs available to us movers of men. No matter that my imperial conception of Athens' good seems to you paltry, still it will do as an illustration. It is true that I regard the conquest of Syracuse as good to be sought, it is no less true that this image serves to build up my following: a goal but also a means; and there is nothing that does not become a means in our hands.*[18]

In light of this point, Masters' suggestion that the *Republic* serve as the frame for a discussion of wisdom and activity seems to overlook the fact that Jouvenel's

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philosophic life, such an understanding is a prerequisite for the activity of philosophizing. Without such an understanding, philosophy risks becoming literary or utopian. Also, tragedy implies that things could be different: Aristotle's *Politics*, *Ethics*, and *Rhetoric* show that one can take this turn without giving up the life of philosophy.

[18] *Pure Theory*, p. 28.

conclusion also takes issue with this more mature reflection. Plato's *Republic* is exactly the type of "new pastures" Alcibiades and his kind are looking for. The *Republic* too easily serves an invitation to those who possess the efficient art of moving man to overcome the political limitations that stand in the way of actualizing the "just" and "philosophic" longings that animate Glaucon's heart and mind.

The Nature of Political Science

Although this is the final word of the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" it is not de Jouvenel's. In the next and final chapter of Part I, "The Nature of Political Science," Jouvenel puts forward his account of why the tradition--starting from Socrates and stretching to the present--has not developed the "efficient" science of politics. In the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" we have already received a statement of the reasons, but the "Nature of Political Science" completes the thought. It is within this essay that Jouvenel lays down the reasons for his departure from

classical political philosophy as well as his difference from the so-called behavioral approach.[19]

Jouvenel begins his examination by asking what is the cause of the "unique texture" of political life and thought? The short and fecund answer is: danger. Political action, while it is the source of great social benefits, also is capable of doing great harm. For Jouvenel,

> *This feeling of danger is widespread in human society and has always haunted all but the more superficial authors: very few have, like Hobbes, brought it into to the open; it has hovered in the background, exerting an invisible but effective influence upon their treatment of the subject; it may be responsible for the strange and unique texture of political science.*[20]

Jouvenel's call for a pure theory puts him in the camp of the "very few" who bring the feeling of danger front and center. One could note that Jouvenel in the conclusion of the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" not only gave an apology for Socrates, he seems to have opened the door for Hobbes as well. The final words of the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" show that, when the political entrepreneurs do open their ears to the voice of political philosophy, it is to use their "ideals" as means to extend their power. This is Hobbes' teaching about the "vainglorious." The good is just a mask for

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[19] *Pure Theory*, pp. 29-40.
[20] *Pure Theory*, p. 29.

power. It is perhaps for this reason that Jouvenel singles out Hobbes by name.

Jouvenel differs from Hobbes in very fundamental ways.[21] The key difference is that Jouvenel, unlike Hobbes, is not an enemy of what he calls "emergent authorities" and the vigorous personalities that drive them. For Jouvenel, the entrepreneur who creates a group and has on retainer a body of men habitually responsive to his calling, is a constitutive part of political life, whose presence--although potentially dangerous--is as natural to political life as the presence of air to fire. For Hobbes, fear of the dangerous "texture" and the vainglorious individuals who bring it about, call for the "Leviathan," the secular state that serves as a "Lord over the Children of Pride."

Jouvenel's approach is more measured and also more willing to accept the permanence of danger. He sees the political entrepreneur as a constitutive part of political life, the cause of both good and bad, and the centerpiece of factual political reflection. For Jouvenel, the task and challenge of political science is to avoid the pitfalls that mark both Platonic and Hobbesean political reflections. A measured political philosophy ought to avoid giving Power "new pastures" and ought not to foster the

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[21] *Sovereignty* pp. 279-298.

belief that it is ever possible to "exorcise" such vigorous personalities out of political life. This is the political problem that wisdom must face if it is going to mitigate the danger poised by the realm of unrestrained Activity.

Jouvenel's final words in "Configuration and Dynamics" capture the nature of his enterprise:

> *Tragedy occurs when processes, naturally diffuse throughout the body politic, acquire a concentration, an intensity, a polarization which affords them an explosive power. Nothing then is more important to the guardians of the body politic than to understand the nature of these processes, so that they may be guided to irrigate and precluded from flooding.*[22]

Jouvenel's "guardian of the body politic" is very different from Hobbes "Leviathan." The political science of Hobbes', to use the language of Machiavelli, attempts to "dike and dam"--to expel outside of political life--the vigorous personalities which foster and feed on polarization. Jouvenel believes that this is neither possible nor desirable, and his political science instead sets its sights on "guiding" the discipline on how the social stream can be kept "irrigated," and in so doing show how the possibility of tragedy can be mitigated.

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[22] *Pure Theory*, p. 13.

In *On Power*[23], Jouvenel tells the story of the two Gracchi and the two Roosevelts to show how politics, like rivers, are flooded when "social" gluts are left unattended. Both the Roman and the American republics faced a regime crisis and an alternative. On the one hand they could deliberately open themselves to emerging authorities. In case of Rome having the Roman patriciate open itself up as a class and absorb plebeian "strivers" would have done this. In the American context, since it lacked a titled aristocracy, the challenge was to adapt its agrarian notion of contract and property rights to new realities of an industrial society. The alternative to opening up the political process to strivers is what Jouvenel calls "policy of free bread." In both cases, because of a failure on the part of the existing authorities to pay attention to growing social pressures and take the necessary steps to "irrigate" them in a manner consistent with its regime principle, an enterprising entrepreneur of the same family took each regime on a very different path. The younger Gracchus and Roosevelt certainly succeeded in removing the impediments that blocked the social stream of their day. However, they did so in a manner that substantially changed the nature and direction of the stream itself. The older

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[23] *Power*, pp. 367-370.

Gracchus and Roosevelt, wanted keep the social stream flowing in the same direction; their namesakes wanted to substantially change the direction of the stream.

While this project has a classical resonance to it, the means by which the social gluts are recognized and responded to, are not, according to Jouvenel, to be readily found in classical political science and philosophy. It should be noted that the first Gracchus is not a political scientist, but a "political entrepreneur"--albeit of a much more noble stock than Alcibiades or his cousin. Neither Teddy nor Franklin Roosevelt were political scientists or philosophers, but they were able to see and respond (positively or negatively) to emerging social gluts.

The "representative" political science that Jouvenel is articulating has taken Alcibiades up on his challenge and has made the "efficient" art of politics a central concern of political science. A virtue of Jouvenel is that he neither thinks nor writes in a vacuum. His trilogy shares this in common with Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*: it is composed of a series of dialogues within treatises. He readily cites both those who are generally critical and those in favor of political science taking a new behaviorist road and distinguishes himself from each.

Jouvenel agrees with Leo Strauss and Irving Kristol that a representative science naturally undermines a prescriptive science.[24] For example, a "prescriptive science" (which classical political philosophy offers) expresses itself in the following manner: "You cannot do X" (the ideal of law), and "This is what is done" (right example). A factual study of behaviors undermines these "salutatory prestiges" by showing that "you can" and that those who do often succeed. It also shows the reverse: good men who take their bearings by prescriptive political science sometimes come to ruin. The virtue of Jouvenel's factual presentation of the weakness of merely prescriptive science is that it does not deny that the good exists but places the good in its empirical or worldly setting. A proper political and philosophic education includes both the *ought* and the *is*, the prescriptive and the factual. Certainly, this mix lacks the purity of the adulterated "prescriptive" position, but the mix, because it is built on a recognition of the factual in all its dimensions, protects the good from those who would use factual insight beyond its due.

Jouvenel is quite aware that a factual science is dangerous for men of weak constitutions but he sees the

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[24] *Pure Theory*, p. 34.

necessity of going public with this teaching. Many might say (and I believe that they would be correct) that the classical political philosophers were well aware of this contrast but believed it morally and politically corrosive to publicly state the harsh facts of political life. Political philosophy is not only the philosophic study of politics, it is the politic expression of its findings, as Leo Strauss insisted. But if political philosophy is inherently dangerous then why formulate a pure theory? Jouvenel's answer is that those with the weakest moral constitutions are unfortunately the ones who most fully possess and utilize this knowledge. Therefore, those with "finer feelings" need such knowledge if they are to be in a position to protect their communities against the subversive activities of the unscrupulous.

What is so interesting is that Jouvenel portrays the behavioral descent from the "moral pulpit" that Strauss and Irving Kristol abhor, and Robert Dahl praises, as a necessary first step--a baby step--in the right direction toward a political science that catches up with what is well known outside the profession. Evidence of this is that Jouvenel's call for behavioral studies includes the study of "strong" behavior, the rare or extreme circumstances, instead of "weak" or general behavior. Voting behavior is

an example of "weak" behavioral studies beloved by mainstream political scientists. Such studies show that the electorate is apathetic. But such a reality begs the question: what opportunity does this apathy create? To the great distress of the moralists, Jouvenel shows the great opportunity that this creates for organized minority initiatives to push their will beyond what their numbers would seem to allow. Later in *Pure Theory*, in a chapter titled, "The Team Against the Committee" Jouvenel painstakingly details the concrete steps by which those who have an interest or will outside of established authority are able to overcome the obstacles--physical as well moral--that stand in the way of the actualization of their will.[25]

Jouvenel thinks that the behaviorist approach "fiddles" but wants to show how a genuinely behavioral approach might use its instrument or fiddle well. Jouvenel highlights and makes explicit the laws or science of moving men for the same reason Aristotle shows how tyranny is established and maintained in Book V of the *Politics*. Since the Perianderian (i.e realpolitik) aspects of politics are only a secret to "those with finer feelings," *Pure Theory* forces those who have traditionally sought to moralize politics to confront all of the ways by which men move men.

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[25] *Pure Theory*, pgs. 176-186.

Politics has a certain character or nature that must be grasped if the moral art is to be successful. As the "Pseudo-Alcibiades" is meant to show, political entrepreneurs have frequently had a greater insight than the theorists into the efficient or factual side of the discipline. By refocusing the discipline to be attentive to its "representative" foundations, Jouvenel gives those who are at present victims of forces they do not understand, the knowledge necessary to be effective advocates of their concerns.

Finally, for Jouvenel, knowing that there is a tension between the factual and prescriptive, and siding with the prescriptive over the factual, is not enough. "[T]o civilize power, to impress the brute, improve its manners, and harness it to salutary tasks," political science needs to know Alcibiades' "efficient" art or science of moving men. To show that this is not simply an issue of presentation Jouvenel makes the following statement, which frames the conclusion of the "Nature of Political Science":

> *It has been suggested here that recognition of the dangers inherent in political activity may have held up the progress of scientific inquiry in Politics; but however important this factor, it can hardly serve as a full explanation. A useful complement is suggested by comparison*

> *with medical science: a comparison current since the days of Plato.*[26]

For Jouvenel the "full explanation" is that the classical approach to the study of politics, like its approach to medicine, was conceptually flawed, because it stayed at a level of high generality and did not effectively direct our attention to the political "microbes" that undermine the body politic. For Jouvenel this classical emphasis on political health is not built on what he calls a true "metaphysic of Power," which includes not only an understanding of these smaller microbes but also of the nature of government authority and of the men who occupy these seats of command. Often it unwittingly fosters political millenarianism. For Jouvenel,

> *Even worse is our picking upon some body politic distant in time and using it as our model of health. This leads for instance to the ludicrous mistake of the French Jacobins who wanted to build a Sparta, ignoring that it had wrested upon extreme social inequality, its renowned 'equals' forming but a minute fraction of the whole population.*[27]

Jouvenel finds it encouraging for his view of political science that the microscope proved so helpful to the study of physiology. "Physiology can hardly be said to start

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[26] *Pure Theory*, p. 38.
[27] *Pure Theory*, p. 40.

before Harvey (b. 1578), when medicinal science was twenty centuries old."[28]. Like Strauss' description of modern political science this is not a kind apologetic. It may have been the case that classical medicine had to wait for the discovery of the microscope to learn that many illnesses were not the product of derangement in natural harmony but the "intrusion of minute agents," but did the study of politics need to wait so long? Jouvenel began his discussion by stating that,

> *There are no objects to which our attention is so naturally drawn as to our own fellows. It takes a conscious purpose to watch birds or ants, but we cannot fail to watch other men, with whom we are inevitably associated, whose behavior is so important to us that we need to foresee it, and who are sufficiently like us to facilitate our understanding of their actions. Being a man, which involves living with other men, therefore involves observing men. And the knowledge of men could be called the most fairly distributed of all the knowledges since each one of us may acquire it according to his willingness and capacity.*[29]

As it turns out one does not need a special lens or key to see and analyze Jouvenel's main characters and culprits. In its own way, Jouvenel's "pure theory' builds on the common sense foundations of politics. Political life comes ready

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[28] *Pure Theory*, p. 39.
[29] *Pure Theory*, pp. 29-30.

with its own laboratory and microscope. What stands in its way is a very old interpretation as well as some new ones.

Jouvenel, like those before him, wants to mitigate the danger that provides political life with its unique texture, but unlike most he resists the temptation to legislate away this reality. For Jouvenel the common good is neither groundless nor determined once and for all, and it is the responsibility of a true science of man to do justice to this reality. What is unique about Jouvenel's pure theory is it shows that a representative political science leads to the recognition of the centrality of manners.[30] For Jouvenel laws and institutional relationships are only as good as the public spirit of its citizens and its government. The cultivation of manners and political civility are shared concerns of political philosophy and a pure theory of politics.

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[30] *Pure Theory*, pp. 187-203.

Chapter Three:

How a Screaming Bundle of Flesh Becomes a Political Man

After exposing the weakness of "Theory" as traditionally understood and practiced within the disciplines of political science and political philosophy, Jouvenel does *not* immediately turn his attention to giving a thorough presentation of "man moving man." One more step must to be taken before turning to that daunting task. He must describe the social setting that gives birth to, nurtures, shelters, educates and restrains this elemental actor and activity. For those who saw difficulties in Jouvenel's use of the language and categories of "science" in Part I of *Pure Theory*, Part II is evidence that he is not unaware of their concern.

While we do not know where atoms come from--some say God, others a cosmic accident, a big bang--we do know how man comes into being. The first sentence of the first chapter of Part II, entitled "Of Man", reads: "Man appears, a screaming bundle of flesh, the outcome of mating."[1] Man arrives on the scene in desperate need of others to sustain him. He is not an independent atom or a solitary individual. He is a child born to parents who are parts of

[1] *Pure Theory*, p. 43.

the vast social complex that Jouvenel calls "Otherdom." The purpose of Part II is to describe the relationship that an individual "ego" has with the larger "Otherdom." For Jouvenel, to truly understand how "man moves man" we must understand the process by which a "screaming bundle of flesh" becomes a Political Man--an agent capable of enlisting the contributory actions of others.

In the Beginning

Part II is titled, "Setting: Ego in Otherdom" and consists of three parts: "Of Man," "Home" and "Otherdom." A child--a newly born and gradually maturing ego--is the character to watch. Why does Jouvenel take a "developmental" route, tracking the birth of a child within the home to his first day of school--a child's first contact with "Otherdom?" Jouvenel's answer: "Many intellectual delusions dissolve if one cleaves to the simple truth that we begin our lives as infants."[2] Jouvenel's developmental presentation of a child coming of age again demonstrates the fecundity of his starting point, which has wide-reaching implications for the study of human nature and politics. In contrast to Roger Masters, who

[2] *Pure Theory*, p. 45.

dismissed Part II of *Pure Theory* as "a rather unfortunate formulation of man's essentially social nature," we will show the pertinence and depth of Jouvenel's presentation.

Let us begin with the "screaming bundle of flesh," Jouvenel's factual starting point. A child is born "utterly helpless," "his means of survival are provided by others," he is "slow in reaching adulthood" and the degree to which he reaches adulthood is predicated on the prior existence of "a lasting society to afford protection"[3]. Jouvenel presents our social nature as first and foremost rooted in need, which is the most elemental proof that an observed characteristic is natural. Without the active aid and constant concern of others, a child dies. All of us entered into this world utterly lacking the capacity to provide for even our most basic needs. Of all God's creatures man is the slowest in achieving self-sufficiency in this regard.[4] And this chain of dependence does not just connect us to our parents. Our parents--lest we forget--were once children too, as were their parents down the line. Also,

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[3] *Pure Theory*, p. 43.

[4] Interestingly, Jouvenel shows that this early, natural and prolonged need that we have of others is what is responsible for mankind's initial lordship over the animal kingdom as well as the progressive and dynamic character of human societies. For Jouvenel, the length of time that a society keeps its young in training for adulthood provides an independent variable for judging how dynamic and progressive a society is. The longer time of preparation, the more complex, dynamic and "progressive" the social world he will enter.

this chain of dependence includes those outside our direct bloodline, what Jouvenel calls the members of "the group." While a child is born of parents, Man does not enter the historical scene until the formation of the group. It is here that the "tuition," the physical, moral and social education of our species and thus progress, occurs. The "state of nature" might very well be "poor, nasty, brutish and short" but it is most assuredly not solitary. Child rearing--the "first principle of political and social evolution"--occurs not in isolation, but within a group and the "common knowledge" and "protection" that a "lasting society" affords.[5] In a note Jouvenel writes, "Pride, all too often impedes us from recognizing what we have 'found out for ourselves' constitutes but an infinitesimal part of our knowledge, almost all of which has been given to us by

[5] While it would be improper to take the various "state of nature" teachings literally–be they Judeo-Christian or its modern rivals–Jouvenel's more anthropological and historically accurate portrayal of mankind's beginnings provides the student of political philosophy with a perspective that calls attention to the limitations that are attendant to these types of moral, political and social narratives. I am aware that properly speaking that there is no Judeo-Christian state of nature teaching–there is a story of the Garden of Eden–which the state of nature thinkers rewrote without God or the natural law. While painfully aware of what is lost, I believe there is some merit in using the state of nature language of the early moderns. For at odds are two warring anthropological notions, one with God and natural limits and one without. Since the only standard for judging the two outside of faith is nature, what is needed is a dialogical and factual engagement with these two rival accounts of man's origins.

society."[6] [7] As we hope to indicate, Jouvenel's political science does not suffer from this unfounded Pride.

Independent Man: An Intellectual Monstrosity

As we saw in Part I, Jouvenel emphasizes that classical political science must take on a more "effectual" perspective and create a political science that is capable of bringing the *ought*--the common good--out of the *is*--the competing, fractious, and incommensurable claims of political life. His work explicitly criticizes, while building upon the insights of, classical political science. For those who thought modern political science got off too lightly in Part I, modern political philosophy, particularly the doctrine of the state of nature and social contract theory, is subject to thoroughgoing criticism in Part II of *Pure Theory*. The purpose of Part II is to moderate the pride that surrounds the modern understanding of man's natural independence. The tone of this engagement is not polite, as the following quotation will attest, but it is well reasoned and crafted with strategic intent:

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[6] *Pure Theory*, p. 44.

[7] To see how utterly dependent man is on common knowledge, try to fix any of the gadgets that make our modern life so productive and independent, or better go out into the wilderness and leave all trappings of civilization behind. On this point see Thomas Sowell, *Knowledge and Decisions* (New York: Basic Books,1998).

> *Man is to be regarded as arising out of group protection and group tuition: but for the former he would not live, but for the latter he would not acquire the traits of humanity. Such obvious remarks should dispel the fantasy of Individual Man striding about in Nature and deciding deliberately to come to terms with his fellows. This is an intellectual monstrosity: it assumes a certain agent, full-grown and competent to fend for himself, while assuming away the conditions of his production. This agent freely joins forces with others: what forces? Those due to the nurture within the social nest.*
>
> *'Social contract' theories are views of childless men who must have forgotten their childhood. Society is not founded like a club. One can ask how the hardy, roving adults pictured could imagine the advantages of society to be, had they not enjoyed the benefits of a solidarity in being throughout their growing period; or how the could they feel bound by mere exchanges of promises, if the notion of obligation had not been built up within them by group existence.*[8]

Why does Jouvenel adopt such a polemical tone toward the architects of modernity? He does so because he is convinced that the state of nature doctrine is strictly speaking unbelievable. To be sure, Jouvenel does not share any nostalgia for the old regime or for pre-modern politics in general. But he does not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Jouvenel wants to retain the best fruits of the liberal order while challenging its self-destructive

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[8] *Pure Theory*, p. 45.

conceptual underpinnings. His central notion of man moving man is, of course, not limited to liberal, commercial, dynamic and progressive societies. But such a social state provides the largest and most just stage for this elemental drama and its attendant benefits to manifest themselves. Jouvenel sees much truth and justice in the "liberty of the moderns" without wholeheartedly accepting the anthropology that undergirds modern liberal practice. Elsewhere Jouvenel defines liberal society or liberalism in terms of the opportunity for widespread initiative.[9] While there is a temptation in the state to monopolize initiatives within modern societies, modern progressive societies allow a degree of diversity unthinkable to pre-modern politics.

Strauss's influential and nuanced thesis on "The Three Waves of Modernity" provides a possible insight into Jouvenel's motives.[10] Strauss argues that the early modern starting point, building on a too narrow of an understanding of the nature of man, sows the seeds for the further radicalizations of modernity by those wanting to recover a place for certain essential dimensions of human experience that modern political life and philosophy ignore. It is important to note that each of these

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[9] *Sovereignty*, p. 364.

[10] See Leo Strauss, "The Three Waves of Modernity" in the Hilail Gidlen ed., *An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989) pp. 81-98.

subsequent waves critiques and radicalizes early modernity on the basis of a fundamental agreement as to man's essential freedom or independence or autonomy. Rousseau does not like the chains of dependence on society that mark the Lockean quest for comfortable self-preservation, the "joyless quest for joy," and Nietzsche expressed disdain for the lack of vitality of the bourgeois; but each is dependent upon the core presupposition of modernity: man as the maker and the measure of all things human. Jouvenel, like Strauss, believes that the early modern starting point and subsequent reactions partake in a common "rationalist crisis."[11] Jouvenel's intellectual project is best understood in light of that crisis. In many respects he believes that it *is* possible to mitigate the limitations of the early modern project, without radicalizing it.[12] Part II of *Pure Theory*, while building upon and presupposing this critical engagement with modern political philosophy in *On Power* and *Sovereignty*, offers insight into the rhetorical strategy of this effort as well as snapshot of its main components.

Jouvenel makes clear that the modern state of nature teaching does not provide a true or complete description of

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[11] *Power*, pp. 231-234.
[12] See Jouvenel's discussion of the "fruits of individualist rationalism" in *Power*, pp. 416-18.

the human condition. It is less anthropology, or history, and more a justification for a certain type of political formation. He forces the reader to confront some fundamental questions: Is man a product of group protection and group tuition or does he create himself? Does his ability to go out on his own as well as come back and fashion a group to his own liking, presuppose the prior existence of the group that gave him the needed knowledge and habits of mind and heart? If one agrees that the group is in some fundamental sense antecedent to individual, then one would have to admit that Jouvenel possesses a more capacious and truer understanding of the "social nest" that made, makes, and sustains Individual Man than anything found in classical liberal theory.

Jouvenel is not interested in putting forward a straw man or in winning debating points against the "state of nature" theorists. Rather, he wants to show the political or programmatic character of the early modern state of nature teaching and the social contract theory that it inspired, and vice-versa. The "individualism" of early modern political philosophy does not account for man's character as a "debtor," dependent on a social world that he does not create. If Individual Man is in truth a product of a certain type of education, then why not place that

education front and center? Jouvenel forces his interlocutor to confront the political reasons that made necessary the creation of this "intellectual monstrosity." Those political reasons had to do with the power of the Church. Jouvenel is well aware of the theological-political problem, and the central role that it played in shaping the modern enterprise.[14] Jouvenel believes that the modern state of nature and social contract theory is a deliberate attempt to redefine the political in a manner that closes the earthly city from those who claim to speak on behalf of a definitive conception of the divine or human good. To do this requires redefining reason and nature in a manner that isolates the political from the claims of super-nature or grace.[16]

By framing the argument in such a way, Jouvenel is suggesting that the theological-political problem that called for and in many respects justified such an "intellectual monstrosity" is no longer our political problem. Moreover, the continuation of this intellectual

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[14] For a particularly illuminating discussion of the origins of liberalism in an effort to address the problem that the Christian Church posed for autonomous politics, see Pierre Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), especially, pp. 1-9.

[16] See especially *Sovereignty*, "On the Development of the idea of the Sovereign Will," pp. 201-221.

delusion of the state of nature undermines the preconditions for defending the nobility and independence of "Individual Man." The false pride of modern man initially produced a State that was friendly to human liberty by depoliticizing the Church, by "ostracizing" it to the newly created domain of civil society and thus diminishing its significance. However, if the modern abstraction from the human good continues unchecked, it risks undermining the modern project by fostering the belief that nothing exists outside the individual will and the sovereign representative state. According to Jouvenel, Power or Governmental Authority "moves" under the opinions that people hold of it. If, as Jouvenel argues in *Power*, Governmental Authority is forever looking for new pastures to extend its reach, such an opinion provides much justification and little grounds to resist the extension of Power particularly when its claims are made in the name of the "People."[18]. The important question is not whether Jouvenel agreed with the early modern departure. My limited point is that even if one says that such a break was necessary, such a concession does not entail that the

[18] It is important to note that Jouvenel, like Tocqueville sees the prospects for both hard and soft or tutelary despotism within modernity. See *Power*, Chapter XIV "Totalitarian Democracy," pp. 282-309 and Chapter XIX, "Order or the Social Protectorate," pp. 316-418 for an analysis of the two faces of modern despotism.

reasons that made that decision have remained constant, that the theological-political problem continues to manifest itself in the same way. Our contemporary political problem stems from the way in which the moderns ostracized the institutions and principles of nature and grace. The early moderns gave birth to "new modes and orders" which are in need of a political science that is suited not only to protect against the rebirth of the problems it solved but also to address and mitigate the new problems that this solution created. What we call civil society or intermediate associations--those public and private bodies that stand in between the individual and the state--has no lasting or stable place because it is denied a constituent role in the modern founding. The modern state represents individuals and not intermediate social bodies such as the family, church or professional organizations.[19]

Locke saw the necessity of bringing in education--dependence on group tuition in order to supplement the

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[19] For a brilliant analysis of the link between totalitarianism and modern doctrines of representation, see Pierre Manent, "Totalitarianism and the Problem of Political Representation" in *Modern Liberty and Its Discontents*, (edited and translated by Daniel J. Mahoney and Paul Seaton) Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) pp. 119-133. Manent shows the intrinsic indetermination of democratic representation: the "device of representation is a matrix or a form that can be filled with very different contents." (p. 120). He also explains how "the liberal state does not represent the contents of life; it represents individuals who possess economic and religious rights" (p.125). On the intrinsic weakness of intermediate bodies within modernity, see also Robert Nisbet, *The Quest for Community: A Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

half-truth of his founding teaching. But by not providing a place for education within his founding axioms, the goods that he tied to its enterprise are destined to share the same ground with, and, unfortunately, the same fate as any other authority that has the dialectic of the individual and the representative state as its starting point. Why? Power, the State, has an interest in stoking a false sense of pride and independence because it decreases the power of social authorities and increases its own. While the democratic dogma claims that Individual Man has the capacity to reason in all matters pertaining to his person, he in practice relinquishes that power to popular opinion and its egalitarian impulses, with the State naturally taking the role as the representative of the "General Will." [20]

Jouvenel's project at this point is best understood as an attempt to "renaturalize" the modern conception of man by founding a place for man's natural dependence at the very beginning of the liberal project. How and why does he do this? He does this by changing Individual Man's self-understanding. No longer is Man seen as prideful, riding

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[20] I have drawn the notion of the "democratic dogma" from Pierre Manent, *Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy*, (Landham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996). The connection between the power of public opinion and popular despotism is a major theme which connects Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* and Jouvenel's *Power*.

out alone and from nowhere. According to Jouvenel, a "wise man knows that he is a debtor." A wise man knows and appreciates where he comes from as well as the feeling of standing alone, freely choosing for oneself the life of a free man. Jouvenel articulates a "state of nature" that precedes the Lockean or early modern state of nature, and it is not an individualistic atomistic one. He reminds liberals of the social nature of man--of the obvious *natural* fact of the family and the group. In short, Individual Man is the result of extensive group tuition marked by the transfer of rich reserves of social capital or civilization.

Pierre Manent has described the trajectory of modern politics as establishing a state of nature within civil society.[21] Such a statement points to the danger and potential tragedy implicit in the modern project. The modern project presents itself as a means of escaping the state of nature. Manent's Tocqueville-inspired point is that by denying in principle and ostracizing in practice man's political and transpolitical natures, modern thought creates a social state that he ostensibly escapes in modern theory--modern men are "social solitaries."

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[21] See Pierre Manent, *Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy*, (Landham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).

Jouvenel's critique of Individual Man adds to this insight by pointing out that man at the heart of the early modern contract theory is at a very advanced stage of social evolution. To return to the myth of the social contract theorist, the only time Individual Man has spent in "nature" is the time traveled from a social group not of his making to one of his choosing and making. Manent's comparison suggests that the individualism of our modern society is a direct result of the individualist premises that mark the modern starting point. By forcing Individual Man to turn around and see both his true origins and his ongoing dependence on others, Jouvenel shows how nature (the family and the group) finds no place in a strictly modern understanding of liberty. He also points to the natural, prescriptive grounds that can correct such a notion of liberty. For example, could one picture a Man who would openly state in front of his own parents and friends, teachers and co-workers, that he is the cause of himself and the sole object of his choosing and affirmation?

For Jouvenel, the reality of true liberty is being self-regulating in light of our natural dependence, self-legislating in light of what we know are the requirements and limits of human freedom. Whereas an overstated independence establishes the preconditions for a slide

toward either tutelary dependence or good old-fashioned Caesarism, Jouvenel articulates a notion of natural dependence that recognizes and sustains the various groups that give protection and tuition to Independent Man. The birth of modern society might lay in an excess of pride, but its continued prosperity does not lie here--nor in the opposite extreme of servility or dependency--but rather in modesty and philosophic equity.

Political Man

What is remarkable about Jouvenel's enterprise is how with apparently modest re-tinkering he provides a new anthropology that is capable of accounting for and supporting "Independent Man." Also, his account of the setting that provides for the protection and tuition of the individual ego has a universality that transcends our present circumstance and is applicable to all regimes and social states, but is particularly suited for our own. What is the composition and ordering of Jouvenel's understanding of Man's nature? Jouvenel lists 5 Axioms, which we will list and then treat separately as well as in relation with each other:

1. Man is Born Dependent

2. Man Acts within a Structured Environment
3. Man is Born Free
4. Man is Susceptible to Promptings
5. Man is Forward Looking

Axioms one and two, that man is "man is born dependent" and "acts within a structured environment", have already been sufficiently introduced and are subjects of their own chapters which we will discuss later in our presentation. The primacy that Jouvenel gives these two axioms is both true to Man's arrival and development but also provide a necessary readjustment to the modern overstatement of man's natural freedom, (which is accordingly ranked third). Jouvenel supplies another reason:

> *. . .I find it useful to stress Man's dependence upon the social nest and his receptivity to teaching. The more so as I propose to deal with the simple relations between individuals. I shall have no occasion then to underline that they are not independent atoms, therefore it is well to emphasize here that they are deeply rooted in the social soil.*[22]

This quote indicates that Jouvenel is aware of certain dangers implicit in his enterprise. Jouvenel is careful to bring to the reader's attention the natural reality of the social soil that sustains and frames his inquiry. Unlike

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[22] *Pure Theory*, p. 46.

the proponents of 'Individual Man', Jouvenel does not take for granted the conditions that make such individual liberty possible. Since the purpose of his study is how individuals move each other--which really develops axioms three through five--he here brings special attention and emphasis to the "social soil" that he will not explicitly focus on later within his main theme: man moving man. For Jouvenel, the individual ego, enters the stage as an "infant born into a humanized cosmos."[23]

While man is born dependent and given "protection" and "tuition" within a structured environment, he is also born free. Jouvenel writes:

> That Man is free is an unquestionable axiom. 'Is', not 'should be': it is not here a legal right claim but a natural datum acknowledged. Acknowledged by the tyrant himself when he throws fear into the balance of choice. Whenever we pray, advise, exhort or command a certain thing, we acknowledge that the man can do this or not; otherwise our effort to influence him would be absurd.[24]

Just as undeniable as our dependence on the "social nest" is Man's freedom. Man's freedom is not first and foremost a right granted by government, a dictate of law, but a datum of our nature. The early modern political philosophers primarily highlighted the negative or atavistic aspects of

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[23] *Pure Theory*, p.46.
[24] *Pure Theory*, p. 47.

our natural freedom of self-preservation, which our forefathers for-the-most-part relinquished to the sovereign power upon entering political society. Man always retains the inalienable right to defend his life against anyone--including the Leviathan. For Hobbes the only way to go to one's death is kicking and screaming. While man's natural police power is a right, an expression of his natural freedom, most would never want to exercise it. In addition, if one is protecting one's life and limb, even in a preemptive manner, the impulse driving this decision is not genuine choice but necessity. Jouvenel, in contrast, focuses on the positive expression of this natural freedom, particularly man's ability to choose. The example that Jouvenel highlights most closely mirrors our capacity as rational and affective creatures--as citizens--who decide to lend our individual assent or not, without fear.

While the picture of man as both dependent on the social nest and free lacks the simplicity some like to call intellectual rigor, Jouvenel shows how both are rooted in our nature. Man is finally a mixed creature. He is born dependent but through the protection and group tuition of the social nest he receives the education that prepares him to choose wisely and well. This mixed view recognizes that man is open to a heterogeneity of promptings. The noble,

the base, the infinite and the eternal, the finite and profane, the mind, the affections and the body and everything in between, act on man and is the stuff of human promptings and response.

The fourth axiom, Jouvenel remarks, is implied by the third, that "man is susceptible to promptings." This as well as the fifth and final axiom "man is forward looking", are the subject of Part III and the true focus of *Pure Theory*. "Instigation" and "Response", which we treated in Chapter 1, underlies these axioms. While Jouvenel's emphasis on the importance of the instigator, promoter, and entrepreneur might suggest a "great man" view of history, this is not Jouvenel's intention. Man's natural dependency on the group shows that the subject of his treatise, "man moving man," is not an isolated atom but men "deeply rooted in the social soil." Axioms one through three, especially three, show that this soil is democratic in the sense that the political and human stage that *Pure Theory* has as its purpose to understand encompasses the bulk of mankind. The "entrepreneur" naturally takes center-stage in the drama of politics because he has a habitual following that acts on his instigation and pursues his "projects." But the capacity to instigate as well as the capacity to look forward and conceive a project, and most certainly the

capacity to give one's assent or to refuse it, runs through the veins of all men.

What do these five Axioms add up to? It is best to have Jouvenel himself answer this question: "Developed and equipped by education, operating in a structured field, conceiving desirable goals and calling his fellows to help their attainment--such is Political Man."[25] Political Man replaces or rather supplements Individual Man. Political Man is Individual Man cured of his excessive pride by being made aware of his dependency on the social nest, and thus shown the dignity and power of his choices.[26]

Jouvenel's "political man" shares many characteristics with his Aristotelean counterpart. But Jouvenel's notion differs from Aristotle's in the primacy that he gives to the role of affections. Jouvenel departs from classical political philosophy, to the extent that he does not give primacy to what is most distinctive in man, our capacity to reason, but rather to what is most common, our capacity for fellow-feeling. Reason certainly has a place in Jouvenel's understanding of Man, but it is neither the Ancient Master nor the Modern "Scout." Reason is certainly connected to the use of Political Man's freedom, to axiom three; it is

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[25] *Pure Theory*, p. 41.

[26] Jouvenel has in mind a choosing that is exercised everyday and not a fiction like the democratic dogma that results in relinquishing man's freedom to a "general will."

an important but not the sole means of prompting others, and it is what allows our species to be forward-looking, (axiom five). But what is the relationship between reason and the affections? In his 1964 essay "Towards a Political Theory of Education," Jouvenel writes: "We are not merely, or even mainly a thinking machine. We are a sensitive organism. The joys of the mind are experienced by only a few. Is that a good reason to regard them as superior? I think not. I think the more important experiences are those of our affective nature."[27] Here we see Jouvenel putting affections above reason as the crown of our nature and focus of reflection. While many might see in this a Rousseauan theme, Jouvenel's understanding and use of affections is very much his own. In my view, Jouvenel's understanding of affections is finally more Christian than the Rousseauan. Jouvenel writes: ". . .I would stress that our Christian faith, perpetually presenting to our minds the passions of Jesus, thereby stresses that the incarnation was an assumption of our sensitive nature, and so dignifies it."[28] Modern compassion, as opposed to Christian charity and love, only works when it does not

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[27] Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Toward a Political Theory of Education" in *Economics and the Good Life: Essays on Political Economy*, edited by Mark Landy and Dennis Hale (New Brunswick: NJ: Transaction, 1999), p. 93.

[28] *Pure Theory*, p. 47.

call upon any great effort on the part of the person moved by fellow-feeling. When compassion starts to hurt, the focus quickly moves away from the other and back to the self.[29] What Christianity does is to take the affections that *naturally* infuse the family, love and sacrifice and supernaturally exports them beyond the intimate social nest, to the universal family of Christian brotherhood.[30]

Home is Where the Heart Is

Jouvenel begins his discussion of affections within the maternal and familial womb. For Jouvenel, parents and the family are "the great power at whose feet children play."[31]. It is for this reason that what happens in the family is of paramount importance to the study of man and politics. Unlike the "childless" founders of the modern project, Jouvenel believes that there are basic political data that flow from our childhood and that shape the way we view public authorities.

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[29] Pierre Manent rightly points out the "pity is indeterminate; any suffering can arouse it, and it contains within itself no principle of evaluation and comparison and affection." See *Modern Liberty and its Discontents*, p. 157.

[30] Christianity has a special status both anthropologically and politically for Jouvenel. Christianity, the problem for the early modern, is for Jouvenel as an important part of the solution to the problems inherent in modern solution to the political problem posed by Christianity.

[31] *Pure Theory*, p. 50.

Accordingly for Jouvenel, children are born into relation of liberality not commutative justice: "Parents give, the child receives. From parents to child, there is a downward flow of services and goods, without reciprocal return." [32] Jouvenel does not focus on this point to deny the place of commutative justice[33] but only to show that our formative experience goes beyond any dangers of a politics of "exchange" or "contract." His purpose is to shows the psychological baggage, or anxiety, that flow from the next movement away from the familial womb and its order and mores into what Jouvenel calls "Otherdom"--the subject of the last section of Part II. The family, as it should, makes a lasting impression that Man carries into his relations within Otherdom. What is relevant to the study of man and politics is an understanding of the lasting imprint of the familial experience:

> *As it is necessary that Man at one stage of his life receive without returning, and at another stage give without a return, it is hardly surprising that his attitude toward his fellows should display traces of his child-role and his parent-role, some expectations to be taken care of, and some disposition to take care of others. These two propensities are surely present in all of us but in very different proportions. The role of parent implies taking care of a very few others: therefore it is not easy to impart to this propensity to a very*

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[32] *Pure Theory*, p. 48.
[33] See the discussions of "Justice," and its limits in *Sovereignty*, pp. 167-198.

> *large span, and only a few tend to become 'a tower of strength' to many; while the habit of having one's needs attended to by others dies hard, and the demand for 'protection' remains widespread in a generation of adults, an important political datum.*[34]

What are the implications of these two propensities for the prospects of limited government, which is the type of politics Individual Man "comes out the woods" (as Montesquieu says) or state of nature to create? Taken as a whole these propensities, while they do not necessitate a tutelary or "nanny state," do seem provide it with fertile soil. The cause of limited government then faces an initial and natural psychological liability or handicap. The fact that parental impulse on an individual level extends to a "very few" is at best neutral. While this truth was used ably by Aristotle to show the unnaturalness of both communism of women and children and property,[35] this limited scope of individual care naturally points to the need of a collective response. Religious communities and philanthropic associations instantly come to mind as representing collective "towers of strength" that compensate for individual limitation. The same might be said for the modern welfare state. The desire to be fed at

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[34] *Pure Theory*, p. 49.
[35] Aristotle's, *Politics*, Book II, Chapter 5.

another's expense, which according to Jouvenel "dies hard", is not favorable to the politics of Individual Man. As we see throughout history, the policy of "free bread for the people" is a powerful and radicalizing force.[36]

Of the propensities listed, the last, the widespread demand for protection, provides the strongest support for the cause of limited government. It is therefore probably no accident that the architects of Individual Man used this as the cornerstone of their philosophic and political enterprise. But this, too, can be used against limited government. War, depression, and hyperinflation are all political and economic facts of life that work against keeping government limited because they undermine the "reliability of the political environment" which is necessary for the sustenance of Individual Man. When these events strike, we see how much Individual Man is a product of circumstance and not of nature. What happens to the Individual Man when hyperinflation makes his hard-earned savings worthless and retirement impossible? Does he look to the government for shelter? And what is the Government's response? The history of the New Deal and the modern welfare state provide an instructive answer. When the

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[36] See Jouvenel's discussions of the Gracchi brothers in *Power*,pp. 365-367.

reliability of the environment is in jeopardy, political communities as well as individual men are inclined to give up the hubris of standing alone for a guarantee of security. Just as feudalism was born in response to the threat of attack by Vikings and other "barbarians," so modern man gives up a portion of his liberty to find greater security behind the walls of the modern social welfare state.

While he is a lover of liberty, Jouvenel does not rail against this natural human psychology, precisely because it is just that, natural. In *On Power,* Jouvenal characterizes man's soul as having two impulses, the "securitarian" and the "libertarian," with it naturally--meaning in this case, for the most part--leaning in the direction of the former. The goal of his political science is to found a place for liberty, which is natural but rare, in light of this stronger human desire for security. To expand upon Montesquieu's famous formulation, "freedom is not the fruit for all climes," not just because of weather and natural resources--things you can't do very much about--but because of the lack of political foresight and the widespread failure to recognize that democratic as opposed to aristocratic liberty grows in the soil of general security. This adjustment would mean that the modern lover of liberty

would have to be on watch to keep general security at a level conducive to limited government.

What these foregoing remarks make clear is that what happens in the family, the type of education and mores that it fosters, is of paramount importance to political science. The fact that liberal society is at a "psychological handicap" with the family, is the starting point for responsible political reflection and action.[37] Jouvenel describes with great clarity and equity how modern individualist society sets the stage for primitivist nostalgia:

> *The material benefits afforded by the large society are conditional upon uprooting and mixing processes which thrust Ego into companies characterized by a low degree of mutual affinity. This is one of the main causes for the unease and anxiety which is so commonly attributed to modern man: the feeling indeed seems more pronounced the more "advanced" the society.* [38]

While Jouvenel notes that the "collectivist urge" exists in all men and times to some degree, it is most pronounced in modern societies because its virtues--its size, fluidity and heterogeneity--cause (as well as require) weak "bilateral affinity" or affectionate cohesion among its citizens. This is not the case for more primitive and

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[37] *Pure Theory*, p. 53.
[38] *Ibid.*

classical societies that are characterized by strong bilateral relations, which he posits as being the "factual foundation" for the "primitivist nostalgia" of Rousseau.

As we already remarked, Jouvenel does not share Rousseau's nostalgia for the classical city, and sees any return to the classical city within our modern circumstance as necessarily Jacobin or proto-totalitarian in character. Man's natural and very strong desire for psychological and social wholeness inclines our thinking about political things--virtues as wells as forms--toward pre-modern corollaries. Such an inclination is not problematic, if, and only if, the political circumstance are "pre-modern" i.e., characterized by small size and population. Only such material can sustain the cultural and social homogeneity, resistance to innovations and foreign ideas, and the insistence on the immutability of society, that pre-modern, classical thought and practice require.

One of the purposes of *Sovereignty* is to articulate an understanding of the common good that is built in light of and tries to mitigate this psychological handicap. But we need not turn to *Sovereignty* to see the real grounds for resisting the "collectivist urge." Immediately after outlining modern society's psychological handicap, he

points to the physical handicap of a large scale politics of affection:

> *It is not my purpose here to discuss whether a social edifice comprising tens or hundreds of millions can be built on the same lines as one which comprises only a few individuals. Galileo's law should be kept in mind, stating that a structure, solid and serviceable at a given size, cannot stand if one seeks to reproduce it in a different order of size, that the much greater edifice had to be built on different lines.*[39]

It is important to note what Galileo's law provides. The law certainly shows that the collectivist urge once freed from small, intimate, political groupings is unsustainable in scientific terms and tyrannical in political effect. Galileo's Law does not, however, provide a simple endorsement for modern liberal forms and principles. It is certainly undeniable that representation, checks and balances, federalism and the market are better suited for an extended orbit and the multiplicity of interests natural to such large groupings. But if the man of the family and group, as Jouvenel describes him, is to both occupy and influence the shape of modern institutions, there are permanent political problems stemming from man's affective nature that threaten to scuttle the modern experiment if they are not openly and actively addressed.

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[39] *Pure Theory*, p. 52.

When we catalogue not only what we like about our modern societies but what are also fundamental facts and realities of present circumstances, such as our great size, our diverse populations, our resistance to conformity and openness to foreign ideas, we see the source of modern liberal and conservative minds and their respective Utopian propensities. The liberals do this by thinking they can forge a notion of the common good built on the celebration of difference, and conservatives do so when they do not sufficiently appreciate that the progressive character of modern society makes an "eternal return" to the common good of the classical city impossible. The position that Jouvenel carves out, which is neither liberal nor conservative, is very similar to the ground that Publius and the Federalists occupied. The authors of the Federalist papers, while they recognized and desired to foster a modern dynamic society wanted at the same time to found a place for American republican genius--which they saw as both natural and noble (*cf.* Federalist #2). In short they saw the goods implicit in the new circumstances as well as the permanent need for political and social relationships characterized by strong bilateral affinities. While the balance they struck was by its very nature a political one, it is a balance the finds much support in the equitable

reflection on the nature of man and the requirements of place. Both Publius' constitutionalism and Jouvenel's political philosophy represent an approach to politics and social change which resists the conservative desire to "crawl backwards" (Nietzsche) and the radical desire to move forward without attention to man's natural desire for continuity with the past.

Unlike Rousseau, Jouvenel accepts the conditions that make modern society possible. What he retains from Rousseau is a very acute recognition of the "factual foundation" of the nostalgia for tight bonds, but tries to carve out a place for Rousseau's insight within the "anxiety"-producing modern society.[40] Jouvenel is very much aware that Rousseau's *Social Contract* is but one of his intended remedies--and one not intended to be applied to a large society.[41] Regarding Rousseau's *Emile* or *Reveries*, which openly take as their starting point the impossibility for a

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[41] In his much acclaimed "Essai sur la politique de Rousseau," his introduction to the *Du Contract Social de J.J. Rousseau* (Geneva: Edition de Cheval Ailé, 1947) and his 1961 essay "Rousseau: the Pessimistic Evolutionist" in *Yale French Studies* 28 (Fall-Winter 1961-62), pp. 83-96, Jouvenel emphasizes Rousseau's affinities to classical political philosophy and his radical pessimism about the direction of modern civilization. He also notes Rousseau's opposition to the liberal revolution in France and Europe and his recognition that ancient liberty cannot exist in the context of a large heterogeneous national communal state. But Jouvenel also emphasizes that Rousseau's contempt for the bourgeois world and his nostalgia for the ancient city have incendiary consequences. On Rousseau and the dangers of this nostalgia, see also *Sovereignty*, pp. 147, 156, 162-166.

large scale return to the unity of the classical city, Jouvenel's portrayal of Political Man provides sufficient ground to question the utility of these more politically sober remedies as well. For Jouvenel, Political Man is both dependent and free at the same time. The psychological ambiguity that Rousseau's system tries to overcome is, for Jouvenel, natural. For this reason, while he shares Rousseau's concern for the affectionate side of man's soul, he departs from him on what is required to give it its due. As result, Jouvenel is not blind to the real virtues that modern societies afford: "The open society affords him opportunities of finding congenial associates, with whom he can achieve an affinity to a much higher in quality that that which is given in the small, closed society."[42] The philosophic and political task is creating a climate of thought and context for action that optimize the opportunities inherent in liberal society.

Jouvenel's Liberal Constitution: Putting the Tongues Back in Modern Man's Mouth

Jouvenel desires that modern society and political science take an active concern for creating liberal

[42] *Pure Theory*, p. 53.

alternatives that address modernity's natural psychological handicap. Tocqueville shared this desire. In some ways Jouvenel can help us see the natural foundation of Tocqueville's concern for intermediate associations within liberal communities. As we have discussed, the modern democratic dogma excludes what is necessary to sustain it (e.g., recognition of the family, the group education or tuition) from its founding principles. This might explain why Tocqueville distinguishes between Democracy's "nature" and its "art"; and places intermediate associations in the camp of the latter.[43] Tocqueville's art, what he calls the "art of liberty" takes its inspiration from nature. But it is a nature that the modern dogma of Individual Man denies.

While sympathetic to Tocqueville and other nineteenth century French Liberals[44], Jouvenel's intellectual project is an attempt to outline a somewhat different response to modernity, one that does not argue from a position of weakness, "art," but from that of strength, "nature." In

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[43] Near to the close of Volume II of Democracy in America (Vol. II, Part IV, Chapter 3) Tocqueville writes: "I see in the dawning centuries individual independence and local liberties will always be the products of art. Centralized government will always be the natural thing." *Democracy in America*, G. Lawrence, translator (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). See also Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, pp. 103-113, esp. 112.)

[44] Jouvenel's account of the use of the centralized state in modern times in *Power* is deeply indebted to Tocqueville's *Old Regime and the Revolution*. *Sovereignty*'s critique of the individualist premises undergirding modern rationalism and its defense of "the general will" are also heavily indebted to Tocqueville. See *Sovereignty*, pp. 238-257, 279-298, esp. p. 256.

short, Jouvenel tries to naturalize democracy's necessary art and in doing so respect modern society's necessary internal duality of nature and freedom.

Jouvenel's contributions are best sought by looking at the areas of agreement with Tocqueville. Both see the health and vitality of intermediate associations as central to the maintenance of a healthy political order. Both Jouvenel and Tocqueville see that the democratic dogmas of the sovereign individual and of the sovereign state were born in opposition to the political roles of social authorities, including the Church. The political and intellectual challenge in the democratic world is to defend intermediate associations from the pernicious consequences of this democratic dogma. Also, it is important to separate what is necessary for a functioning liberal society from this dogma. Political and civic affections, what Tocqueville calls "links" or "bonds," are naturally attenuated in a large dynamic society. In fact, the virtues of modernity, what Tocqueville elsewhere calls its "justice,"[45] are predicated on this happening--i.e. the law of Galileo cuts both ways. Galileo's Law requires that the modern city find materials, principles and forms, outside

[45]See *Democracy in America*, Vol II, Part IV, "General View of the Subject."

those of the classical "corollaries." It also requires that modern "legislators" pay attention to the continued need and power of the affections---particularly in a political order where they are not given primacy. Neither Tocqueville nor Jouvenel is unappreciative of this fact.

Jouvenel focuses more explicitly than Tocqueville on the "rationalist crisis" that gave birth to democracy's nature. Democracy's understanding of equality, its "nature" Tocqueville argues, is inseparable from its understanding of liberty.[46] The "self-evident" proof of equality is our natural liberty: all men are free, therefore all men are equal. For Jouvenel, the problematic for equality lies in its antecedent liberty. The "intellectual monstrosity" of "Individual Man"--its over-prideful articulation of man's natural liberty--is the primary cause behind Tocqueville's "religious dread."[47] The paradox of modernity is how an overstatement of man's freedom, a denial of his natural indebtedness,[48] sets in motion a logic that produces a social state not characterized by Independent Man but by Dependant Men. For Jouvenel, the problematic of equality

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[46]For Tocqueville the "nature" of democracy is equality. See Pierre Manent's *Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy*.

[47] See the "Author's Introduction" to volume I of *Democracy in America*.

[48]For a beautiful treatment of how man's dignity is tied to his self-understanding that he is a debtor, see *Sovereignty*, "On Obligations,"pp. 316-317. Jouvenel makes our natural need for one another the cornerstone of his understanding of liberty and justice.

stems from Individual Man acting like an irresponsible aristocrat. Seen in light of this paradox, Jouvenel's seemingly counterintuitive emphasis on dependency and affections is a product of a political science that makes the rationalist crisis as opposed to the rationalist fruit its focal point. This difference is best seen by thinking through the implications that Jouvenel's sketch of Political Man has for Tocqueville's teaching on individualism.

Tocqueville was among the first to use the word individualism and to distinguish it from egoism. His definition of individualism has had a profound impact on the full range of conservative, liberal and communitarian reflection upon modern politics. In Chapter 2 of Part II of Volume II of *Democracy in America,* Tocqueville differentiates individualism from egoism and proceeds to define individualism as the great problem afflicting democratic society. His discussion is so important that it is necessary to quote it in full:

> *Egoism is a passionate and exaggerated love of self which leads a man to think of all things in terms of himself and to prefer himself to all.*
>
> *Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mess of his fellows and withdraw into*

> *the circle of the family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself.*
>
> *Egoism springs from a blind instinct; individualism is based on a misguided judgment rather than a depraved feeling.*[49]

A natural return to the comfort of one's family and intimate "social nest" is a proper response to the anxiety created by liberal society. Individualism is less the fruit of democratic dogma than a natural response to democratic reality, with its erosion of the natural human ties or affinities. Egoism, however, what Tocqueville contrasts with individualism and calls a "perversity of heart" is for Jouvenel the unnatural--but logical--consequence of the democratic dogma--and symptomatic of the rationalist crisis *tout court*. Egoism is the poisoned fruit of the "intellectual monstrosity" of Individual Man. Or to state it another way Tocqueville's egoist is the unfortunate offspring of Individual Man's over-prideful understanding of his natural liberty. Instead of reproducing a libertarian like himself, he gives birth to a libertine. The distinction is made between the Individual Man as the tree and egoism as its fruit because of a recognizable

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[49] See *Democracy in America*, Vol. II, Part II, Chapter II (p. 506 in the Lawrence translation).

difference in their respective political attitudes. While Individual Man fails to pay due respect to where he came from, he is still outwardly political as opposed to the egoist who has turned away from politics as well as well as the smaller sphere of affections, left contemplating only himself.

While Jouvenel shares Tocqueville's recognition of the pernicious political consequences of individualism, he sees and makes more of the natural resources that are implicit in the reality of individualism. This in no way meant to suggest that Tocqueville does not see the true nature of individualism. Tocqueville describes individualism as a *calm and considered feeling* whose end is the creation of a "little society" characterized by fellow feeling and group affection. Jouvenel does not see the reality differently, but his assessment of what he sees is finally different. For Jouvenel, individualism is a telling indicator of permanence of Man's natural dependence and affective nature. It points toward a natural ground--albeit a "toe-hold"--on which to challenge the march of egoism. However, the reason why individualism is a greater political problem than its surface would suggest, is that the "little society" of family and friends is finally inadequate for the political task at hand: the checking of an expansive

Power. Within this "little-society" are natural resources that can be put into the service of a practical as well philosophic "art of liberty." What is needed is the creation of "larger society" that exists in between the modern State and the autonomous individual, a society strong and vital enough to check both its Caesarian and tutelary excesses. But as we will see shortly the little society of natural affections is the soil upon what this larger society can be cultivated. Jouvenel's contribution is to see in the problem of individualism a realm of nature that--if cultivated--can support the spiritual and social Authorities that must stand in between the state and individual. Jouvenel's contribution is to show that Tocqueville's liberal art has the support of the social nature of man.

From Jouvenel's perspective Tocqueville's much dreaded individualism contains some very real and much needed virtues. While Tocqueville's individualist is sentimental only about his narrow circle of family and friends, he is not *overly* sentimental about the loss of large-scale political affection. He therefore is not inclined to long for political expressions that violate the laws of Galileo. Seen from this perspective, individualism may be seen as a mean between an apolitical egoism and the longing to

reestablish the lost cohesiveness and affection of primitive or classical communities. This middle status in no way turns individualism into a solution to either of these excesses but rather points to the realm of natural sociality and affection that can be enlisted to engage the problems the dogma of Individual Man poses. Finally, for Jouvenel, individualism is not a virtue but a moderate form of liberal anxiety that points to a realm of natural affections. But he also believes that individualism by itself is incapable of standing up to the incremental but steady advancements of the tutelary state.

Those aspects of Political Man's nature that Individual Man ignores find their expression in Axiom 1(dependence on a group) and 2 (dependence on a structured environment).[50] What Tocqueville calls individualism contains the primary social authority, the family and immediate group. Like all social authorities, the naturalness of the family and group does not have a place within the framework established by the dogma of the individual and the state. Nonetheless in truth, democratic man who retreats into his small circle is looking for affection where affection is naturally located, in the

[50] It is worth noting that its expression lies in democracy's practice as opposed to its speech.

family and the close circle of friendships and interests surrounding it. The individualist who retreats into his small circle is neither Rousseau's isolated man nor yet Jouvenel's Political Man, but rather a social creature that recognizes and cherishes his sociality. For this reason, individualism certainly marks a turn away from politics but it is a turn that does not deny the ground for politics in the same way as the democratic dogma. Dependence on the group and a structured environment--Axioms 1 & 2--are necessary parts of a larger whole that goes by name of Political Man. While Political Man is reducible to neither of these two Axioms, he cannot be understood without them. Take these two Axioms out of Jouvenel's description of Political Man and we are left with Individual Man, the "intellectual monstrosity." With the recognition of these two Axioms, Individual Man is on his way to becoming Political Man--and the natural ground for a responsible response to "the rationalist crisis" is discovered.

Individualism, while it is indicative of a naturalness that Jouvenel sees as both true and instrumentally necessary for correcting the defects of Individual Man, is for Jouvenel fundamentally and finally inadequate. While the individualist possesses a trait of Political Man, he lacks all those other more social and political traits that

surround and supplement the natural affections man has for his immediate grouping. However, what individualism does point to is a realm of nature that lovers of liberty can tap into in order to move men outside the narrow circle of the group or "little society" to a larger, more fully social and political world of social authorities.

As we have indicated in our exposition of Jouvenel's critical assessment of the early modern state of nature teaching, it is not difficult to make Individual Man see that he is not his own cause. Jouvenel uses the "self-evidence" of Man's natural dependence and affection to provides intermediate associations with the support that they need to effectively challenge the democratic dogma. What still remains to be shown are how the natural realm of dependence and affection supports intermediate associations. For Jouvenel, nature or more precisely natural affections provide the necessary foundation for intermediate associations. To see this, all one must do is track what Tocqueville calls intermediate associations and Jouvenel calls "social authorities" in their genesis and corruption. While social authorities or intermediate associations take on over time institutional or formal characteristics, they find their genesis as well as their continued strength in their capacity to move and hold on to

the hearts of men. Jouvenel distinguishes two types of authority: established Authority and emerging authority.[51] The road to becoming an Authority--more institutional and fixed forms of authority--is through developing and building authority with a lower case.

Because modern political philosophy was born in reaction to the power of the Catholic Church, a student of emergent authority could not find a better example of the road to established Authority than the Church itself. The Church, lest we forget, started out as an authority--a founder and twelve disciples or lieutenants--and grew into a world religion because it was able to convert men. When Jesus says to Peter, "You are the rock, on which I will build my Church," he is pointing to the fact that all things earthly, even those things with a divine end, are built upon human authority, particularly on men who can move the hearts and minds of others.

Both Tocqueville and Jouvenel understood that established Authorities and emergent authorities, while natural to all times and places, are conceived differently in the Old Regime and in the modern democratic order. Under the Old Regime, social authorities had two means of support. The first and most obvious was their own Power.

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[51] *Pure Theory*, pp 99-118.

These authorities were as strong as their own numbers and their ability to move their members. To supplement their raw authority, they also had the added weight of prescription. The Divine Right of Kings, while it gave Political Authority its necessary preeminence above the social authorities, did commit the King to the maintenance--at least in speech--of their permanent and "natural" place within the created political order. The problem Jouvenel points to is that prescription favored the established over the non-established, thereby creating "social gluts" to emerging political authorities, particularly those of the bourgeoisie and the court. The King, however, as the history of early modern Europe attests, had a natural impulse to weaken established Authorities by supporting the growth of newly emerging authorities, particularly the growing power and influence of the bourgeoisie. To return to our image of the social stream, established Authorities have a tendency to dam up the social stream against emergent authority. Part of what it means to be effective guardians of the body politic is to break up these social gluts and let these emerging authorities develop. This is not to suggest that the absolutist monarchies of Europe were motivated by a concern with the just regulation of the social stream. The monarch, like all forms of authority--

established as well as emergent--can be moved by narrow interest as well as by justice. At times these different interests intersect. We are not denying that the Sovereign is capable of seeing the justice of the claims made by these emerging authorities, but only pointing out the potentially stronger motive of interest and utility. It is worth noting that emerging authorities, once they become established Authorities, began to change their tone. We see this everyday in the business community, which is forever appealing to Authority to close out its emerging competitors.

In modern democracies, social authorities no longer have the support they had under the Old Regime. Under the democratic dispensation, social authorities lose the protection of prescription. Is democracy therefore to be characterized by a competitive market of established Authority and emerging authority, some rising, others falling, and still others maintaining their advantage not because of their opposition to competition but by their intelligent response to it? Creating such a competitive market is a central goal of Jouvenel's Political Science and it is consonant with Tocqueville's enterprise. But this noble vision is threatened by the dogma of the individual and the state, which does not recognize any claim that does

not spring from these two poles.[52] The problem is that democratic theory empties these social Authorities of their natural authority. In the spirit of Thomas Hobbes, it rips the "tongues" out of men's mouths, that is, natural associations and authorities are denied public or political legitimacy by the founding dogma of the modern state. Tocqueville's "art of liberty" and Jouvenel's conceptualization of Political Man are complementary attempts to deal with this modern "denaturalization" of social man.

Jouvenel's liberal contribution aims to give social authorities back their tongues. First, by showing the weakness of this dogma--by showing how Individual Man is incapable of accounting for his arrival on the social scene--he opens a place for authorities that exist outside the individual but that are directly tied to the individual through social affections[53]. It is imperative for modern man to recover a true anthropology that maintains and builds a reality that stands in-between the Individual and State. "Individual Man" must be made cognizant of his debts, obligations and true sources of his happiness--and in doing

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[52] *Power*, pp. 417-418.
[53] Jouvenel reintroduces the idea of friendship in the modern dictionary of the good.

so create the vast "labyrinth" of social authorities that are capable of checking the natural appetite of the State.

The Primacy of Speech

Jouvenel ends his discussion of the "Home" by linking the affections that characterize the working of the family and group to Politics proper and the role of speech as a means of moving men and building authority. "Working on affections is a characteristic of Politics. Followers are won, not hired." [54] Neither classical philosophy nor modern utilitarianism is particularly suited to win followers. Witness Socrates' self-professed weakness within popular forums. The life of reason was too high for most. Utilitarianism's initial universalism gave way to the recognition that the call of self-interest, like the call of reason for the classics, is not for all men but only for a few. It is worth noting that Jouvenel's outline of Political Man is not a description of Man simply or finally. The classical conception of man's soul is certainly a true expression of the soul of the philosopher, as the modern is that of the utilitarian or bourgeois. But the Political Man, as opposed to the ancient master and the

[54] *Pure Theory*, p. 53.

modern scout, is moved by "political urging," which is "a stirring up of man's own passions."[55]

The important question is what are the ends to which man's affections or passions are attached? Jouvenel lists nine examples of the passions of Political Man. Four are best expressed as virtues: love, devotion, admiration, and respect. The other five are resentment, fear, anger, vengefulness, and cruelty. Politics and man have a natural dignity but they are also tilted in an undignified direction. Based on this distribution of virtues and vices, a natural disharmony that is weighted against the good, it is understandable why classical political philosophy gave reason a weight in speech that it lacked in practice. It is also understandable why the moderns put reason in the service of finding means other than virtue to harness man's passions. Jouvenel, however, is dissatisfied with both strategies.

As we have already discussed, knowledge of what Jouvenel here calls "political urging" is not "outed" or divulged by Jouvenel. From Alcibiades to Huey Long to Bill Clinton, "political entrepreneurs" have proven themselves capable students of this craft. It is on the level of political speech that one sees the distinct ground on which

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[55] *Pure Theory*, p. 53.

Jouvenel has pitched his political science. As we have suggested, Jouvenel's Political Science cannot be fully comprehended by either ancient or modern categories.

First and foremost, the modern project intended to overcome, or to neutralize the effects of political speech and the rival authorities that it fuels. But while Jouvenel wants to give modern men their tongues back, he shares with the early moderns their desire for dynamic societies characterized by initiative and a certain degree of anxiety. In addition, Jouvenel understood that this dynamism would largely happen outside what was previously seen as the realm of politics. Jouvenel's basic building block, "man moving man" is more democratic than the classical conception to the degree that it sees politics where the classical conception would not. For example, Aristotle not only drew the political line at the city; he did not consider certain highly evolved political regimes to fit fully within his definition of a truly political order[56]. Jouvenel does not deny the distinction between things political and sub-political, but reminds us that what is below politics is political in its own way. In short the integrity of the political, its superiority over

[56] See Aristotle's discussion of the limits of even those regimes, which are commonly said to be the best (i.e., Sparta, Carthage and Crete) in Book II of the *Politics*.

the sub-political is not purchased at the expense of human spaces that allow for speech and for ruling and being ruled in turn.[57]

Jouvenel understood as well as Hobbes the political consequences that are attendant on this dynamism and anxiety, but worked to articulate an alternative to the "Leviathan." He desires a liberal world where politics and political speech still exists. Like Rousseau, Jouvenel is aware of the power of affections but, for him, affections are part of a larger whole. Political Man must not be nostalgic for those small communities, which are both impossible and undesirable in modern circumstances. As we have shown, he shares the liberal concern for political hedges but thinks that Authorities stripped of authority will prove ineffectual for this task. He therefore makes political speech and activity the center of his liberal political science. Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* offers the elemental--grammatical rules that will govern this enterprise. For example, Jouvenel calls our attention to the speech and activity of those within the modern camp who

[57] Aristotle saw this reality as well. At the beginning of the *Politics* Aristotle says sharing speech about advantage and justice makes a household and a city; also he sees the forms of rule in relation to the family. What distinguishes Jouvenel from Aristotle is his appreciation of this sub political reality. Jouvenel, as we argue throughout this dissertation, has a more democratic understanding of the political nature of man and the forms required for its cultivation. Jouvenel repoliticizes the subpolitical.

deny their dependence on--their debt to--the affections, as well as those who see speak and act with the intent of bringing about a re-instauration of a harmonious politics of affections. Jouvenel's own position is an attempt to harmonize the liberal project with the permanent requirements of the nature of man in way that does not violate the "Galileo's Law."

Jouvenel's relationship to the ancients is just as complex and nuanced. Because he is aware of "Galileo's law" he eschews the possibility of a return to the classical or closed city. As we have seen, Jouvenel's own understanding of the ancients is best seen in the light of the dialectical tension between ancient practice and theory, neither one satisfactorily accounting for reality of politics.[58] The purpose of *Pure Theory* is to articulate a "representative" political science. While political science in his view must have a central place for ethics (in fact Jouvenel's *Sovereignty* marks his attempt to articulate a political ethic that is appropriate for our modern circumstance), political ethics--the ideas we want Power to labor under--must be built in light of a true phenomenology of politics. Only then will political science provide the moral and philosophic hedges that harness Power's energy

for salutary purposes. Looked at from this perspective, reason alone lacks pull or power over either the affections or the appetites. As a result reason's claim of mastery over the body has a certain pretension. One is reminded of Aristotle's *Politics*, where the man claiming to be the overall king is asked "where are your teeth and claws?"[59] But what if wisdom was supported by consent? Leaving aside the misappropriation of reason that the Alcibiades of the world specialize in, are there reasons to be wary of reason and those who speak in its name? Jouvenel's notion of Political Man suggests that reason--what is distinctive in man--is not an end but a distinctive means. To begin with, when reason is not seen as a means by which we develop our sociality and political nature, there is a tendency on the part of the philosopher, who represents reason's mastery over the body, to order the political community around his soul. The "beautiful city" of the Plato's *Republic* offers a disturbing example of just such a political community. For those who are moved by idea of the absolute sovereignty of reason, Jouvenel's insight into the affections raises questions about the ultimate capacity of the philosopher and reason to rule. Jouvenel is very much aware--as should all students of the history of philosophy--that reason is

[59] *Politics*, Book 3, Chapter 13.

not isolated from the siren calls of affections.[60] The history of philosophy seems to be characterized by an effort to discover an order and wholeness that does not exist in reality. Since as Leo Strauss points out the coming together of wisdom and consent is an extraordinarily rare or chance phenomenon,[61] it is worth looking at the implications that such an understanding of reason has for the philosopher's own self-understanding and his role within the political community. One sees the risk of the "Socratic turn" turning in on itself. The "Socratic turn" was premised on the opinion that reason is the means by which man as political and social animal manifests and deepens his understanding of his nature. Once reason becomes the stated end of man and political communities, there is a permanent temptation on the part of the philosopher to use reason in order to justify a schism between the philosopher and rest of mankind. But as Jouvenel points out, the philosopher and the rest of mankind might not be radically different in kind.

Jouvenel differs with both the ancients and the moderns on the role and the status of reason and its relations with the affections. In short, for Jouvenel, the

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[60] As Aristotle suggests in Book I of the *Politics*, reason must rule the affections "politically," i.e., not despotically.
[61] See Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, pp. 135-138.

ancients gave reason more than its due. Jouvenel does not deny reason importance in pursuing and perfecting our affectionate social natures. As we have shown, Jouvenel's conception of reason is not that of the utilitarian scout for the passions. His understanding of affections is not the modern understanding of the appetites. Men's natural affection for one another is the soil and foundation for the social and political nature of man. The modern understanding of appetite on the other hand disregards both the ground of natural sociality as well as that of reason. Jouvenel's understanding of Political Man and political speech has a place for all three. As we have remarked, Jouvenel sides with giving affections primacy over reason, or sociality primacy over the distinctive means by which we pursue our social nature. But as we have seen in his description of political speech, Jouvenel is very much aware of the appetites that stand in the way of both the affectionate and reasonable dimensions of Man's nature- appetites that often come to the forefront and wreak havoc in the forum of politics.

Chapter Four: Ego in Otherdom: Or on the Social Nature of Man

Standing in between Jouvenel's discussion of man's natural dependency (the "Home" or Axiom 1) and the treatment of the many ways men move each other (Part III: "Instigation and Response"), is his treatment of "Otherdom." "Otherdom" examines the interplay of Axiom 2, "Man operates within a Structured Environment" and Axiom 1, "Home". Jouvenel's presentation of "Otherdom" paints a picture of the human cosmos that our subject, the maturing ego, is born into and within which he must "find his way." Jouvenel introduces the concept of "Otherdom" by depicting the experience of a new boy's first days of school:

> *A 'new boy' stands in the courtyard of a boarding-school to which his father has just brought him. He is lost in uncharted territory, among alien people: he feels a solitary intruder in a strange cosmos, the parts of which have no name or meaning for him, and in which he has no place or significance. He is exposed to the queries, demands and commands of 'the others' which, at first, appear as a many-voiced and many-limbed giant, unaccountable and overpowering. How can he single anything out, when behind so many surrounding windows are unknown rooms, and behind so many faces unknown characters. He perceives only an ancient, all-pervading and omnipotent presence to which he*

> *must bow. This subjective appraisal I denote by the expression: 'Ego in Otherdom.'*[1]

The anxiety of the first day of school often marks the first venture away from "Home," and it is easy to see how Jouvenel's rich psychology arises from his deep and sustained reflection on human things. Jouvenel wonderfully captures the subjective character of this common experience. What is remarkable about Jouvenel's approach is his ability to see and to show the phenomena under examination afresh through the eyes of the subjective participant. His highlighting of the subjective character of experience does not deny the importance of "objective reflection," but only raises the bar regarding its content. Jouvenel is a philosopher with the acute eye of the novelist, which is to say his reflections on human things actually capture human beings as they are.

What is evident to the newcomer is that the ways of "Otherdom" are not the ways of his father and family. The result is a near debilitating level of anxiety that everyone has at one or more times experienced. Any objective analysis that fails to see and account for the subjective character of the actor, in this case the individual ego, is blind to the importance of interpersonal

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[1] *Pure Theory*, p. 55.

and thus "political" dynamics. For example, configuration can provide a useful map of the school's structure of authority and even list all names of the classes and professors behind the many doors. But this only touches on part of the maze, and thus confusion and anxiety, that the newly arrived "ego" experiences. Existing concurrently and competing with this established formal authority, are the membership, hierarchy and mores of his peer group as well. Learning the requirements of these formal and these informal but nonetheless real secondary authorities, and learning to juggle the often incommensurate and conflicting requirements of each, is the realm of dynamics and the reason why student handbooks are of limited utility. [2]

By making his starting point an experience we all share, we are able to judge the quality of Jouvenel's reflection. While very few have ever found themselves in a state of nature, Jouvenel's political reflection is drawn

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[2] One could imagine a student handbook that mapped all the players. At X high school there are various groups outside the headmaster and teachers: these would include the jocks, preppies, geeks, tough guys, grunges, etc. Each of these groups can be identified and mapped out. For example, the end or purpose of the Jocks are sports, those who belong all play a sport; they have an identifiable leader, their number and names are known and listed. One can even give historical background that is helpful in gauging behavior. For example jocks have been known to be enemies of geeks and vice versa. The interplay, the give and take, the dialogue, the friction between the rival authorities within and between group as well as individuals level, is what makes up the realm of "dynamics"—a sector of politics that Jouvenel finds regrettably unexamined.

from an experience that is common to man as we find him. When we find Man he is never alone; others always surround him. The virtue of Jouvenel's description of the "solitary junior" is that it offers all the benefits of the modern state of nature teaching without its limitations and liabilities. One does not lose the feeling of anxiety and fear that comes from imagining oneself in a "solitary, nasty, poor, brutish and short" circumstance. The superiority of Jouvenel's portrayal is that he gives this anxiety experienced by the individual ego within Otherdom its due and no more. For example, Hobbes uses this anxiety and fear in order to justify a particular political response, the Leviathan--"Lord over the Children of Pride." Interestingly, Jouvenel's portrayal of the subjective impression of the nature of Otherdom as a "many-voiced and many-limbed, unaccountable and overpowering" being is somewhat similar to Hobbes' description of the Leviathan. However, for Jouvenel this feeling of anxiety does not require the political response that Hobbes proposes. This feeling of anxiety that Hobbes makes the cornerstone of his political science subsides as the individual ego comes to make sense of many voices and arms pushing and tugging him. Jouvenel writes:

> *The new boy painfully finds out that marching to this or that bidding has brought him under this or that fire, and instinctively seeks an equilibrium path between pressures the diversity of which he comes to realize. Such a path is indeed very different from the mere obedience to formal authority; and if the father has instructed the child to submit in all cases to established authority, the boy will find out by incurring the mockery and indignation of others, that is not the optimal course, the tracing of which is altogether more complex. What to do, when, with whom, and how is learned by a process of interaction with the collective, a process by which a boy acquires the worldly prudence attuned to this specific Otherdom.*[3]

Hobbes' emphasis on the need for a powerful secular state, a political force that is just as free as the individual is in the state of nature, is from Jouvenel's perspective a political and philosophic form of "malicious misdirection," since this feeling of anxiety subsides as the individual ego comes to make sense of many voices and arms pushing and tugging at him. Jouvenel's goal is to provide a political science that has room for this newly acquired "worldly prudence".

One could, in the name of the Enlightenment, criticize Jouvenel for taking Otherdom as his starting point. Otherdom depicts a highly advanced society, not man as we find him in the raw. Jouvenel's rejoinder is that man is

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[3] *Pure Theory*, p. 56.

inseparable from Otherdom. Man is not born into a state of nature but into a family and a group, and as the species progresses, a rich universe of Otherdoms. Thus, the standard of the state of nature--the cause and stage of Individual Man--as we have shown is far from a factual portrait. Only a highly "civilized" man is capable of thinking of himself in such a prideful manner.

Jouvenel's account of Otherdom echoes Rousseau, who in turn was echoing an ancient understanding which held that the more primitive, which for our purposes is defined by little surface tension between the duties of family and that of Otherdom, the less anxious or divided is man. But while Jouvenel echoes Rousseau's analysis, he does not make unity the objective of political thought and science. Rather he aims at keeping this surface tension and anxiety alive but in check. It is also worth noting the position he takes toward this tension is decidedly different from Hobbes as well.[4] Jouvenel in contrast to both Hobbes and Rousseau sees the political task as providing prudential counsel on how to navigate oneself in Otherdom. For those who would be prone to look toward a protector, Jouvenel counsels that the debilitating anxiety engendered by

[4] Interestingly both Rousseau and Hobbes side with one half of this tension at the expense and truth of the other.

entering a new Otherdom will pass away, that it is a intelligible world with rules and order. Because a "freshman's" anxiety is short lived and the goods of Otherdom real, Jouvenel is not nostalgic for the wholeness of the world that he left behind. Man for Jouvenel is capable of finding happiness in a world of competing Otherdoms.

It is fitting that since Jouvenel has made political speech a central focus of his political science that he finds the Achilles' heel of the early modern project in its language. Neither Hobbes's nor Rousseau's language can satisfactorily account for the reality of Otherdom. But, two qualifications are necessary. First, Jouvenel's criticisms are made with the purpose of achieving what he believes is a shared concern, human and political Liberty. While it is necessary to refocus our attention on man's natural dependency, dependency does not displace liberty or freedom as an end. It is worth repeating that in place of Individual Man, Jouvenel posits Political Man not Dependent Man. Jouvenel focuses on man's natural dependency on the home and structured environment in order to strike a balance in the soul of Individual Man, a balance which is found in Political Man. Secondly, he is not unaware that the view of man that he is criticizing has produced some

real fruit. Jouvenel writes, "This view of things is quite advantageous to freedom since civil obedience is now conditional on his keeping the promise he made." [5] Jouvenel's criticism is not of freedom as an end, but with the ability of the liberal premises to actualize this end.

Jouvenel reminds the reader that individual political liberty, ruling and being ruled in turn, has an ancient pedigree.[6] This implies a criticism of modern contractual thought. The political language of contract, while is useful in one realm--laying out the terms of political obedience--becomes more problematic when applied to Otherdom or society. He calls this experience "Ego in Otherdom" not simply because it sounds impressive. He does so because he finds the term "society" inadequate for describing the phenomenon. Jouvenel uses the phrase "Otherdom" for the same reason he took on the language and meaning of terms used in the hard sciences when he concluded that what existed in the discipline of political science lacked representative rigor. "Just as *socius* means a companion you have deliberately chosen, one with whom you have contracted an alliance, *societas* means an association

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[5] *Pure Theory*, p.58.
[6] Jouvenel writes, "In any political doctrine it is recognized that the ruled have obligations toward the rulers and the rulers obligations to the ruled." *Pure Theory*, p. 58.

that you have entered upon by an explicit meeting of wills, a contract." [7] Not all of life is understandable, much less livable in terms of contract.

The following paragraph is worth quoting in full because Jouvenel both outlines the requirements of "finding one's way" in Otherdom, and suggests how our juridical approach to politics tends to negates these requirements:

> *You can tell me that the social field in which I find myself has rules and customs which I would be foolhardy to infringe, that I shall arouse enmity if I show no deference to the values current therein, that I shall suffer if I do not meet the demands made upon me; that moreover, I should cultivate my affections for my fellows and thus become chary of offending them; that I should also seek to understand what is established so that my conforming shall come from rational assent rather than from timorousness; but it is too much to tell me that I have of my own free will entered into association with men most of whom I shall never know, and signed a contract rife with clauses which I in fact only find out bit by bit. This is equivalent of producing an endless document in illegible print to which my signature has been faked. Non-conformity therefore becomes forfeiture. My dependence upon all others seems in itself enough to bind me down without the forging of my signature.*[8]

When this juridical language is turned away from the individual's relationship to the public Authority and is used as a standard for all of one's commerce within

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[7] *Pure Theory*, p. 58.
[8] *Pure Theory*, p. 59.

Otherdom, it no longer fills a salutary or limiting function. Interestingly, at the same time that this notion frees the individual from an overreaching politics by planting a juridical hedge that stands between the individual and the state, it promotes a societal libertinism that undermines the public space that stands in between the individual and the state. In short it frees man from the content that makes for the best use of his liberty. Fortunately, at the same time Jouvenel is showing how destructive this juridical language is to the fabric of Otherdom, he defends this world of meaning by reminding Individual Man of his natural dependence on others, thus cooling his excessive pride and giving the world of Otherdom its necessary due.

The Heterogeneity of Egos

There is, in Jouvenel's view, an expansive natural ground which can serve as a basis to pare back the excessive pride that fuels this juristic assault on Otherdom. Jouvenel introduces five types of egos that this enterprise on behalf of nature must take into account. He writes:

> *I find it tempting to venture a rough classification of attitudes, based upon picturing Ego's approach to Otherdom as a shape. The retiring ego will assume that shape which subjects it to minimum pressure from Otherdom, filling up less social space than it might , in order to reduce its surface of contact to the minimum. Far the most frequent attitude will be that of the conforming ego, taking the shape that fits readily into a repaired nook. The opportunistic Ego takes advantage of every cleft and opening in the structure of Otherdom, expanding through infiltration: it will occupy a maximum volume while accepting a strange shape. The solid Ego assumes its own shape coming into conflict with Otherdom; and finally the forceful Ego systematically undertakes the modifications of the structure of Otherdom.* [9]

This "rough classification" that Jouvenel offers provides further content to, and support for, a behavioral political science that is attentive to the significant influence of political "outliers" i.e., those who have undue influence on the nature of an otherdom. While we will treat these egos separately, one immediately notices the weakness of the "conforming ego," which Jouvenel describes as the "far most frequent". At the heart of every "Otherdom" is a soft, malleable center. One sees from Jouvenel's portrait that to understand what constitutes as well as maintains Otherdom's most "frequent" ego we need to look to the forces that stand outside, surround, and influence its shape and

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[9] *Pure Theory*, p. 61.

provide it with content. Jouvenel shows there is a right or wrong way to offer a "rough" classification. For Jouvenel, behavioral political scientists are the inheritors and practitioners of good liberal theory. The problem with good liberal theory is that it is true but not exhaustive, that it is at one and the same time capable of explaining for the most part, but is blind to the exception that can change the rule. When they see a conforming ego, a majority shape, surrounded by smaller minority shapes, motivated by different impulses, they see the "extended orbit" that fosters a stable Otherdom. They fail in seeing no further than this stability. They do not see that these shapes have attitudes or humors.[10]

What motivates these various egos? Before he responds, Jouvenel is careful to qualify this classification, warning the reader that his remarks should not be seen as offering an exhaustive psychology. However, even if this warning is not heeded, the first thing that comes to the reader's mind is the diversity of egos represented. For example, Jouvenel does not reduce the heterogeneity of all political actions or motives to "power" in the manner of Hobbes. And while he paints a portrait of man that stays on the level of

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[10] Dogmatic practitioners of the fact-value distinction have open eyes but closed ears.

attitudes, he does so in a manner that is not closed to the heterogeneity of those who share the common attitudes. Jouvenel's portrait of the various egos is not an attempt to see through and dissolve the speech of men, but an effort to create a typology of how political men with similar conceptions of the good will pursue these visions differently based on the types of ego they possess.

The power and richness of Jouvenel's portrait is immediately demonstrable, when one starts to engage his "rough classification" with the classifications of others, and with reality itself. One is struck by the surface similarity between Jouvenel's retiring ego and Tocqueville's individualist. Both the individualist and the retiring ego are not political. Each describes a deliberate withdrawal from the greater society and the building of a smaller society to their liking. However as one further considers Tocqueville's individualist and Jouvenel's retiring ego, we see that the latter ego is more of a silent reactionary variety, an oddity, a ego not quite at home in Otherdom and without the disposition to change it.

In truth, Jouvenel's conforming ego is closer to Tocqueville's notion of individualism. This is because within our democratic context, individualism is what is expected and promoted. Such apathy is "rational"-a calm

feeling that is in the air of democratic societies because democratic societies produce it. The conforming ego reflects generally the intent of Otherdom.

Examples of the third type of ego, the opportunistic ego, are poll-driven politicians, company men and the Greek restaurant menu, which seems intent on serving the full variety of ethnic cuisine to all comers. Dick Morris' policy of triangulation is a political strategy built with this ego in mind. The public benefits of this ego becomes manifest in such a strategy. Jouvenel says of the opportunistic ego that it "takes strange shapes." Triangulation is the political strategy or science of "strange shapes." Triangulation is the co-opting of what is good in your opponent's arguments and presenting it as your own, effectively taking an arrow of out his quiver and broadening your own base in areas once the preserve of your opponents. While one would be justified in criticizing this policy and the ego who promotes it for lacking permanent guiding lights, one should be equally sensitive to how such a strategy and ego supports non-ideological and moderate politics. While it is not the most principled way to find out where justice and the general good lie, it does give counsel to those who are inclined to expand it in odd directions but who are not committed to radical changes in

the established ways. This latter point needs to be stressed. The opportunist ego for Jouvenel does not try to change the structure of Otherdom. Its goal is to acquire maximum volume within an established set. The opportunistic ego is like the forceful Ego in that it is expansive, but it does so within the structure of an established Otherdom.

The solid Ego is the flip side of the retiring ego. The solid ego, like the retiring ego, is partially defined by its independence from societal pressure, but instead of retreating to the side as the retiring ego would do, the solid ego is prone to stand in the center of Otherdom and cry, in the manner of Luther: "Here I stand and I can do no other." It must be noted that all these attitudes, all these sorts of Ego, display great variety.

Finally the forceful Ego systematically undertakes the modifications of the structure of Otherdom. One is reminded of the political character that Lincoln says in his "Lyceum address" belongs to the "tribe of the lion and eagle." These are the entrepreneurial egos, those who would rather rip down an established order than occupy a place built by another. It is important to note that great statesmen such as Churchill and Lincoln are forceful egos as well, but ones who systematically tried to check those trying to subvert a given Otherdom. But these forceful egos are not

simple conservatives. Both Churchill and Lincoln wanted their particular Otherdom to reflect--to live up to--the principles that they saw animating their "Otherdom." For Churchill it was the honor of England and the verities of liberal and Christian civilization that he saw threatened by Nazi tyranny and would defiantly resist, thus giving Britain its "finest hour". For Lincoln it was living up to the logic implicit in the Declaration of Independence's statement "all men are created equal." Their statesmanship sustained and elevated the Otherdom to which they dedicated their public lives. While our minds naturally gravitate to such political heroes, Jouvenel's purpose is also to show how these egos are represented at every aspect of life. Churches, unions, the market place, et cetera, have within their ranks forceful egos as well as more placid types. In pacific times within commercial democracies, this is often the best place to see manifestations of vigorous egos.

After Jouvenel describes the various egos he makes an assessment of the relative advantages and disadvantages of 3 of the 5 egos he has discussed. This assessment is rich in implications for political science. "The third type of conduct is favorable to the advancement within an unchanged structure, the fourth and the fifth types generate changes

even if eventuating in personal failure."[11]. His assessments of these three types are very nuanced. He seems to suggest that the third, the opportunistic ego, is superior to the solid and forceful egos. But this needs to be qualified to avoid confusion. Jouvenel is very attuned to the political operator and entrepreneur. The superiority of the third lies in the primacy Jouvenel gives to the structured environment, without which human development and politics are impossible. Jouvenel writes: "The condition of such learning is that the environment should be reasonably stable."[12] Note the phrase "reasonable stability." Jouvenel is not trying to solve the political problem.[13]

This needs to be stressed. Jouvenel closes *Pure Theory* with an addendum entitled "The Myth of the Solution," which offers a key to his intellectual enterprise. For Jouvenel, political science is about establishing and maintaining a state of ever re-negotiated equilibrium, constantly striking settlements between dynamic forces and adjusting

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[11] *Pure Theory*, p. 63.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] He is close to Aristotle in his choice for equilibrium. Aristotle recognized that political science was not a science in the same way as mathematics. For the Ancients, political science aimed at an equilibrium, but it was an equilibrium that tended to be purchased at the expense of dynamism. The same charge of favoring one pole over the other could be said of modernists who side with dynamism or progress over the stabilizing forces that made a polity cohere. Jouvenel's thought does not fall within the camp of the Open or Closed Society but decidedly in the middle recognizing the place of statics and dynamics in every human community.

factors. The opportunist is naturally disposed to adjustment. Our modern liberal politics provides useful hedges, gardened by opportunistic mediocrities that keep vigorous personalities where they can do the least damage and provide the most public benefit. A virtue of liberalism is that it separates the public or political realm from the private realm of civil society. It is to the realm of civil society that Jouvenel thinks these egos will be drawn, thus the energy of vigorous types can be harnessed for salutary purposes. For example, the "creative destruction" essential to the success of a market economy, when applied to realm of politics produces a political and social state similar to Latin American regimes, which tragically oscillate between the extremes of military rule and the rule of the streets.

The Social Price System: Show Me Your Scars

But what about the Churchills and Lincolns? First, let it be said the Jouvenel does not think it is possible to have a world devoid of great statesmen, or tyrants for that matter. Both statesmen and tyrants will continue to find their way on the historical stage, even in societies where commerce is given center stage. Statesmen will rarely be at

the helm to prevent a crisis but will be brought out of the political wilderness when a crisis arises.

Jouvenel speaks directly to this issue in a chapter he calls "The Law of Conservative Exclusion," which we will treat in Chapter 6. But again, Jouvenel makes another observation about what he terms the "price system," which is crucial to his political science, particularly his understanding of political ethics and justice. Jouvenel writes,

> *Ego may learn about his Otherdom and still not like it. He now knows what is expected of him in his present position, but the obligations are to him painful. The 'price' (e.g. attitudes, performances) which he must pay for being accepted in that position seem too heavy. . . .If aware of other talents which are badly priced in this environment, he may realize that his "terms of trade" with Otherdom are unfavorable, and hope to change the social pricing system. He might be quite slow to pass from that merely wishful attitude to the indignant rejection of the prevailing price system.*[14]

The problem of the social price system is the problem of political legitimacy. To exist, Otherdom needs the support of its members. Certainly a given Otherdom could rule tyrannically, but even tyrants are in need of assistance and therefore cannot be deaf to the 'price system,' the needs and expectations of their bodyguards. While

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[14] *Pure Theory*, p.64.

Jouvenel's descriptions of "ego" provide a useful way to understand the various dispositions of man, it would be wrong to see these five types of ego as an exhaustive and deterministic typology of political types. These various manifestations of ego cannot be separated from Otherdom's price system. For example, might not a retiring, conforming and opportunistic ego be such because the social price system of his given Otherdom seems to him legitimate? If so, one could expect that the changes in Otherdom's values could change his shape and manifest disposition. For example, could not a seemingly conforming ego under a different circumstance become a hard, forceful ego, or if he lacked the outward vigor associated with these types, a retiring one? It would even be a mistake to think that the camp of retiring egos is without potential hard and forceful egos within its ranks. What do retiring egos do when the cloistered worlds of their making and liking on the edge of Otherdom come under attack? This dialectic between an individual ego and the social price system is a key to understanding the rich texture of Political Man. It also suggests what a superintending political science must do in order to keep the price system in balance--to maintain a situation where the majority of egos see that the values of Otherdom are in sync within their internal

"scoring cards."[15] While there certainly will always be egos whose natural disposition will determine their relation and affection in Otherdom, for most it is a product of a dialectic between their dispositions and Otherdom's social price system.

Jouvenel uses Shakespeare's account of Coriolanus' revolt in, and from, Rome as an example to show the complexity of the social price system.[16] Coriolanus is unwilling to show his scars, to ask "kindly" for the office he thinks he deserves. Coriolanus is not arbitrarily denied the highest office. It is his for the asking. But it is for a price he is unwilling to pay. However showing his battle scars is a price that the republic charges the prospective Consul. Is it unreasonable that those who distinguish themselves in war and are therefore eligible for the highest political distinction must pay this price? The citizens of republican Rome did not think so, and Coriolanus most certainly did. The path to this title is valor in war and a sign or the proof of valor is scars. This is the argument of the citizens. For Coriolanus these are a sign of his own deserts, which he will not demean by asking kindly for what is rightfully his. We see a tension

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[15] *Pure Theory*, p. 63.
[16] See Shakespeare, *Corialanus*, (New York: Signet Classics, 1963).

here between someone who possesses the virtues that the Republic intends to foster and reward, and need for the republic to harness that excellence in its service.

While Jouvenel does not tell the history of Coriolanus' revolt, it is worth retelling. Coriolanus leaves Rome to serve the rival of Rome, Volsci. He leads the army of Rome's enemy against the army he once led and the city of his birth: Rome, having demanded the indignity of having Coriolanus show his scars, will be humiliated. It is only through the intervention of his mother and her tears that Coriolanus is convinced to turn himself and the army that he leads away from Rome. The political consequences that flow from affections is amply displayed in her intervention. Rome is spared not because Coriolanus recognizes Rome's Authority but because he sees that he is a debtor to the woman who gave him birth and his country or patria. Authority, no, the affections of son to his mother and fatherland, yes. Also, in a perfect illustration of Jouvenel's description of the fate of forceful egos, Coriolanus is put to death by the Volscians. The tragedy is that Coriolanus moderates his unbridled magnanimity only to be ruined in the end. And Rome has seen that the virtue it cultivates produces men who are an uneasy fit with

republican life, which requires both ruling and being ruled in turn.

Jouvenel began his treatment of Otherdom by showing how the modern notion of social contract, when used as the standard for all our relations, undermines the very preconditions of Otherdom. In doing so he points out the democratic problem of the social price system, prior to introducing the concept itself. By choosing an ancient example he brings to light two important points. First, his political theory speaks to man as man and seeks to transcend the ancient and modern distinction. Secondly, we see the political problems that arise from failures in ancient and modern price systems being obviated by an appeal to the affections. With regard to the failure of modern social contract theory, Jouvenel writes: "My dependence upon all others seems itself enough to bind me down without the forging of my signature." [17] Both the excesses of modern liberalism as well as the grandiosity of republican virtue are cooled when they are confronted with the simple fact that we are born into this world as children in dire need of others.

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[17] *Pure Theory*, p. 59.

Friendship: The Greatest Boon Under the Sun

Jouvenel's final word on Otherdom is on the subject of friendship. According to Jouvenel he has saved for "last the pleasantest part of this exploration."[18] The most joyful part of making one's way in Otherdom is the making of friendships. Jouvenel beautifully articulates the boon which is friendship:

> *The new environment is one which is initially sensed as hostile, that is where the ego sees no friendly face. His making friends therein is the most important transformation of Otherdom. The "I and Thou"[19] relationship is Man's greatest boon under the sun, and Sulla was much mistaken in calling himself Felix by reason of his successes, an adjective more suitable in the man rich in mutual affections. The formation of friendships is like the surging up of hospitable islands in an open sea of Otherdom.*

> *Few men have been so unfortunate as to have never experienced the intense happiness of communion. Those who have missed its most complete fulfillment in true marriage, who have not achieved enriching companionship, have at least glimpsed it in the rough cordial partnerships such as those of war.*

The malicious misdirector is not the only ego type that the freshman bumps into in making his way in Otherdom. The friend, an ego that has the freshman's interest in mind,

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[18] *Pure Theory*, p. 65.
[19] Jouvenel makes reference to Martin Buber's *I and Thou* and *Between Man and Man*.

exists as well. Jouvenel likens friendships not simply to hospitable islands, but hospitable islands that surge out of an open sea. In short, friendships are made (although much of their material is given.) Friendship, "the greatest boon under of the sun" is a product of an individual ego's effort. To have an "I and Thou" relationship presupposes two or more egos who willingly come together in a bond of mutual affection. It is a not a product of diktat, law or necessity, although as Jouvenel himself notes, the school, the battlefield, the institution of marriage, can all create circumstances which allow the "I and Thou" relationship to flourish.

However, even in this happy portrait a few dark sides are conveyed. While friendship and the happiness that flows from it is the greatest boon under the sun, it exists in an "open sea of Otherdom." What do we know about open seas? They range far from bodies of land and they are not calm. Jouvenel's use of this metaphor even expands upon the meaning we have of it. Since friendship is likened to a landmass the size of an island, the world of friendship that Jouvenel is describing bears little likeness to our globe. Within our modern Otherdom, the world of friendship is a world without continents, a world of islands and open

seas, i.e., friends are a tiny faction of our social existence and the social scene.

This description provides some light on the place of affection in Jouvenel's thoughts. While the whole logic of Part II has been to argue for the importance of human affections, Jouvenel concludes this discussion by clearly separating his political science, which has given the affections a central role, from a politics of affections. Jouvenel writes: "But the better the thing, the worse its caricature. The community, which arises out of love or friendship, cannot be contrived by decree, the intensive emotions that it proposed to extend wear thin. Such is our hankering for union with our fellows that the less we achieve it in our daily commerce, the more we dream about "instituting" it at large--a dream which has generated more hate than harmony."[20] It is clear that Jouvenel is not a political Rousseauan or a romantic ideologue of any stripe.[21] He is not a simple liberal either.

In the period leading up to World War II, Jouvenel was disillusioned with liberal democracy, particularly in its "decadent" Third Republic French form, and flirted with

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[20] *Pure Theory*, p. 66.
[21] Jouvenel's work prior to World War II was not unaffected by this kind of romanticism.

authoritarian alternatives.[22] But in the manner of American 'neo-conservatives," Jouvenel was, to quote Irving Kristol's famous formulation, "mugged" by the reality of total war and the total state in the first half of the twentieth century. But when a thoughtful man gets mugged, this does not mean, as our example of American neo-conservatives testifies, that he drops what is true in his earlier commitments. Rather he undergoes a process of maturation. Jouvenel's intellectual odyssey is not of a man exchanging one extreme for the other, but more appropriately, becoming a man of the center. In the subject matter at hand, this entails giving the affectionate desires of man their due, limiting their excesses, and letting friendships be those "surging islands" that fill our lives with happiness. But Jouvenel learned from the experience of totalitarianism the limits of politically enforced community in the modern world. Friendship must not be taken beyond its due because in doing so one "generate(s) more hate that harmony." On the other hand, not only does he recognize the affectionate dimensions of human life, he makes it a constituent part of his definition of political man, and a central object of his

[22] For a discussion of Jouvenel's pre-1945 intellectual itinerary see Daniel J. Mahoney's and David M. DesRosiers' "Foreword" to the Liberty Fund edition of *Sovereignty*, esp. pp. xv-xvi.

political science. And as we have seen he does so because he knows that the liberal order cannot maintain itself without broadening its view of man and society. But even more importantly, he knows that life without affections is not complete or truly human.

Jouvenel and the Primacy of the Political

Let us turn briefly to a serious criticism of *Pure Theory* that has been often raised: the book, it is suggested, does not respect the specificity of politics. In this view, Jouvenel does not adequately distinguish between Political Authority and Social Authorities. He confuses or collapses the political and social realms.[23] The danger of doing so is that politics is denied its natural, even "existential" primacy. I will address this serious objection in greater detail. But for now, I would like to suggest that far from ignoring the specificity of politics, Jouvenel's starting point lays the basis for understanding and defending the true specificity of Political Authority. Jouvenel's *Power*, which treats almost exclusively the nature of governmental Authority, and *Sovereignty*, which is

[23] At a 2000 Liberty Fund Conference on *Pure Theory* Professors Daniel Mahoney, Jim Ceaser and Philippe Bénéton, among others, found this to be a major limitation of Jouvenel's approach in *Pure Theory*.

an inquiry not into the good itself but the political good, is initial evidence that Jouvenel does not lose sight of the specificity of political Authority.

It might be suggested in response that while Jouvenel has a place for the distinctively political, he fails to adequately distinguish the political and sociological dimensions of social life. In one sense this would be correct. As we have seen his notion of the 'political" and "political man" includes much more than magistrate and citizen. Moreover, Jouvenel's political science seems, at least in *Pure Theory,* to be weighted in favor of the "dynamic" or sociological as distinct from and at the expense of the political and social Authorities.[24] However, it is important to distinguish Jouvenel's understanding of

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[24] As we have shown in our treatment of Jouvenel's relationship with Tocqueville, one very real reason for giving the dynamic and the sociological a specificity of its own, and expanding the notion of Authority to include intermediary associations or social Authorities, is that both are denied any real ground and dignity by the modern dogma of the Individual and the State. Another was that the path to and maintenance of Authority is through authority. By putting intermediary associations solidly into the camp of Authority, Jouvenel does blur the specificity of political Authority proper. But is this a dilution of Authority? We will argue that it is not. A political problem that Tocqueville saw the need to address was that of the breaking up of the traditional links of affection and obligation that connected the whole of society in the "Old Regime." What filled Tocqueville with "religious dread" was that democratic speech could result in a corresponding reality, a reality where these social and political bodies that developed the characters of individuals and remonstrated Power no longer existed. It would not be unfair to describe these "links" as Authorities, or to say that if one was to provide a configuration—a map—of the political whole that it should not simply describe the final link, the King or Power, but the whole chain of Authorities. For Jouvenel, Power is distinct from Authority and is set off from the rest by that designation.

this world outside of politics more narrowly or more traditionally conceived from that held by the various sociological schools. There is one key point that distinguishes Jouvenel's more capacious understanding of authority and the more narrow sociological schools: their respective understandings of Man. The sociological understanding not only reduces the political to an epi-phenomenon of social reality, but its understanding of the social or the sociological does not make sufficient room for human agency. Sociologists tend to emphasize impersonal general causes of which man is the effect.[25] In contrast, Jouvenel's understanding of authority, Authority, and Political Man is built around a concept of man as a dependent being who is also a free, moral agent.

Just as Jouvenel temporarily suspended a concern with political ethics--what politics "ought" to be--with his willingness to let the phenomena speak for themselves, he does the same with the specificity of Politics. With those who are concerned with "values" Jouvenel uncovers and lays forth a factual ground that supports genuine goods while restraining naiveté and inordinate hopes. A true phenomenology of man and politics, because it looks for the

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[25] See Pierre Manent, *The City of Man* (Princeton: New Jersey 1998), especially Chapter Two, "The Sociological Point of View."

"ought" in the "is," points to an activity of sober valuation. Likewise, those who are concerned with specificity of political Authority are shown the antecedent causes and supports of Authority in the moral authorities of social life. Particularly in our modern circumstances, where we no longer appreciate the notion of the political regime or *politeia*--in a world born in explicit opposition to such a notion--Jouvenel's turn to the elemental building blocks of politics shows how those who are rightfully concerned with giving the political its due, can begin to recover the political condition of man. Before articulating the regime, it is necessary to recover a palpable sense of the social nature of human beings.

Chapter Five:
The Full Effectual Truth: Jouvenel's Phenomenology of Political Life

An Introduction to Part III of Pure Theory

As Jouvenel stated in the Preface, Part III of *Pure Theory* can stand by itself as a treatment of the subject at hand. It deals explicitly with "instigation and response," with "the action of Man upon Man."[1] However, the fact that Jouvenel chose not to begin here gives the reader a less than subtle clue that what precedes this treatment is of fundamental importance. Those who are advised to go directly to the subject matter at hand are not the practitioners of the discipline that Jouvenel intends to revolutionize, but new arrivals to the study of politics. But any student worth his salt would not pass up such an inviting preface to the study of politics.

Jouvenel offers two main reasons for the extended preface. The first is that the nature of the discipline of political science taken broadly (and political theory, more specifically) is not based on a "representative" theory, a theory that strives for greater descriptive and probabilistic clarity of human behavior. Secondly, he

[1] *Pure Theory*, p. xii.

insists that this is not merely a question of presentation, of bringing to the forefront what was previously understood, but rather a question of presenting a new grammar of politics that can transform the art of political inquiry.

We remember that Jouvenel said that the discipline of Political Science was founded by "immigrants" and that what goes by the name of "political theory" is not theory in the manner described above, but rival and insulated "normative ideals." Jouvenel's rationale for the latter is that students of political movements are not simply "content to find some pattern, we want it to fit our idea of justice."[2] Adherents of such a view will claim that a "theory" of political behavior or grammar of politics as Jouvenel claims to present, a theory unadulterated with prescription, is a theory that is "nefariously suggestive,"--"dangerous medicine" for those with "weak moral constitutions." Therefore it is impolitic to speak about it openly. However, Jouvenel counters that the recognition of the danger implicit in the activity of men living together, particularly a concern for not fanning the flames of civic discord, is responsible for the "unique texture" of political science and theory.

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[2] *Pure Theory*, p. 33.

Jouvenel's response to those who see this dangerous texture as an argument against a "representative" political science, is that the knowledge that is nefariously suggestive is already known by the very weak moral constitutions that they would like to withhold it from. Therefore, what is needed is a political science that defends the political community against those whom we have learned to call political entrepreneurs, instigators--those solid and forceful egos that change the character of our politics, even if their actions result in personal failure for themselves. For Jouvenel, to be political and politic, political philosophy and political science need to adopt new means in order to effectively pursue its age-old end, which Jouvenel beautifully describes:

> *its function (political philosophy) is to civilize power, to impress the brute, improve his manners, and harness it to salutary tasks.*[3]

Such a position points to common ground potentially shared by all practitioners of political science by showing the common exigency--the dangerous material--that political science was born in response to, and the nobility of trying to "harness" Power and the men who wield it to "salutary tasks." In doing so, Jouvenel not only points to a reality

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[3] *Pure Theory*, p. 35.

that bridges the differences within the discipline, he redirects the attention of these various immigrants. For if one accepts the fact that the fruits of the "factual" approach are already out there in our daily commerce, the discipline as a whole is more likely to gravitate around a new center and a common language that expresses this common reality. This quotation is also evidence that Jouvenel, in contrast to the so-called behaviorists, thinks that it is possible to pursue a factual examination of the political phenomena while staying firmly attached to a normative universe. "[C]ivilize," "brute," "manners," "salutary tasks" are, to use the modern parlance, value-laden terms. However, Jouvenel disagrees with those who would use such a normative language or claims to ignore or dismiss the factual foundations of such values. Jouvenel does not think it is necessary, desirable or finally possible, for the human being to be an "ethical eunuch."[4]

Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* offers an understanding of this mixed reality and a language that can both account for it and foster its "better angels". For example, those who practice political science from a "moral pulpit" have to descend from this high place, not forever, but for long enough to reacquaint themselves with the basic phenomena

[4] *Pure Theory*, pp. 33-34.

that their moral enterprise intends to civilize. In addition, behavioral political scientists, having made the descent from the moral pulpit, have not articulated an adequate phenomenology of the political life of man. They study "cold" and not "hot" behavior, voting behavior and not organized minority initiatives that thrive within the otherwise apathetic settings of their studies. Interestingly, both classical/traditional and behavioral political science, while positing different ends and means, share a common "prescriptive" character in their aversion to the reality of danger.[5]

This brings us to Jouvenel's second and more fundamental point: that political science has lacked a genuinely factual or representative theory since its founding. It is not that political "elements", especially the harsh realities of politics, were not understood and esoterically treated, as Strauss argues against the supposed novelty of Machiavelli's "effectual truths." Jouvenel claims that the political "elements" were never appreciated in their pure or fundamental state. Jouvenel couples his criticism of classical political philosophy

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[5] Aristotle is among the classical philosophers, a noted if partial exception to this claim. The same might be said of a behavioral extremist such as Laswell. Machiavelli and Hobbes also are referenced by Jouvenel as examples of those who put danger front and center in their sciences of man.

with those leveled against classical medicine in that neither led to a "close study of diseases attuned to their specificity, nor to a far-reaching physiology."[6] On this point Jouvenel quotes Charles Benard:

> *Descriptive anatomy is to physiology what geography is to history, and it is not enough to know a country's topography for the understanding of its history, it is not enough to know the anatomy of organs for the understanding of their functions. An old surgeon, Méry, compared anatomists to those messengers, who are to be found in great cities, and who know the layout of streets, and the numbering of buildings, but do not know what goes on inside. Indeed, in tissues, in organs, vital physio-chemical phenomena occur which mere anatomy cannot reveal. (Leçons sur les Phénomènes de la Vie Commune aux Animaux et aux Végétaux (2 vols., Paris, 1878), vol. I, pp. 6-7).*[7]

On the heels of this statement, Jouvenel articulates his own intellectual project in a manner that shows that it is not to be finally or fully identified with modern political philosophy or science either. "I regard it as encouraging for my view of political science that the microscope proved so important an instrument of physiological knowledge, and finally led to the discovery that many illnesses are not mere derangements of natural harmony but arise from the intrusion of minute agents."[8].

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[6] *Pure Theory*, p. 39.
[7] This quote both calls to mind and summarizes Jouvenel's discussion of configuration and dynamics. Quoted in *Pure Theory*, pp. 39-40.
[8] *Pure Theory*, p. 39.

Jouvenel thus is not granting an understanding of a pure theory to modernity. Jouvenel's political science is distinct from both ancient and modern political science. Strauss' statement in defense of the classical camp is correct, in that the ancients knew that there were bad men out there, who do bad things and profit from them, and good men, who do good things, but come to ruin, as well as the everyday reality of political actors and the bodies they represent. But while that is data for a pure theory of politics, it does not add up to a pure theory.

On the other side, the moderns can make a claim to picking up the gauntlet that the Alcibiades of the world put before them, which is the art of "getting people to do". But their presentation of the "effectual truth" is not for Jouvenel the full effectual truth. There are essential data regarding the nature of man that are not to be found in their account of human being and society; many of which are of a positive character ignored or denied by modern thought. Unlike Machiavelli and his landing party, Jouvenel does not claim to be the Columbus of a new world. Jouvenel does not put himself in the company of a founder, but rather likens himself to a scientist whose observations led to a discovery that refocused and expanded our understanding of human physiology. His claim to have

developed a pure theory of politics that captures the essential building blocks that undergird all political reality, and whose title as such is to be found in its demonstrable predictive value, is nonetheless still exceedingly bold. In the rest of this work, we will do our best to both understand and test it.

The Man of Action is a Man of Regulated Choice

Part III is entitled *Action: Instigation and Response* and is a thorough discussion of human Action in its various manifestations. Jouvenel begins his political reflection with the first datum of politics: the ability of Man to move Man.

At the foundation of action is the fact that the man of action is a free or a "choosing" creature. The free will manifests its reality in man's power to instigate--to call on the contributory will of another--and to respond--to give his assent to the call of another. Man appears not as a thing, which is best defined as lacking the capacity of choice, but as an agent capable of lending his assent to action. Jouvenel expresses this reality in the formula that we are used to by now: A moves B through H--H being Instigation.

The simplicity of the formula, can be, however, misleading. A world of rich human complexity is conveyed by Jouvenel's simple and profound statement of the fact that A moves B through H. Jouvenel's grammar does not posit a pure end of human action, such as virtue, grace, fear of violent death or the desire for comfortable self preservation, motives well known to students of political philosophy. He rather posits a "pure" activity that does capacious justice to the range of human motivations. A pure theory does not reduce man to an elemental or single end but rather highlights a pure activity: man's capacity for choice.

Jouvenel tempers an overly Hobbesian reading of free will through his discussion of Response, and its "cardinal social virtue," compliance. Hobbes understands man's free will primarily in terms of Instigation. Instigation is the fuel that lights a "war of all against all." Compliance, the tendency toward a favorable Response, to the degree that it figures into Hobbes' understanding, it is not seen as an effective regulating valve. For Jouvenel on the contrary there is great dignity and strength in the human capacity of Response and compliance. Rather than seeing it as an ineffective check on instigation, he will show that the man whose general inclination is to respond favorably to instigations preserves rather than undermines civilized

politics. Of course, Jouvenel does not deny the dangerous texture that surrounds instigation. His more limited point is that this dangerous texture is in part obviated by another will's capacity to respond or not to respond to investigation. Jouvenel's balanced portrait of the will accounts for the fact that everywhere we find man, he is in a group or in relation to other human beings. It also accounts for why these groups are prone to heat up. Jouvenel eloquently captures the power and dignity of Response, and its relationship to instigation in the following sentences:

> *The one who speaks to others and carries them to the actions he desires: There is the man who makes history. Yes, but there is one who decides whether our "hero" shall indeed make history: it is the man spoken to.*[9]

For Jouvenel, the instigator, the one who speaks, is not the sole cause of history. Yes, the instigator is the one who makes history but only when the man spoken to gives him his assent. The bulk of mankind would seem to have an important role in the making of history and therefore possess responsibility for its outcomes. The fact that man has a history that is coexistence with the near universal reality of established Politics, shows that those spoken to for the most part and quite naturally have limited those

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[9] *Pure Theory*, Page 83.

who would lead men to a new state of nature, that is, a state of bellicose politics. However, as history amply attests, Response is not always wise or sensible in character. Therefore, immediately after establishing the dignity and world historical implications of Response, Jouvenel discovers its mixed historical track record. It makes possible both the restoration of liberty and unprecedented adventures in tyranny. Jouvenel writes:

> *The landing of William of Orange in 1688 might have been mere anecdote; response turned it into 'the Glorious Revolution; the landing of Bonnie Prince Charlie might have been 'the Glorious Restoration': lack of response turned it into the anecdote. In the early twenties of the present century, Hitler made an initial failure where Mussolini had succeeded; and there was a time after the abortive putsch of November 1923 when Hitler's chances in Germany seemed weaker than those of a Blue Shirt leader in France called George Valois. Response to the latter, however rapidly fell off, while the response to Hitler, after lagging, soared.*[10]

For Jouvenel, man's dignity is therefore connected to his instigating and choosing well.[11] The larger question is: by what standard should we judge an instigation? The frame out of which such a standard is developed, justified, and

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[10] *Pure Theory*, p. 83.

[11] Unfortunately, Roger Masters' missed seeing all of this in his *Yale Review* essay on *Pure Theory*. He argued that Jouvenel's formula, A moves B through H, tells us little about man or more accurately the least important part about political life. By seeing the enemy too facilely in the language used in *Pure Theory*, Masters fails to appreciate the rich world of meaning that is attached to Jouvenel's elemental or phenomenological grammar. In short, he fails to see that Bertrand de Jouvenel is not David Easton.

defended is what Jouvenel calls the "basic political action"--"the working of words upon behavior" which *Pure Theory* claims to have discovered.

Jouvenel's Pure Anthropology versus the Ancients and the Moderns

Since the argument we are putting forth is that Jouvenel's definition of man is finally distinct from the accounts put forward by both ancient and modern political philosophy, we will address both in relation to Jouvenel's own anthropology. Jouvenel's understanding of man moving man through speech is clearly related to the classical conception of man as political animal. Man is political, in large part, because he possesses speech and shares speech over the just and the advantageous. Jouvenel's "speech" is similar but by no means identical. "Man moving Man through speech," the elemental building block for Jouvenel is both more expansive and more "democratic" than the classical understanding. Jouvenel's man moving man through speech extends to include all types of social and political exchange. In contrast, the ancients focused their definition and forms on the most refined uses of these faculties in opposition to its less refined, more

democratic or social ones. It was not that ancients did not appreciate these human capacities; it was rather that they wanted to limit this expression, to keep a lid on man using his higher faculties in the service of that which is below it.

Jouvenel's approach differs from the moderns in that his understanding does not deny the ground for the high. Jouvenel does not have any difficulty making distinctions between the high and low, the noble and the base, the goods of the body and the goods of the mind, and intermediate and final ends. While Jouvenel is more democratic than the ancients, his political science rejects any reductionistic account of human motives. Jouvenel does not sacrifice the high for the sake of the low, or the low for the sake of the high, for that matter. Instead he bridges the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns on one hand by giving the full heterogeneity of human motives their due. Then out of this heterogeneity he develops a new grammar of politics, a pure theory, that is the factual foundation for a political science that distinguishes between the high and low; the best, better and worse; and moral good from moral evil.

Jouvenel's elemental starting point gives those who follow his lead a way to see both what supports and undermines what is salutary in both ancient and modern

politics. Very simply, by starting with a definition of man that is attuned to the natural heterogeneity and complexity of the subject, Jouvenel commits his enterprise to recognizing what the partisans of Ancient and Modern thought tend to be blind to, namely, the political consequences that flow from their decidedly circumscribed understandings of man.

Jouvenel points to the Achilles' heel of the ancient definition of man's nature in the following formulation: "the more general case surely includes the more particular."[12] But is the inverse of this conjugation true? Does the particular include the more general? One could argue that at the heart of the ancient understanding was a distinction between the high and the low, and that the high, the distinctive, is defined in contrast to and therefore cannot be understood without a recognition of the existence of the low or more general. This being true, however, does not mean that the ancient notion does justice to the truth of the general. The ancients made the distinctive the master over the general.

The metaphor of the particular as master is apt for seeing the problems of the ancient conjugation. A master implies the existence of a slave. A slave's existence is

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[12] *Sovereignty*, p. 359.

for the sake of another and a master's debt to the slave is minimal. When this relationship is internalized, when the mind is given supremacy over the passions, much good can come of it. This is the fire that forges great souls or "giants" as Rousseau called them. When this relationship takes on a political cast it means one of two things: the rule of one man's mind over many bodies: what Aristotle called in Book III of *The Politics* the rule of the "over-all king," or, in the absence a heads-above-the-rest particular, the "political rule," the "ruling and being ruled in turn" of similar masters.[13] The political art aims to found a political equilibrium that allows for the greatest numbers of free men or citizens, while recognizing the permanent necessity for non-citizens, if not slaves.

Where do the moderns stand in relationship to the high and low, the particular and the general? They stand squarely on the side of the general or the low, against what they see as the "vainglory" of the few. Unlike the ancients, the moderns put what is general or common at the center of their understanding of man and politics. The mind is no longer the master of the body, but rather its scout. But just as the ancients recognized that their way of life

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[13] Even Aristotle's "best regime" presupposes the necessity and permanence of slavery.

was dependent on the existence of bodies, the moderns saw the need for a certain type of mind. The "bourgeois" is such a man.

However, this modern conception is not what Jouvenel means by is his formulation that "the general surely includes the more particular." Jouvenel's understanding is finally quite distinct from the moderns. Like the moderns, Jouvenel believes that politics exists for the cultivation and progress of all men, not just for a chosen few who represent the highest development of man's distinctive faculty of reason. He differs from the moderns and the ancients in that he does not define man from the vantage point of either the high or the low. Jouvenel's "general" is man moving men through speech. The bartering that surrounds commercial exchange and the debating of merits and demerits of a particular political proposal, or the dialogical inquiry of a philosophic community, do not violate this elemental principle, they exemplify it. Jouvenel's framework is also broad enough to include all the negative things that can come in a world dominated by commerce, virtue, or even philosophy. Jouvenel's elemental starting point is capable of following man everywhere, of exploring every object the body and mind employs speech to achieve or attain.

The following statement from Jouvenel's 1960 essay on "Efficiency and Amenity" captures his nuanced relationship with ancient and modern thought:

> *The position sketched out therefore is modern in opposition to the ancient moralists, and if you will it is progressive. It is however classical in opposition to the modern moralists, in its assumptions that that the judgments we pass upon the quality of life are not mere expressions of individual fancy but tend to objective value, however approximately attained.*[14]

Jouvenel is with the moderns in his choice for a progressive, that is a dynamic and mobile, civilization which opens up new opportunities to those previously left out of the circle of citizenship. But he refuses to identify democracy or progress with relativism or the unleashing of the human will. He is with the ancients in affirming the reality of an objective order where actions and human qualities are judged according to their distinctive merits. His capacious phenomenology of political life does not presuppose that human beings are ethical eunuchs. Acting man is informed by a moral constitution, which he may attempt to disregard but which inevitably shapes both instigation and response.

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[14] *Efficiency and Amenity*, Economics and the Good Life, p. 3. Earl Gray Memorial Lecture, Kings College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1960. From K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky, eds., Readings in Welfare Economics (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1969): pp. 100-112.

Chapter Six:
Authority: Potestas and Potentia

In Part IV of *Pure Theory* Jouvenel discusses the subject of Authority, which he defines as "being heard." He analyses two species of Authority, *Potestas*--the "power of the office" and *Potentia*--"those who are powerful." The argument has moved from the elementary form of action (instigations and responses) to the forums within which this essential activity occurs. The argument builds on three chapter contributions: "On being Heard", "The Law of Conservative Exclusion", and finally "Place and Face."

On Being Heard introduces the two species of authority, Potestas and Potentia, as two voices: "the voice which mustered and the voice which appeased."[1] Jouvenel's presentation takes into account "Response" but naturally is much more an elaboration of a split within the nature of Instigation. Instigators come in two packages. Jouvenel calls the authority of voices that muster, "emergent authority," and the voice that appeases, "Authority".[2] The

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[1] *Pure Theory*, p. 99.

[2] Jouvenel writes of the choice in these terms: "Clearly Authority and authority are different concepts: Authority is, and in a view of its salutary purpose must be a static concept; how disastrous for society were the Authority of magistrates to vary ceaselessly! On the other hand authority is a dynamic concept called for to described the actual

latter is a stabilizing force that has the final authority or right to stop the debate when political life is breaking down and the tone of voice--which is a strong indicator of the type of action--is heating up.[3]

Both Authority and emergent authority are dependent on what Jouvenel calls "capital." Compliance, a favorable Response, is the common currency that both species of Authority need to generate and maintain. In a world without textured choice[4] and forceful and solid egos there would not be competition between these two voices. The political marketplace would be characterized by the ceaseless commerce of emergent authority, with established Authority stepping in only to reestablish the rules of the market. It would thus be the guarantor of the "communication system." But reality teaches us something different.

Emergent authority[5] looks at established Authority as a "multiplier of wills" that it would like to put in the

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process of Politics wherein personalities are forever losing their "stature" and "weight." I regret that I could not find two distinct words to denote two distinct concepts. *Pure Theory*, p. 101.

[3] *Pure Theory*, p. 99.

[4] Hobbes has a place for choice but it is choice that has been radically deprived of its texture. Modern choice is very much like the choice of the cereals in a grocery store, a narrow diversity within the same species.

[5] See *Pure Theory* p. 103. Jouvenel writes "What I am concerned to stress here is the contrast between the claim to compliance attached to a given position and the current accumulation of propensities to comply achieved by a man who gradually builds up his credit. In the latter case, we have the phenomenon of 'emergent authority.'"

service of its aim.[6] Jouvenel beautifully captures the critique that the emergent authority typically makes of established Authority, which is its justification for desiring established Authority. Established Authority is described by emerging authorities as being "static"[7] and the people who occupy it as being "mediocre."[8]

Jouvenel is not an obsequious supporter of the "dynamism" and "vigor" of emergent authority. He knows its dangers and disruptive possibilities. He, therefore, is careful to locate the characteristics of established Authority around the awesome Power--ability to do and command--that is at its disposal. This has its advantages. Jouvenel writes,

> *A system of well-established Authority can be run by men of mediocre authority: indeed, I would be tempted to stress that it requires such men, because its multiplier effect is so great as to make it very dangerous in the hands of a man with huge personal authority. It is therefore not unreasonable that there should be a tendency to recruit, into anciently established systems of Authority, individuals with decreasing ability to move people on their own account. But in time this slowly rots the collective Authority of the system, while competing authority rears its head outside the system: these combined phenomena finally result in violent change.* [9]

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[6] *Pure Theory*, p. 102.
[7] *Pure Theory*, p. 101.
[8] *Pure Theory*, p. 100.
[9] *Pure Theory*, p. 102.

The challenge and threat to the integrity of established Authority is presented as a problem that manifests itself over the long-term. Authority, even when it is exercised by mediocre men, is capable of lifting itself above those with "huge personal authority." How? The "mediocre" men that established Authority "requires" come to the forefront as a result of a natural tendency on the part of those with the capital of assent that both need, to choose to keep established Authority and its "multiplier effect" out of the hands of the those with "huge personal authority."

A problem arises because over the long term this "salutary trend" has the affect of rotting established Authority. While Jouvenel does not tell us how the "Authority of the system" degenerates, he is clear about the consequences of this rotting: "violent change."

Interestingly, the problem of Authority is not that it is incapable of changing its nature. Jouvenel does not think established Authorities can or should be run by huge or interesting personalities. This is not the source of degeneration. The source of rot is that those who are excluded, those with huge personalities, are engaged in "subversive" activities. They are the equivalent of political microbes, which introduce a change that those in established Authority will not easily foresee.

Jouvenel's preliminary answer to what causes this degeneration is "time." Jouvenel writes,

> *In time, emergent authority always wins, and its victory goes far beyond the mere replacement of personnel within established positions. Established positions of authority are the shells generated, captured, extended, destroyed and replaced by the play of political enterprise. History is a museum of broken shells and a workshop on new forms.* [10]

This quotation tells us much about Jouvenel's understanding of politics. On first reading it appears unduly pessimistic. While such an understanding is certainly not progressive--mankind is not portrayed as inexorably moving to some predestined and superior end--it is not pessimistic either. Rather, Jouvenel is describing what he sees to be a fact. While a fact is a fact, the conclusions that we draw from it can differ. For example, Saint-Simon or Comte were right to see that bourgeois societies are pacific, and that the bourgeoisie views war as an anachronistic residue of man's atavistic past. This is a fact. However, to draw from this fact the conclusion that all peoples will view war as the bourgeois do, is an erroneous step that blinds liberal communities to threats from those regimes or ideologies that have not accepted the "pacification" of political life. Conclusions drawn from a fact ought to be judged by

[10] *Pure Theory*, p. 107.

their ability to be useful guides for anticipating the future.

Unfortunately, a pessimistic conclusion, unlike a progressive one, is more likely to accurately predict the future. Certainly, one could draw the conclusion from the factual portrait that the history of man is "a tale told by an idiot signifying nothing." But this is not what Jouvenel is suggesting when he describes the "creative destruction" at the heart of emergent authority.

Let us try to unpack Jouvenel's discussion of emergent authority and its prospects for ultimate victory. For Jouvenel established Authority consists of all "established positions of authority" that are "generated, captured, extended and destroyed and replaced."[11] In so defining it, Jouvenel is tying the genus of authority to the reality of emergent authority. Emergent authority is the father of established Authority; it is both prior to Authority and its continued existence is forever transforming Authority's

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[11] Roger Master remarks that Jouvenel makes a distinction between established political Authority and authorities and at times mistakenly lapses and refers to what would be by his own classification Authority as authority. While we have not made an exhaustive audit of Jouvenel's usage, his use of the "Established positions of authority" is deliberately chosen. Four pages prior Jouvenel writes of "subsisting authorities" (p. 102-103), once established Authorities like the Church that have found themselves relegated through the drama of political enterprise to a different position within society. His use of the phrase "established positions of authority" is meant to include subsisting authorities like the church but also emergent authorities that are sure to be "extended"—and possibly extended so far as to be an Authority.

face.[12] The political regime is presented as being born, coming of age, growing old, dying, and being replaced through a dialectical process which is dominated by the presence of "emergent authority."

Emergent authority, far from suggesting that human action is not important, puts human action at the center of the historical stage. In this regard, Jouvenel's pure theory is affirming classical political science's notions of the legislator and the cycle of political regimes. What the classical authors called the founder, Jouvenel calls the "political entrepreneur."[13] A regime is founded when the authority of a political entrepreneur--and the group that is responsive to his instigations--emerges above the others and in doing so establishes an Authority over them. The founder of a political regime is not a 'mediocrity' but a man with "huge personal authority." While emergent authority is the source of the greatest gift to mankind, established Authority, it is also the source of revolution--the overturning of a prior founding. Jouvenel describes, as we suggested, an on-going process of "creative destruction."

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[12] Jouvenel writes, "As we have ever lived in the shadow of established Authority, it seemed necessary to stress that simple authority is a ubiquitous, dynamic and prior phenomenon."
[13] *Pure Theory*, p. 105.

Jouvenel's notion of emergent authority provides strong support to Aristotle's notion of education relative to the regime[14], whose aim is to slow down regime degeneration and revolution by mitigating injustices that allow political entrepreneurs to make their move on Authority. But Jouvenel emphasizes that these entrepreneurs will not be happy either participating in a regime that is headed up by mediocrities or "rentiers," or in living under their enlightened administration. [15]

The Law of Conservative Exclusion

After Jouvenel describes the long-term weakness of established Authority, he turns to "The Law of Conservative Exclusion." In this chapter he discusses the source of Potestas initial strength over Potentia. The law of conservative exclusion will help explain how a static, mediocre established Authority ever stand up against the vigorous and dynamic emerging authority.

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[14] Aristotle's *Politics*, Book 5, Chapter 9.

[15] Emergent authority too is shown to have a life span that is susceptible to the same process of degeneration. Jouvenel shows in the founding of a trade union the vigor and dynamism of its founder and group giving way to the mediocrities who head up the organization that they themselves could not have founded. Over time the institution becomes stagnant and is challenged by rival authorities within its own ranks.

The law of conservative exclusion is an outgrowth of simple necessity. It is a fundamental, practical necessity that at a certain point the debate must end, a decision must be made, and this decision must be obeyed (the Greeks call this *Krisis*). This is the foundation on which rests the primacy of the political. Jouvenel calls this practical necessity the Law of Conservative Exclusion and defines it in the following terms,

> *Any set of people in some way dependent upon one another must have some provision, explicit or implicit, for the elimination of signal at the level of the set. Signals which do not conflict at the level of the set may freely compete, but signals*[16] *which are incompatible at the level of the set cannot be allowed to compete. . . It is a law in the sense of its being a necessary condition for the persistence of a body politic.*[17]

It does not take much foresight to see the consequences that would result if potentia were left unregulated, if the social state were left without a Potestas, a voice that is able to rise above the others. Hobbes' description of a "war of all against all" captures perfectly what happens when public Authority dissolves. It allows us to appreciate why the founder, the introducer of a lasting source of public Authority, is traditionally so

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[16] "Signals" are initiatives, instigations, proposals and the like.
[17] *Pure Theory*, pp. 111-112.

venerated. A politics of potentia is a regime in a permanent state of crisis or revolution, threatened by civil war, and approaching a "state of nature."

It is one thing to see the necessity for something, and another to have the natural resources to meet or address this necessity. As we have stated, Potestas and Potentia are two ways of "being heard." These two types of authority are distinguished by the kind of assent that is characteristic of each. Politics, understood in terms of man moving men through speech, is first and foremost a matter of persuasion, persuasion which operates on intensive and extensive levels. Jouvenel shows that there is a strong correlation between potentia and intensity of assent, and potestas and extent of assent. Regarding the former, potentia finds its inspiration in a love, in a strong attachment that springs from and is nourished by the heart. The good news--at least from the perspective of the basic requirement of political stability--is that intensive assent can only extend so far and can only motivate a limited number of people. When political entrepreneurs attempt to give to their intensive potentia an extensive expression, they find that their ability to generate intensive compliance exponentially lags.

For Jouvenel, political "mediocrities" find themselves in office because, unlike vigorous instigators, they generate the extensive support necessary to gain access to the "City of Command." The ability to generate extensive support makes up in area what it lacks in intensity. Jouvenel in a witty essay entitled "The Chairman's Problem" discusses how the Athenian Assembly worked as an extensive check--albeit not the best one--on those with intensive potentia.[18] Again, the problem is getting oneself heard. While those with potentia are able to get their voices heard, because standing behind the speaker is a group that is responsive to the speaker's voice, this does not mean that the speaker's instigation will necessarily carry the day. To carry the day, he must generate extensive support for his instigation. To do so requires that he must change both the tone and content of the message to include the concerns of the others whose assent he needs in order to gain access to Potestas. To return to the example of the Syracusan Expedition, the political frame of Jouvenel's "Pseudo-Alcibiades," Alcibiades has a backing to be heard where Socrates does not. But we cannot forget that Alcibiades was in no way guaranteed success. Alcibiades had

[18] See Dennis Hale and Marc Landry, eds., *The Nature of Politics*, pp. 108-118.

potentia and this potentia provided him the capital to be heard. His success in convincing proved that he was adept at generating extensive assent for his proposal. For example, Alcibiades had to answer the objections of Nicias while he would not have to answer the objections of a Socrates. And finally, if Alcibiades wanted to use this expedition as a political stepping-stone, he had to deliver a victory to Athens, which he finally was unable to do.

While the Athenians chose to respond favorably to Alcibiades' instigation, it is worth reflecting on the content, the "what," that he was proposing. Alcibiades was instigating in favor of a particular battle against an existing enemy that Athens was already at war with. Would he have fared as well with any instigation? For example, how well would democratic Athens respond to a proposal to institute a Spartan type of education in Athens, or to experiment with any number of *Republic's* "practical" recommendations? These proposals might satisfy the longing of some men for perfect justice, but they would never be capable of generating the needed extensive ascent. How many ordinary people would be willing to give up their own lives as well as the lives of their children over the age of ten, in pursuit of abstract justice? To ask such the question is to answer it.

Politics thus seems to possess a natural regulating capacity, by which those who are capable of speaking for the general concerns generally do well in attaining potestas, while those who are capable of generating intensive support find themselves in the possession of a power that is commensurate with their ability to generate support i.e., relatively limited. The law of conservative exclusion provides some natural support for public and social stability, liberty, and affections. Of course, something that exists naturally, such as the law of conservative exclusion, can be given better and worse public expressions.

The Limits of the Law of Conservative Exclusion: Which Way Did They Go and What are They Doing?

It would be mistaken to think, however, that Potestas is somehow immune from being overtaken by those with strong potentia. To do so would to be forget the examples that history provides us. While excluding such vigorous personalities is an operational necessity--and knowing the law of conservative exclusion, helps us work toward this operational end--another operational necessity is to keep an eye on those whom Potestas and extensive assent exclude.

To inform and alert the guardians of public order, Jouvenel outlines three options available to those with potentia.

The first is to found what he calls an "extra-governmental" authority. Jouvenel gives the example of the founding of a labor union. While Jouvenel's choice is an extra-governmental force with obvious political implications, it is worth noting that the majority of authorities that exist outside of government, what George Bush called "the thousand points of light," Tocqueville, "intermediate associations," and which contemporary discourse influenced by Tocqueville calls "civil society," would largely fall under this species or venue of potentia. Also included within the species of "extra-governmental forces is the market economy generally and specifically its industrial and entrepreneurial Titans such as the Carnegies, Rockefellers and Gates of the world.

The second option for those with potentia is to introduce what Jouvenel calls a "new force" into society. Unlike the former, this force is explicitly political in its intentions. What is key in Jouvenel description of a "new force" is that it operates under existing political rules and manners. Jouvenel's example of such a "new force" is the founding of a political party. Within the American context, which favors two parties because of our winner

take all electoral system, this option is less attractive or available to those with potentia. It makes the study of such groups by political science less interesting. However, if one concedes this point, there are still rivals working within each of the existing two parties, rivals who vie for influence and predominance. Pat Buchanan's recent departure from the Republican Party for the Reform Party provides a nice example of a political entrepreneur operating within an established party, who sees the need to move outside of the existing partisan structures.

The third and most radical alternative is the founding of a "revolutionary force" with the intention of overthrowing the existing political and social order, and the constituting of another to its liking. The worse possible political expression of the law of conservative exclusion is a regime built in complete opposition to it, where extensive assent is completely suppressed and the intensive longing of a group is given the great powers of potestas. It is fair to say that any group that rules narrowly in its self-interest while ignoring the general interest is acting tyrannically. Here Jouvenel is in full agreement with the Aristotelian criterion.[19] In Jouvenel's view, the worst form of tyranny is a small group which is

[19] Aristotle's *Politics*, Book 3, Chapter 6.

possessed with a single-minded vision of the good and a desire to use the multiplying power of public authority to root out any individual or group which seems to oppose its will.

These various manifestations of potentia have great, if diverse, political implications. How they act and how Potestas reacts will determine whether established authority will be "captured, extended, destroyed or replaced."[20]

Our discussion of these routes has tried to stay away from emotionally charged specific examples because Jouvenel himself does not give such detailed examples. One may speculate that to do so would risk having a specific event, and the subjective appreciation that is attached to it, get in the way of appreciating the reality of these three avenues of potentia that exist independently of one's liking. Having said this, however, there is something missing when we only look at general expressions of a pattern detached from historical or political particulars. For it is by its ability to shed light at the level of any given particular that Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* ultimately has to be judged. For example, who could deny the political implications of Poland's Solidarity movement, the first

[20] *Pure Theory*, p. 107.

free trade union in the communist bloc, born in the dockyards of Gdansk in 1980, or the impact of a Republican Party born from the consolidation of various splinter parties (the Free Soil, Abolitionists, etc.), relegating the Whig Party to the ash bin of history and helping to set off a civil war, or the effect that the small organized group of revolutionary conspirators called Bolsheviks had on the destiny of the world? These examples give texture to Jouvenel's discussion of emerging authority challenging Established ones. And elsewhere in *Pure Theory,* Jouvenel himself gives numerous contemporary and historical examples to illustrate his building blocks of politics.

The actions of emergent authorities are among the principal causes of historical change, what a recent book that goes by the same name has called "tipping points," and they happen outside of Potestas. History is largely moved by those whom potestas tries to exclude from the public field. Jouvenel faults the profession of political science for not having these avenues of potentia on their intellectual radar screens. Political screens too often ignore the "strong behaviors" that shape the course of history. The task of political science is to understand such behaviors and then to conceive of ways to check their harmful consequences and to incorporate their salutary

possibilities. "A pure theory of politics" is a first step in an "inquiry into the Political Good."

Chapter Seven:
Decision: Foresight and Political Responsibility

We now know how established Potestas comes to rule emergent authority and how that rule is overturned by a combination of contempt by those with Potentia and inattentiveness on the part of Potestas. In the next section of *Pure* Theory, Jouvenel focuses on those who are in a position of authority and who are thus able to make decisions. In Part 5, entitled "Decision," Jouvenel looks at three understandings or species of decision-making with the goal of finding a notion that is most basic or "representative." These understandings of decision appear in the following order: "The People or 'Committee of All'", "The Committee I (Judicial or Political?)" and "The Committee II (Foresight, Values and Pressures)."

These different conceptions of decision closely follow the trajectory of modern political thought. The first, the People, engages the democratic thought of Rousseau and its classical inspiration. The Committee I (Juridical or Political?) looks at the juridical thought of Locke and the larger liberal tradition. The Committee II (Foresight, Values and Pressures) looks at the early "princely" or

"monarchical" thought of Machiavelli and Hobbes. The progression of Jouvenel's argument does not simply mirror the historical development of modernity but it is historical in character. Jouvenel starts with ideas that are most immediate and important to modern consciousness and then works back through liberalism to the raw thought of modernity's earliest architects. The reader is given a clue to Jouvenel's intention by the fact that he poses a choice between the juridical and the political. In doing so, he points to an essential political reality that exists outside of a juridical or formal understanding of politics. Jouvenel's account of the representative foundations of a political decision is a product of an active engagement with and synthesis of what is true in both the political and juridical understandings.

Jouvenel begins with three essential statements that initiate the dialogue on the nature of Decision. The first is what he describes as the "most basic human activity," which is the ability of man to move man through speech. The second he calls the "most familiar aspect" of politics. This has two parts, the "competition" among men and the conflict among their proposals. The third, which Jouvenel calls the "most fundamental question," is the "spirit" of the men who compete.

We have emphasized that Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* articulates an understanding of political reality that exists between the extremes of Rousseau's and Hobbes' competing visions of human being and politics. Hobbes more than any other political philosopher sees the danger that attached to men moving men through words. His decision to locate and monopolize political initiative in the person of the "Sovereign" is an attempt to avoid the danger that surrounds the competition of man and the conflict of their proposals. The premise and product of his teaching is a democratic relativism marked by a separation of power and opinion--of speech from its natural tendency to articulate the good.[1] And what is Rousseau's "general will" but an attempt to overcome the danger of both civic and religious strife and Hobbesian relativism through the search for a harmonious, republican community?

Is Hobbes' attack on language, his monopolization of initiative and accompanying relativization of manners and morals, warranted? Is Rousseau right in insisting that the only alternative to the austere democracy he proposes--a proposition beyond the reach of most political communities--is Hobbes' Leviathan? These alternatives and questions set

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[1] See Pierre Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

the backdrop for Jouvenel's articulation of the character of political decision.

Pushing Rousseau's Anthropological Envelope

Rousseau emphasized the need to maintain political and psychic wholeness in a world marked by ever greater "separations"; especially the bourgeois from the citizen, and the individual from his fellows. In his view, historical evolution entailed a movement away from civic harmony and psychic wholeness and towards new forms of misery and oppression. While politics is not man's natural condition according to Rousseau, he clearly recognizes better and worst forms of political life. For Rousseau the worst political community, the ultimate human degradation, was the one unfolding before him, the modern liberal or bourgeois state. He was an admirer of Sparta, where common education, strict mores, and republican politics maintained civic unity and psychic wholeness. Rousseau pushed the anthropological envelope back even further by finding an existing people, the Hottentots, who had the unity of the Spartans but without the support of any established Authority. Outside of original man, such a primitive people, offers the purest portrait of man as man. Such

primitive peoples are representative of what Jouvenel calls "Pure Democracy," or the "Committee of All," a social state where political authority is not yet necessary, where there exists no need for command, because there is a complete harmony of will.[2] Jouvenel examines these anthropologically primitive human communities to see if Rousseau captures their essential nature. Drawing from the numerous findings of modern anthropology, Jouvenel adds to Rousseau's short list a long list of peoples such as the Navaho, the Bushmen, and Bergdama, who are test cases for the Rousseauan hypothesis.

What does he conclude? Jouvenel finds the unanimous decisions and emotional coherence that is the lodestar of Rousseau's account of primitive democracy, but he does not find that they are produced in the manner that Rousseau describes. Far from displaying "campfire democracy", these primitive peoples decide on their collective and intimate life in a manner that has far more in common with Hobbes' understanding of Power than with Rousseau's account of the "Natural Goodness of Man." Even among the most primitive peoples, where public Authority exists in the most rudimentary form, political unanimity and emotional coherence is a product of the words or instigations of the

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[2] *Pure Theory*, pp. 131-133.

few working on the many. Jouvenel cites the observations of William Chaseling about one "Stone Age" community:

> *Late one day I came out of the bush to a camp where the Yakangaiya and his married sons were sitting quietly in groups by the fire, cooking fish and waiting for their wives and mothers to come home with firewood. For an hour or more Damilipi, the oldest of Yakangaiya's wives, partially blind, stark naked and switching files with a bunch of twigs, strode up and down haranguing and insulting her men, accusing them of cowardice and laziness in not raiding their hereditary enemies and continuing a feud that was dying out by mutual consent. Damilipi's campaign was continued for two days, and as other women joined her, the horde was roused to the point of a killing party. Weeks latter the men attacked, and in the reprisals two of Damilipi's sons and a daughter-in-law were killed.*[3]

This quote shows not only a state of peace being transformed into a state of war, it shows how and from what quarters such a transformation came, as well as the limits of tying emotional coherence or unity to natural goodness. Jouvenel shows how even in this state of pure democracy one still finds the predominant influence of the few over the many. Pure democracy or primitive consensus is possible but it is not necessarily the path of wisdom as Rousseau seems to suggest.[4]

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[3] *Pure Theory*, p. 135, Wilbur Chaseling, *Yulengor: Nomads of Arnhem Land* (London, 1957) pp. 63-64.
[4] *Pure Theory*, p. 135.

In his account of decision-making in primitive communities, Jouvenel tempers Rousseau's moral condemnation or outrage at the historical evolution of man by questioning the empirical accuracy of his account. Politics is at its essential core always a product of one or a few and never a majority or collective initiation; although as we have seen initiative needs compliance to be successful.

The Dimensional Law:
Rousseau and Aristotle versus Hobbes and Jouvenel

This critique of Rousseau is crucial. But it must be separated from an insight that Jouvenel believed Rousseau articulated as well as anyone. This is Rousseau's understanding of what Jouvenel calls the "Dimensional Law", which holds that "the role of established Authority must inevitably increase as the body politic grows in size, complexity and heterogeneity."[5] While Jouvenel does not see an anthropological analogue to the Rousseauan notion of a general will, he does find and appreciate the psychological cohesion that keeps Authority small, and understands the real and sometimes pernicious human consequences of the

[5] *Pure Theory*, p. 143.

movement away for this cohesion.[6] And while the evolution of society has moved away from small political communities, marked by simplicity and homogeneity, Jouvenel is aware of what is lost as well as gained in this process. Jouvenel, in a 1961 essay entitled, *On the Evolution of the Forms of Government*, adds to Rousseau's normative and pessimistic reading of the dimensional law the considerable authority of Aristotle,

> *No writer ever stated more clearly than Rousseau that true popular participation in government requires a small community, that in a large state it is a myth; that men in a large state are in fact and must inevitably be subjects, on which score he rejected the large state as incapable of a good form of government; just as Aristotle had said. Observing that the historical trend was toward the large state, he felt that it was away from a morally good form of government."*[7]

But this is more than an articulation of the dimensional law. This is the dimensional law plus Rousseau's normative

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[6] Jouvenel extensively quotes from Ludwik Krzywicki's *Primitive Society and Vital Statistics*, 1934, and its sensitive account of the forced assimilation of the Tasmanians and how such a movement robbed them of their zest for living. Krzywicki recounts that the motives of the White, were pure: the Tasmanians were dying and their aid came first in the form of food, but even with food they kept dying out. Kryzywiki writes,

> *In order to understand the inevitability of their dying out, we must take into consideration the breaking up of their inner life by the changed conditions of existence... .They were surrounded by the outward semblance of material well-being, but they were deprived of their former abundance and vitality of impressions and emotions"* Quoted in *Pure Theory*, p. 143.

[7] *Evolution of the Forms of Government*, in D. Hale and M. Landy, eds. *The Nature of* Politics, p. 199. See also Aristotle's, *Politics*, Book 3, Chapter 9.

evaluation of this law. The dimensional law--that popular government is tied to smallness of size and cannot be grafted to a large society--is a representative or factual statement. On this point Hobbes, Rousseau and Aristotle and Jouvenel are in full agreement. What is not a law, and is open to disagreement, is Rousseau's normative assessment of what this movement away from compact, simple and homogeneous political communities, ultimately entails. To those who might quickly dismiss Rousseau's moral assessment of the politics of the large state, Jouvenel enlists the authority of Aristotle in his defense of his normative reading. Despite their other disagreements, both Aristotle and Rousseau share a commitment to the political "corollaries" that limit the size, complexity and heterogeneity of politics.

My reason for taking the conversation outside of the Jouvenel's "pure" presentation of the dimensional law in *Pure Theory* is to show how the dimensional law--a datum of pure theory--is at the foundation of any rigorous inquiry into the political good. In *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good* Jouvenel takes heed of this normative reading of the dimensional law by arguing that the inquiry into the political good must free itself from the "prison

of the classical corollaries."[8] Not surprisingly, the four corollaries that foster the classical notion of the common good, according to Jouvenel, namely smallness, homogeneity, immutability, and hostility to foreign ways, are nothing but the political requirements needed to bring about the politics of a certain scale; for only in politics of a certain size could one achieve the moral harmony that the classics or Rousseau saw as necessary for the proper cultivation of the human soul. Jouvenel put these corollaries in the service of a single principle: "so great a blessing is moral harmony that whatever tends to weaken it must be dangerous and bad."[9]

But many "essential" observations of the nature of man call into question the representative and normative validity of this principle. Certainly, the dimensional law is an outgrowth of compliance--man's cardinal social virtue according to Jouvenel. Where strong lateral ties exist, as they do in differing ways within primitive societies and the classical cities, there is a strong propensity to comply. The opposite is also the case: where the lateral ties are weak so too is the propensity to comply. Therefore compliance is rooted in the existence of lateral ties and,

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[8] *Sovereignty*, p. 147-153, esp. 148.
[9] *Sovereignty*, p. 148.

as these lateral ties are weakened, force or command steps in to maintain order. The classical principle makes more of this virtue in order to bring to man a degree of coherence that he naturally lacks. However, if the law of conservative exclusion is right and men have a natural tendency to lend their assent to those capable of generating extensive preference, then increasing the size, complexity, and heterogeneity of politics might be a good thing. In that case, new means must be found to sustain social friendship, an indispensable feature of any political community.

Morality of Choosers, Agents and Subjects

Jouvenel began his discussion of the People by classifying three types of people: subjects, agents and choosers.[10] Within the context of the discussion of the "People," Jouvenel appeared to be making a simple point that there are fundamental disagreements about precisely who the people are. Within the context of Part V, such a distinction neatly follows the division of the chapters, as well Part V's ordering principle, Decision. The Rousseauan view emphasizes the democratic character of legitimate

[10] *Pure Theory*, p. 131.

political decision--it sees citizens as choosers and downplays the natural role of instigation (with the crucial exception of the Founder or Legislator)[11]; the Lockean or juridical understanding sees political decisions in terms of "agency," executing the will made by another; and finally, the "Hobbesian" understanding sees all but the one Sovereign as subjects. However, one finds that from the outset Jouvenel provides an analytical framework that shows the basic political divisions that are at play in any political group, in any time or place. Rather than pointing to three rival conceptions of the people, he is pointing to a political grammar that can account for and accommodate all three notions.

This classification is very helpful in allowing one to deal with something as general as the people. The moment one looks at politics in these terms the logic of these classifications becomes evident. While politics touches everyone, its contents and administration is the responsibility of a much smaller number of "choosers" or "content providers." When one looks at the most primitive or most participatory classical expressions, a few are providing content and agency and the bulk are subjects. Certainly, they are subjects who live under minimal

[11] See *Social Contact*, Book II, Chapter 7.

authority, but they are nonetheless subjects. In such an environment, there are few agents because the authority speaks directly to the subjects. Complex institutions or representative forms do not mediate politics in such a state. As a people grows in size, complexity, and heterogeneity, the need for agency increases. For example, our modern politics are very much on the right side of the dimensional law curve. In the modern state, Authority makes its commands indirectly through its "representative" agents.

The Rule of Law or the Rule of the Political?

The next species of Decision, "Judicial," in many ways marks a necessary step in the evolution of political science as it tries to come to terms with the growing reality of agency. The solution to the growing power of agency is to have agents' decisions be Judicial, the application of a rule made by the People or its representatives. In short, agents are applying laws to subjects that are in principle the making of subjects. Therefore, these agents implement a "general will" which is applicable to all. As this formulation makes clear, the effectual content provider or chooser is obscured in such

an understanding. It is for this reason that Jouvenel gives the Judicial partial billing, posing the discussion in terms of a question: "Judicial or Political?"

According to Jouvenel, treating political decision judicially or juridically is to apply rules that suit men well in one forum to a forum in need of a different standard. For example, the judge and the juror are not supposed to think about the outcome of the event. Their role is to assess guilt or innocence, *recognitio veritatis*, and let the chips fall where they may.

Crucial to the application of justice is that time is not a factor. Jouvenel introduces a term of moral theology, *tutiorism*,[12] the preference for the safest course, to capture the rationale and atmosphere that characterize the judicial decision. Jouvenel writes:

> *The inconvenience of delaying a decision, the cost of gathering more information, are discarded against the danger of incomplete justice: 'expeditive justice' is no justice.*[13]

The Magistrate does not have this luxury. He must act now, or soon. Interestingly, in his discussion of this factor Jouvenel does not go directly to the political. He

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[12] *Pure Theory*, p. 147.
[13] *Pure Theory*, p. 149.

gets there by a peculiar route, by comparing the judicial mode of thinking to the reality of a battlefield.

The Magistrate seems to have more in common with the General than he has with the Judge. Jouvenel argues that the decision-making that characterizes a war committee is in essence closer to that of the magistrate, rather than that of a judge. Both have to make decisions on the basis of hard, often inconvenient, facts. In the case of the general, the army of the enemy is positioning itself on its border. This is certainly a fact. But unlike the situation on a chessboard, the respective positions of the parties are changing as the general is determining his next move. Certainly, chess trains the mind in foresight--in looking ahead and seeing things before they happen. But chess is a middle world between the courthouse and the battlefield. It has traces of the courthouse, in that there are unnatural breaks, intermissions between decisions. It has traces of the battlefield in that it is attuned to the outcome or to the next move. With a judicial question of guilt or innocence, the facts and the problems freeze in time; with an issue of war, these facts are changing by the moment, and therefore our general must decide on incomplete information. He plays chess with the pressure of a stop clock. Jouvenel writes,

> *In such circumstances, proposals to the council of war are a matter of character more than mental speculation. The first to indicate a bold course of action is apt to rally those of similar temperaments and to be opposed by those of more timid dispositions.*[14]

The consummate skill of the general is not so much his ability to move men on the battlefield--this is a prerequisite for playing at this level--but rather his ability to read his councilors' characters, and to know his own as well, and while confronting a limited information and a ticking clock, to make the right decision.

While Jouvenel likens the Political Decision to Military ones, he immediately pulls back from this extreme case or "violent contrast" to discuss the nature of political events proper. Jouvenel writes,

> *Whoever has given a good deal of attention to the course of events knows how things are apt to go. There is a long, slow subterranean progress to a problem. You point to this mole-track and you are told: 'There is nothing there'; or perhaps they will admit: 'Yes there is a problem there which we will have to deal with someday, but there is plenty of time. Things have been that way for a long time and they are not moving, you know.' It is true that 'things' have a deceptive trick of moving slowly, giving the lie to Cassandra. But however long this may last, one day suddenly, there they are in the open.*[15]

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[14] *Pure Theory*, p. 149.
[15] *Pure Theory*, p. 150.

This "long subterranean progress" is nothing other than the "rotting" that afflicts all established authority, and rotting we know to be a process that involves the assistance of time. We also know who is making these mole-tracks, those who "picture a future situation and seek to actualize it."[16] Jouvenel calls this "intending politics."

Jouvenel distinguishes between those who do not see problems and those who do. The former are those who follow what the "law of conservative exclusion" and extensive preference excludes, or better, pushed underground. Since Jouvenel is describing how events are apt to go, which is emergent authority eventually overturning established authority, he shows how seeing the *facts* of mole-tracks, the concrete signs of emergent authority working under the surface, means that one is able to act on a problem that has not yet surfaced. The tendency on the part of Potestas is not to be proactive but reactive. The holders of Potestas always think that there is time to decide, while in many cases, as a result of incremental and subterraneous change, there is no time left. In doing so Potestas is "tuturistic" in character or inclination. One might even say this preference for the safest course wins the Magistrate the extensive capital he needs to occupy

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[16] *Pure Theory*, p. 169.

Potestas. It certainly would explain how he so often wins the contempt of emerging authority.

The tragedy of politics, what makes "History" the "workshop of broken forms," is that when circumstances change, citizens or statesmen too often don't. This is habit of mind that Machiavelli and Hobbes wanted to change. Hobbes's Leviathan aims at teaching the occupant of Potestas to focus on the "vainglorious" creators of these mole-tracks and to go after them sooner rather than latter. It also gives the Leviathan the loud voice that the attentive statesman often lacks. Instead of engaging the intending politician in a conversation on fundamental questions of politics, the Leviathan says that his intention has no right outside of what the established Authority allows. The Leviathan defends individual rights while creating a framework of absolute authority. Machiavelli's *Prince* gives similar counsel but is more conservative, or has greater reserve, than Hobbes in his presentation of princely flexibility. As we recall "seeing is given to everyone, touching to a few"[17]--i.e., publicly announcing flexibility is not in the service of flexibility. Machiavelli thinks it is best to speak with actions and keep the reasons to yourself.

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[17] See Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Chapter XVIII.

Jouvenel's approach differs significantly from both these philosophers of "extreme situations." He thinks that the attentive statesmen--he who has "presence of mind" and grapples with an emerging political situation,[18]--needs help, but he does not think it is either necessary or desirable for him to co-opt an intending politician in the hope of making him into an attentive statesmen. While fully cognizant of the dangerous texture of politics and the dangerous sources of this dangerous texture, Jouvenel focuses his efforts on tightening up the mores of society and the procedures of the attentive statesmen, and alerting the science that guides and enlightens his activity. Such a position is characterized by a genuine realism lacking in both of these supposedly more "effectual" positions. Jouvenel's realism supports the focus of those attentive statesmen such as Churchill, de Gaulle and Lincoln, who remain firmly committed to established Authority but have foresight to see and meet the challenges posed by emergent authority--even long after the early circumstance, or optimal time for dealing with this problem has passed.[19] Such characters are *tutior* in disposition in that they see

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[18] *Pure Theory*, p. 147.

[19] For example if French and British public opinion listened to their respective Cassandras the course of history would have been different.

themselves as stewards of the political order,[20] but they recognize that the safest course at times requires quick decisions about changing facts, and that it finally hinges on clear assessment of those emergent authorities who threaten civilized order.

The Discipline of the Suzerain of the Social Field

It is only in the final chapter of Part V, *The Committee, II (Foresight, Values and Pressures)* that Jouvenel painstakingly reconstructs the end or goal of the political committee and decision. For those whose business it is to decide, or to instruct up-and-coming deciders, Jouvenel shows in detail the character and requirements of a "forward-looking decision." The example that he chooses, "the President's deficit problem," and the detail that he goes into, should impress any student of rational choice literature.[21] Jouvenel writes, "Such speculations and investigations are very interesting to me and I believe that they will come to play an important part in political

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[20] In his 1932 book, *The Edge of the Sword*, de Gaulle called the attentive statesman who saw himself as steward, "the man of character." See Daniel J. Mahoney, *De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur and Modern Democracy* (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction, 2000).

[21] *Pure Theory*, p. 157.

science: this will, however require a great deal of adjustment to the specific requirements of the discipline."

Jouvenel shows the types of adjustments necessary for this *economic* approach to decision-making to become a truly political approach. What attracts Jouvenel (at least in part) to the rational choice school is its rigorous attempt to theoretically simulate the values and pressures[22] surrounding decision-making. The same could be said of the study of economics in general. However, Jouvenel does not simply admire the rigor of disciplines. What attracts Jouvenel to the discipline of economics and its sub-discipline of rational choice is the same thing that magistrates look for in ministerial advice: they think rigorously about matters that are the concern of politics. And when asked to give advice they are prepared to give it and can give the reasons that lead them to take the position that do; they can give a ranking of the values and pressures that they considered in arriving at their conclusions.

Jouvenel understands that economists look at political problems economically. While he certainly would like the economist to be more sensitive to the political

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[22] Unlike judicial decisions, political decisions are properly informed by all sorts of outside "pressures." See *Pure Theory*, p. 162.

implications of his advice, he does not think it is possible or desirable to radically transform this discipline. What he does want to revolutionize or to found is a discipline of political science that concerns itself with weighing and ranking of the political implications of economic and ministerial advice generally.

Jouvenel in an important essay entitled "Political Science and Prevision"[23] gives this category, an economic problem facing a President, a very concrete expression. The deficit problem was that faced by Dr. Brüning, Chancellor of the Weimar Germany (1918-1933) during the final years of that ill-fated regime. The economy was saddled with the debt of repartitions and was teetering on the brink of a catastrophe. Brüning's response to the deficit problem was to cut expenditures and to raise taxes. This was not a wholly unreasonable path to take. What Dr. Brüning failed to consider, however, was the political implications of pursuing this policy; his ranking failed to ask what immediate effect these economic policies would have on the lives of the people and the political climate that greater economic austerity would foster. He failed to anticipate the effect that such moves would have on the political

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[23] Jouvenel, "Political Science and Prevision" in *The Nature of Politics*, pp. 145-165.

fortunes of extremist parties such as the Communists and National Socialists. Jouvenel shows the political consequence of this failure of prevision by giving an account of the numbers of seats the Nazis held prior to the implementation of his economic program and the number it had as a result of his program,

> *. . .on taking office, Dr. Brüning found three million unemployed: after two years of "draconian measures," he had six million; that he found twelve Nazis sitting in the Reichstag; after six months in office he saw the number raised to 107 (September 30 elections), and soon after he left office (May 1932) the Nazi's obtained two hundred thirty seats (July 1932).*[24]

By the spring of 1933 Hitler had consolidated power and the Reichstag, the symbol of German parliamentary liberty, was set ablaze.

One can see a division of labor developing between the political scientist, whom Jouvenel calls in this essay the "suzerain of the social field", and the discipline of economics, with the former having a final responsibility in the ranking of values and pressures[25]. Economics *ought* to be subservient to Politics or political science, but only if political science is capable making those calls--those

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[24] *The Nature of Politics*, p. 148.
[25] This division can be extended to include other disciplines or sub-disciplines within the social sciences.

judgments--that the economist, in his activity as economist, feels incapable of making.

In order for political science to be a "suzerain" it is insufficient for it simply to have an attachment to the values of "civility" and "manners," or the capacity to know what a "brute" is when one crosses its path. Its suzerainty must include the ability to bring about the practical ascendancy of these values and to keep in check the forces that threaten to undermine the liberty and stability of a political community. A suzerain's expertise lies in keeping all the divergent parts that make up the kingdom in check. His responsibility, which justifies his position above the others in the kingdom, is his ability to ask the right questions of those whom have a particular and pertinent knowledge, and to draw from these divergent perspectives a general ranking of values and pressures. The suzerain accepts the inherent partiality of the advice he receives as a permanent fact of politics and is trained to prudently evaluate such advice. And from this audit of the social and political field he recommends a course of action, a what, that will finally be judged by its ability to forecast the future. Perhaps most importantly, the Magistrate

understands that some subjects or agencies[26] will resentfully receive every decision that he makes. It is an important part of foresight to actively monitor and anticipate such resentment. This demands political judgment and not juridical reasoning or economic calculations. Neither the awesomeness of Leviathan, the warmth of community, or the generality of law are adequate substitutes for this indispensable political virtue.

[26] Cf. Rousseau's *Social Contract*, Book IV, Chapter 1. Jouvenel ties Rousseau to the point.

Chapter Eight:
Political Attitudes: Keeping Bellicose Politics at Bay

Part VI of *Pure Theory* addresses the subject of Attitudes and is composed of three chapters: "Attention and Intention," "The Team against the Committee," and "The Manners of Politics." Part V ended with the need to monitor the resentment that is a natural byproduct of political decision-making. Part VI treats political attitudes in the broadest sense and concludes with a reflection on the effect of attitudes on the maintenance of liberty and political civility.

Throughout his discussion Jouvenel has connected the basic divisions of his "pure theory" with particular aspects of human nature. We have looked at man egotistically. We've studied him from the perspective of his affections. Here Jouvenel grounds his final discussion in "mind." Jouvenel's introductory comments are so rich that they deserved to be quoted in full:

> *Our thinking is actualized in our speaking: looking at our words therefore is a good way of looking at ourselves. The Latin tendo denotes both effort and orientation, that is, the basic properties of any living organism. A child knows that while a stone can be picked up in shallow water, a fish which the hand seeks to grasp will escape: it mobilizes its energy for flight. While energy is available in psychical systems, only the living organism can be said*

> *to possess energy. The difference is striking: in the case of the former, stored energy can be released at the time and in the direction chosen in an outside operator; in the latter case the timing and orientation of the release come from within the organism, which also controls its degree, making for lesser or greater effort. Man is immensely superior to other living animals in the control of owned energy: under the telling name of "self-control," we praise a high capacity of refusing the release of energy under outside provocation and of administrating this release purposefully.*[1]

What student of philosophy could resist being brought into Jouvenel's discussion by these suggestive first lines of Part VI? Jouvenel points to the fundamental distinction between living and non-living organisms. We know very early that a man is superior to a rock, and we can express it phenomenologically.[2] Living organisms *possess* energy. Jouvenel also points to the grounds for distinguishing man from other living organisms. The same principle that distinguishes living from nonliving things can help us distinguish among different kinds of living beings. By founding the distinction among living organisms in terms of "control of owned energy" and "self-control" Jouvenel suggests that a human being must ultimately be judged by

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[1] *Pure Theory*, p.169.

[2] For a complementary phenomenological analysis of the living difference and the human difference, see Leon Kass "Death with Dignity and the Sanctity of Life," *Commentary*, March 1990.

his capacity to regulate his will.[3] Jouvenel proceeds to more fully develop this insight about the proper channeling of energy:

> *Our generalship of energy release involves attention and intention. Lacking both, the human organism would be passively responsive to any pressure exerted upon it. Attention is a "presence of mind" whereby we take cognizance of a situation, conceive it as a problem and try to solve it. Intention might be called "futurity of mind" whereby we picture a future situation and seek to actualize it. These attitudes pertain also, in far lower degrees, to animals. For example if we view a sleeping dog bothered by a buzzing insect we first notice its merely mechanical reactions to each contact of the fly; but then the dog awakes, becomes attentive to the fly, and then because intent upon catching it.*
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> *While Man is eminently capable of attention and intention, these capacities are very unequally developed. Anyone who has raised children--or indeed looked at himself--knows the difficultly of steadying attention or intention: attention shifts or vanishes, intention flags. Man manifests great inequalities in these capacities essential to achievement.*[4]

"Self-control" then involves two qualities of the mind: attention and intention. These qualities are not exclusively human but human beings are "eminently capable" of exercising these qualities. His example is very

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[3] In Part III Jouvenel listed three "unquestionable" statements that illustrate this point: 1) Decision-making is the supreme manifestation of human dignity. 2) Decision-making is an expenditure of energy. 3) This energy should be wisely spent. See *Pure Theory*, p. 93.

[4] *Pure Theory*, p. 169.

instructive. The example of the dog shows very clearly both the interplay and complementarity of attention and intention. However, Jouvenel's use of human examples raises the issue of inequality among men and the need for developing our capacities for self-control. In the realm of instinct these two faculties seem to operate fairly equally among the same species of animal. Jouvenel does not mention any inequality between dogs that is related to their faculties. But within the human realm there is "very unequal development" from one human to another. His reference to the parent and the child relationship is significant. First it places man in a very advanced social environment, the one we saw in "Otherdom". The family and the rearing and education of children is the first step in the social evolution and history of man, and this step was made possible by man's "self-control." It is also apt that Jouvenel chose to describe energy release in terms of "generalship." He thereby suggests that the mind of man needs command and training. Self-control is perfected by human art and the focused energy of self and others. It is also worth noting the context in which these "great inequalities" manifest themselves. Jouvenel is looking at the mind's capacity for energy "control" and "release" from the angle of what humans achieve. A cursory look around us

shows that human beings exercise their human capacity for self-control in more and less *successful* ways.

One might raise the question: "How can one look at achievement in abstraction from the ends that are being achieved--and preeminently whether these ends are good or bad?" As the very next sentence attests, Jouvenel does believe that one can separate these two questions:

> *Let us consider attention and intention from an ethical angle. We would hardly hesitate to say that greater capacities of either attention or intention are better than lesser capacities. But the likeness stops here.*[5]

"Ethical angle?" Isn't the ethical outside the self-imposed limitations of his pure inquiry? Roger Masters criticized Jouvenel both for unduly constricting his inquiry of politics and for finally not living up to that self-imposed limitation. But Jouvenel never says that a pure theory demands obtuseness about the ethical dimensions of human life. Political science is a "natural science dealing with moral agents." Since the moral life is integral to man's "constitution," Jouvenel freely speaks in terms of what is good or bad for man as well as "successful".

Let us look us at how the ethical angle arises out of the phenomena under consideration. It appears that one is

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[5] *Pure Theory*, p. 170.

unable to permanently abstract from the ethical implications of the "generalship of energy release." Because we see goods flowing from each of these qualities of the mind, we can say that the "higher" capacities of attention and intention are "better than lesser capacities." "The likeness stops here" because one of these qualities is inexorably tied to a "what." Attention, Jouvenel remarks, "can never do any harm." The harshest adjective he thinks a misdirected attention deserves is "wasteful."[6] Intention is another matter. "'Bad' attention' will mean no more than 'weak attention'; but 'bad intention' does not mean 'weak intention'; indeed the term [bad] is most apt to be used when the intention is strong."[7] The "core contrast", that which puts 'futurity of mind' on the radar screen of the 'presence of mind,' is that intention breeds "conflict." And uncontrolled conflict is destructive of the harmony that allows a political community to be a "whole." In the next section, we will explore Jouvenel's analysis of intention and conflict in their relation to the vision of civic unity that underlies the classical city and the modern state.

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[6] *Ibid*
[7] *Ibid*

The Two Extremes: The Classical Polis and the Modern State

Conflict is at the heart of what Jouvenel thinks is the most important problem of politics, the problem of the *what*--how a given intention is pursued. Jouvenel's Introduction to *Sovereignty* begins with an examination of "The Who and the What," criticizing modern democratic normative or juridical thought for no longer concerning itself with the "What" of an duly elected "Who."[8] The limitation of democratic theory is seen in its excessive or sole concern or that a given Power find its authority in the will of the people--that it is in a consecrated Who--and does not sufficiently concern itself with the Whats--the concrete initiatives or products of Power.[9] This obtuseness to the problem of intention is a product of modern thought's preoccupation with the question of political legitimacy. Jouvenel reacquaints modern liberals--theorists and citizens--with the reality of conflict and the need to attend to the problems that naturally rise from a political state that gives wide latitude to man's intentions. Democratic legitimacy does not do away with

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[8] *Sovereignty*, pp. 2-5.
[9] *Ibid.*

these *natural* political tendencies but rather exacerbates them.

According to Jouvenel, the great political philosophers accept the reality of conflict but their responses to it vary quite widely. Jouvenel posits two extremes: "at one extreme it will be regarded as a measure of a community's moral derangement, at the other extreme it will be regarded as the natural outcome of a desirable accentuation of individual liberty."[10]

Jouvenel does not name an adherent to the former extreme. But he does present Hobbes as being a proponent of the latter one. Jouvenel writes:

> *Hobbes stressed the latter view, but on account of this he was also led to picture the task of coping with conflicts as very hard and calling for very great authority.*[11]

Hobbes is highlighted because he clearly appreciated the political "what" that is implicit in the "modern" understanding of individual liberty. The key word in the above quotation is "but." Hobbes' attentive mind saw the "Leviathan" as the necessary solution to the problems that arise from a liberal understanding of intention. Hobbes is not indifferent to the conflicts that arise from this

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[10] *Pure Theory*, p. 173.
[11] *Pure Theory*, p. 173.

accentuation. Openness to Intention and the necessity of a strong Power are logically linked. Hobbes' liberalism and authoritarianism derives from the same premises.[12] At the very least, the dimensional law would require a significant expansion of the political sphere or orbit. Those that think otherwise are succumbing to illusions. On the other side, within the "moral derangement" camp, there is general agreement on the political corollaries that are necessary to deal with the conflicts that are implicit in divergent intentions.

Where does Jouvenel stand in relation to these two extremes? As we have suggested, Jouvenel occupies a very qualified middle ground. He is "for" social friendship and civic harmony--but he wants to free them from the "prison of the corollaries." Let the qualifications begin. Jouvenel's understanding of man is both mixed and balanced. The human being capable of choice and compliance, instigation and response, is a human being who transcends the variety of regimes, ancient and modern. However, based on the reality of compliance and the law of conservative exclusion, Jouvenel thinks that the classical corollaries go too far in their effort to bring coherence to the will.

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[12] See the discussion in Chapter 14 of *Sovereignty*, "The Political Consequences of Hobbes," pp. 279-298, esp. pp. 289-290.

There is also the logic of the dimensional law. The dimensional law is a one-way street: small, simple and homogeneous politics can give way to large, complex, and heterogeneous politics but not the reverse.[13] In short there is no return to the "unity" of the classical city. Jouvenel therefore rejects every form of communitarian nostalgia. So the real political question for Jouvenel is: what type of decent politics is possible under conditions of modernity? Are we going to have a politics that respects liberty in circumstances of large, complex, and heterogeneous communities, or one that does not, or can't--not because one does not want to but because it does not know how? Hobbes's thought is highlighted because of its clarity concerning the requirements of the dimensional law and the limitations of the law of conservative exclusion. Hobbes is aware that only a strong and sizeable public Authority can keep these heterogeneous wills in check, and that the law of conservative exclusion needs to be supplemented by an attentiveness to the political threats that those who are

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[13] The dimensional law provides support for Nietzsche's famous warning to reactionaries: "Today too there are still parties whose dream it is that all things might walk backwards like crabs. But no one is free to be a crab." (*Twilight of the Idols*, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," #43) At a certain point the reality of a certain type of politics becomes what Tocqueville called our "fated circle." (See the final paragraph of Volume II of *Democracy in America*. Jouvenel, like Tocqueville and unlike Nietzsche, believes that the virtue of prudence is still available to citizens and statesmen within their new situation.

excluded continue to pose (for example partisans of religious politics). On this general point Jouvenel is on the "same factual ground" as Hobbes even if he rejects many of his fundamental premises--not to mention his Leviathan solution.

Jouvenel does not believe that Hobbes' premises are compatible with political liberty or with the maintenance of some degree of social friendship.[14] If one starts with Hobbes' understanding of the will--which Jouvenel thinks is widely held--only the most powerful and unlimited sovereign can keep such a large-scale collection of heterogeneous egotistical wills together. Force then is the necessary substitute for social friendship. However, if man's will has regulating resources within it, if human beings are capable of Response as well as Instigation, with the former as a check on the latter, and if the law of conservative exclusion keeps intense Instigations in check on a political level, it is possible to escape "the political consequences of Hobbes."

In any case, Jouvenel does not think that he has found a "solution" to the problem of conflict; there will be casualties in the path he proposes, just as there are casualties with taking either of the other two extremes.

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[14]*Sovereignty*, p. 298.

The Attentive Statesman and the Intending Politician

Jouvenel fashions out of Attention and Intention--two capacities of the mind--two types of political actors: the attentive statesman and the Intender. These are political actors as well as political entrepreneurs. Both share a common capacity and ability to raise the capital needed to exercise a leadership role in politics broadly understood. But there is in Jouvenel's estimation a real range or inequality in these "political" capacities.

Jouvenel attributes to these actors metaphorical and mythological terms that beautifully capture the depth and nuance of his thinking. He likens the attentive statesman to the mythical creature "Argus," a god or creature with eyes all around its head, giving it the capacity to see everything. The Intender is likened to a man who has "blinkers" on his head that only allow him to look forward. Everything that Jouvenel says in this first chapter is captured in these metaphors.[15]

The many-eyed Argus and the myopic Intender are distinguished in terms of sight, the former having an unnatural panoramic view and the latter an unnaturally

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[15] *Pure Theory*, p. 173.

narrowed view of political achievement. But the "unnaturalness" of both these types of sights cuts different ways. The Argus is a "superman" in the sense that he enjoys a hyper-accentuation of the faculty of sight. And since the Attentive Statesman is occupying the office of Potestas, he needs the panoramic view of a godlike creature to keep watch over a political field that is characterized by Intenders wearing "blinkers." The tribe of the "blinkers" is far from being composed of gods, in fact they are described in terms that suggest they are wearing a device that is used with animals, particularly horses, so to keep them focused on what is directly in front of them and to drown out any peripheral interference.

There is tragedy inherent, or lurking, in these metaphors. The attentive statesmen needs--but does not possess-a vision that is beyond human capabilities and that of the intending politician is too well within reach. The attentive statesmen, whose task is to "keep the whole communications system running" generally, or necessarily, lacks the foresight to see all the threats that can come from an open, or even a monopolistic, communication system.[16] In addition because the maintenance of the

[16] The ancient political corollaries were thoughtful attempts to limit the extent of this communications system. But as we know from a cursory

communications system is the object of his attention and intention, the attentive statesmen lacks the clarity and loud voice of the intending politician.

Jouvenel ends his discussion of Attention and Intention as follows:

> *Therefore it is not surprising that the perfections of attentive statesmanship should be so rare. Where it is approximated to as nearly as human fallibility allows, it is not recognized; the benefits, which then accrue, are not attributed to the statesman, since he has not directly procured them but has only fostered the conditions of their occurrence. Human foresight being limited and uncertain, our man sooner or later will fail to see a "cloud no bigger than a man's hand" out of which the tempest will come. The trouble may arise at any point; and it is a handicap of the Attender that he is expected to abate any trouble; while the Intender promises nothing of the sort: he turns people's minds to a goal and away from any intervening troubles. Indeed he represents any trouble arising as one more reason to drive to the goal, however illogical the connection.*
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> *As the pace of change increases, it seems that the world of politicians is increasingly caught unprepared by events, its mores and procedures having undergone no tightening up, perhaps the reverse: perception is not more acute, reaction to impending events goes on in a more dilatory manner through more sprawling channels. With this increasing lack of efficiency in attentiveness, intending comes to the fore as the most visible attitude.*[17]

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reading of ancient history, many a regime was overturned by some unforeseen Instigator.

[17] *Pure Theory*, p. 175.

Who would knowingly sign up for this thankless vocation? To the degree that the attentive statesmen maintains the smooth running of this communications system, his actions go without notice. For example, how would history have treated Chamberlain if he acted quickly to oppose Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in March of 1936? This very well may have averted a world war. But would History have remembered him as it will remember the great Churchill? And if Jouvenel's surface description were not bad enough, we must remember what he has already said about the "mediocre" capacities that are capable of winning extensive support--and how over time their mediocrity rots established Authority. In short, established political orders are typically led by Chamberlains and not Churchills.

Jouvenel's "pure" description thus seems initially to give more support to either of the extremes then to some middle position. If Potestas is at a disadvantage with Potentia, then Potestas needs to be shorn up. For example, classical political philosophy looked to "virtue" and the political corollaries to bring it about. Smallness of size, cultural homogeneity, resistance to foreign ways, and the immutability of beliefs, were means of bringing coherence, predictability, and peace to a political animal whose

tendency is toward conflict. These are the premodern mores and procedures that provided what Jouvenel calls in *Sovereignty* the labyrinth of the "regulated will."[18] The movement away from this labyrinth acerbates modernity's "rationalist crisis" and favors totalistic politics.

The proponents of the other "extreme"--"Popular Sovereignty"--theoretically, then practically overturned these corollaries and the labyrinth of the "regulated will" by embracing rather than suppressing human individuality. However, among modern thinkers there is a range of opinions regarding the mores and procedures needed to mitigate the conflict that is the "natural accentuation of human liberty." Hobbes is the most consistent and tough-minded of these positions. Hobbes' understanding of Power is anti-"vainglorious" in intent. Like the ancient understanding of virtue his notion of power seems to bring coherence to a political creature that is by his nature prone--if unregulated--to pursue vainglorious instigations. But Hobbes' opposition to the vainglorious few does not make him uncritical of the non-vainglorious many. Hobbes is no Tom Paine; he is very aware that there are enemies on his left. The Leviathan is not only a lord over the children of pride and thus a protector of the people and their desire

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[18] *Sovereignty*, pp. 247-249.

not to be commanded or oppressed but also over the varied passions and interests that he sees as a natural accentuation of man's liberty. In Hobbes' view, a society that protects individual liberties needs to be policed.

The mores and procedures of Hobbes' Power are in "principle" very tight. They are finally everything necessary to maintain peace; the one thing that is outside the power of Power is to compel a person to assent to his own death. Under Hobbes's ingenious solution to the problem of conflict, the instigators' clarity and loud voices now find their match; the attentive leader now has an even clearer vision and louder voice: the freedom of the individual does not exist outside the public Authority's ability to guarantee civil peace.

As Jouvenel remarked earlier in *"On the Nature of Political Science"*: "This feeling of danger is widespread in human society and has haunted all but the more superficial authors: very few have, like Hobbes, brought it in to the open, it has hovered in the background, exerting an invisible but effective influence upon their treatment of the subject; it may be responsible for the strange and unique texture of political science."[19] As Jouvenel's description of the phenomenon attests, the representatives

[19] *Pure Theory*, p. 29.

of both these extremes are not "superficial authors." Like the best political thinkers ancient and modern Jouvenel himself makes this "dangerous texture" a central theme of his political science.

Jouvenel does so for two reasons. He agrees with Hobbes on two crucial points: initiative and conflict are natural accentuations of individual liberty, you cannot have one without necessarily opening the political to the other. Jouvenel articulates an alternative that accepts the reality of conflict but does not extract the "high price" of an authoritarian Leviathan or entail the denial of the natural sociability of man.[20]

"The Team Against the Committee"

In the next chapter, Jouvenel turns to an examination of the threat posed by those who are dissatisfied with the decision of a "Committee"--(Jouvenel's term for a group of political decision-makers). He discusses how a team, which he defines as a group that "shares an intention,"[21] exerts pressure on a Committee.

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[20] That pace of change that characterizes our politics makes a return to premodern politics impossible, undesirable, and any effort tyrannical.
[21] *Pure Theory*, p. 176.

According to Jouvenel, there are three basic ways--present under any regime--to approach an established authority with the goal of getting a team's intention heard and acted upon. The first is to make one's case directly to a committee. The second indirect route is to focus on getting your intention heard by acting on the members of the committee individually. In a word, lobbying. Jouvenel introduces the third, the establishment of an outside pressure group, within the context of the first two. An outside pressure group becomes necessary when the effort to "persuade directly" or to "mildly nag" fails to move those in authority.

While the third approach appears to be a source of friction, Jouvenel is quick to remind us of the legitimacy of such action in a liberal order:

> *This is a current procedure in a regime of liberty: indeed its being held legitimate defines political liberty.*[22]

To get rid of the ability to generate a pressure group after the Authority has spoken would to be strike at the heart of the regime of modern liberty. Also, to put a case in front of a committee--directly or indirectly--presupposes the reality of an outside pressure group. As a

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[22] *Pure Theory*, p. 176.

rule, those with Potentia can appear before or lobby a given Potestas. That such teams exist everywhere that there is free politics is not disputed. The political question is what are the appropriate procedures and attitudes of established Authority toward such a group, once it has decided not to act positively on a request and the group continues to promote its instigation? How do you balance what constitutes the liberty of instigation with the stability of the political order? To provide a real alternative to Hobbes, Jouvenel must show how this basic liberty to form a pressure group after the public Authority has issued a command is rooted in a right outside of the decision of the Authority to tolerate it. He must also show that this right is limited, and that when instigation threatens the stability of the established Authority, a decent political order has every right to defend itself.

It should be noted that a pressure group that does not accept the legitimacy of decisions made by established authorities calls into question the very notion of legitimate authority. This is why this third option is not to be found everywhere. It is universal to the extent that pressure groups of this kind are natural to politics; what is not universal is the public Authorities' recognition of them. The best short answer to why these regimes do not

recognize of rights of teams is that these pressure groups strike at the heart of political command and the legitimacy of established Authority. At a certain point the debate must end. There must be a legitimate source of political command announcing that the debate is over. In Jouvenel's view, issuing and enforcing a command is the very nature of Authority. Without the right of command there would be no public Authority, only a ceaseless war of instigations.

This is one reason why Hobbes defined the power of the Leviathan to be in principle unlimited. Outside of Public Authority, there are no rights, only "a war of all against all." Therefore, when the debate is over and a decision is made, the pressuring must stop and obedience rendered, or exacted. Jouvenel believes that the primacy of political authority is rooted in its ability to compel obedience and to enforce its decisions. But he does not advocate command for its own sake or even for the preservation of civil peace in the manner of Hobbes. Jouvenel describes the attentive statesman as the caretaker of the communication system. For communication to exist, rules once pronounced must be obeyed, or the system collapses, and Authority dissolves. The right of command is rooted in this natural social necessity. The public Authority can regulate the pressure it allows to be exerted by others not because it

is absolute but rather because it is limited. When push comes to shove, the integrity of the political whole takes precedence. It is worth remembering that Jouvenel shares with Hobbes a concern for giving Authority the resources it needs to deal with the challenges of emergent authority. However, Jouvenel thinks that what is needed is a stricter definition of what is legitimate and illegitimate instigation. A stable liberal order depends upon such a distinction.

Jouvenel distinguishes between two types of pressure groups, those focusing on changing the committee's decision either by "converting the people" or by "subverting the committee." The former is the distinguishing characteristic of a liberal regime. Jouvenel's factual description captures the natural dignity of this "converting" team,

> *The team is confident that it can muster ever-increasing support, expects that such backing will in time become overwhelming, and is content to wait for the reaching of this situation.*[23]

These are intensive groups that work to generate extensive support in order to apply greater pressure on the decisions of committee. In Part V, Jouvenel distinguished three types of new forces: extra-governmental (i.e. a union); new force

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[23] *Pure Theory*, p. 177.

(i.e. a new political party); and revolutionary forces dedicated to the overthrow of the existing order. All but the third can be understood based on this positive use of liberty. However, it should be noted that what qualifies these forces as positive examples is the spirit that motivates these pressure groups; they pressure Authority without causing any direct breach of peace or initiating any fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.

Jouvenel describes the second type of pressure group as lacking both the patience and the potential extensive base of the former:

> *The team regards it as unlikely that it can over a period of time mobilize adequate support to carry the wanted decision by sheer weight of numbers, or is unwilling to accept the implied delay, either because the critical date is too distant, or too uncertain, for its patience, or because the decision called for would be stultified by the passage of time...In such a position, the team avails itself of its dedicated supporters to generate nuisances for the committee. Nuisance policies are the natural resort of a team, which relies on intensive rather than extensive support. Its efforts are addressed to subverting the committee rather than converting the people. The word "nuisance" is used here relative to the committee: it is not implied that the actions so denominated are themselves "wrong." They are meant to badger the committee. There exists a vast range of nuisance tactics. Ethically speaking, going on a hunger strike and throwing a bomb are poles apart: yet both*

> *are demonstrations of an intense feeling, meant to break the will of the committee.*[24]

Interesting in this description is Jouvenel's use of the ethical angle. The act of badgering a committee is not presented as something "wrong." In the abstract "badgering" is ethically neutral. However how or *what* one does is not ethically neutral. Jouvenel establishes a range of extreme action, from a hunger strike to bomb throwing. While one could come up with examples where both these examples could be "ethical," the throwing of the bomb at a committee would certainly justify a response. But would a hunger-striker? Not necessarily. Certainly, some of those who have gone on hunger-strikes while in prison found themselves in prison because they threw bombs. But this is not the case with every hungry striker. And what can an Authority do to those who elect this avenue of defiance? While these examples are extreme, they clearly point to the limit of a team's right to the guarantee of political liberty. To further muddy the waters, Jouvenel discusses "milder forms" of nuisance politics such as marching, picketing, demonstrating. Jouvenel did not distinguish "converting the people" and "subverting the committee" in order to neatly separate legitimate and illegitimate pressure groups. Marching,

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[24] *Pure Theory*, p.178.

picketing, and demonstrating are presented as legitimate, "nuisance"-expressions of political liberty. In fact these are widely accepted legitimate means to pressure a committee. What was the purpose of such distinctions? It seems that Jouvenel distinguishes between these two types of pressure groups in order to separate those who ought to be protected in a regime of liberty and those who ought not to be.

At first glance, Jouvenel's argument is somewhat frustrating. He has identified a problem with instigation but this problem appears to be inextricably woven into the fabric of the goods that we associate with free politics. How are we to separate the wheat from the chaff? First, by making such distinctions within the nuisance category Jouvenel is showing that the dangerous texture of politics is in reality localized within a particular extreme of an extreme form of nuisance politics. For Jouvenel, a pressure group loses its legitimate standing when it opts for violence. The public Authority or committee needs to be able to identify and exclude those with violent intentions. The civility of "the city" must be defended against those who choose bellicose means or ends.

Jouvenel isolates this extreme for special consideration. He finds within the camp of extreme instigation both a "terrorist strategy" and a terrorist morality. The latter is a distinctive bitter fruit of late modern politics. Such a morality combines the "manners of gangsters with the moral benefits of martyrdom."[25] Jouvenel is very careful to distinguish between the natural inclination toward violence and the distinctively modern manifestation of the phenomena. However, before we separate the two types of violence, we first need to explore why conflict is so natural to politics. In "The Manner of Politics" Jouvenel writes,

> *The common good is indeed a powerful notion, but of indefinite content: its uncertainty, together with a variety of personal wants and wills, give rise to a number of disagreements. Who should fill this position? What should be the decision on that occasion? Such is the daily stuff of Politics, inflamed from time to time by disagreements regarding the very structure of institutions.*[26]

So much is expressed here! Jouvenel captures in these few sentences what is behind the "daily stuff of Politics." Political thinkers as diverse as Aristotle or Hobbes would

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[25] *Pure Theory*, p. 180.
[26] *Pure Theory*, p. 188.

not disagree with this description of what gives politics its dynamism and texture. Conflict and violence are constituent parts of political life, an unfortunate but necessary byproduct of humans living together. They stem paradoxically from the natural human desire to articulate a "common good." While it is natural that violence erupts in politics from time to time, it is also natural for human beings to abhor it. For Jouvenel man has a "natural sense" that killing is wrong. That men kill each other is an established fact. What is also a fact is that they have to get themselves worked up to do so:

> *If a team feels very strongly about an issue and communicates this strength of feeling toward others, there is always some risk that someone of these others will commit an act of violence. If this occurs, those who have inspired the feeling should now experience a sense of guilt: that is an ancient and natural pattern.* [27]

Jouvenel singles out the French anarchist theorist George Sorel (the author of the 1908 revolutionary classic, *Reflections on Violence*) as the herald of a new terrorist morality, one which defines itself in opposition to this natural moral sense. No longer are those who inspire violence supposed to feel a sense of shame but rather a kind of revolutionary pride. Under this new morality, the

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[27] *Pure Theory*, p. 180.

blood of Duncan no longer haunts MacBeth. In fact his willingness to spill Duncan's blood is precisely what puts him above the rest. In "The Manner of Politics" Jouvenel returns to this point:

> *The new "sublime of extreme actions" has been immortally illustrated by Stendhal in the micro-portrait, the medallion of Julien Sorel. What characterizes the hero is that in a succession of small incidents, Julien overcomes both his timidity and decency, which he satanically confuses, to do the bold thing.*[28]

From where does this nihilistic attitude come? What justifies this election and worship of violence? Jouvenel answers,

> *This evil attitude is far more harmful than any false ideas and it is not fostered by intellectual error but aesthetic suggestions.*[29]

Does that mean that the mind has nothing do with this evil attitude? Not in the least. Jouvenel's distinction between intellectual error and aesthetic suggestions refers to how such an evil attitude is spread or fostered. It does not mean that an intellectual error might not lay behind this virulent delivery system.

This new morality seems to make a good case for the Hobbesian position. The Leviathan cannot be criticized as

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[28] *Pure Theory*, p. 180.
[29] *Pure Theory*, p.196.

lacking the stomach for dealing with the threats posed by these "sacred battalions."[30] In fact the Leviathan can respond to this morality and strategy blow by blow. But Jouvenel suggests elsewhere that the soullessness of the Hobbesian "Babylon" actually inspires the moral inversion which is the revolutionary "Icaria." It gives rise to the moralistic abolition of the moral sense.[31] On the other hand, Jouvenel does not deny the attraction of the Hobbesian understanding of man. Relativism cools the minds of most men, and in doing so contributes to an atmosphere of peace. The majority of men are not prone to follow great instigations that go against the peace inherent in the Hobbesian solution to political conflict. The strength of Hobbes' solution is that it calls into question the legitimacy of the instigator by questioning his motives, which hampers his ability to generate extensive support. The paradox and potential tragedy of Hobbes' understanding is that while the metaphysic of power cools the majority of men, it heats up smaller groups. It stirs up their moral passion against society and morality itself. In the Hobbesian system, Power discredits the vainglorious in the eyes of the people, but provides no intellectual grounds

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[30] *Pure Theory*, p. 197.

[31] On "Babylon" and "Icaria," see *Sovereignty*, pp. 328-333. On the moralistic revolutionary denial of the moral sense, see *Pure Theory*, p. 180.

for limiting the human will. For example, those longing for the psychic wholeness of the past--a longing that modernity's "soullessness" naturally nurtures, those who are disgusted with the trivializing "conviviality" that rules Hobbes' world, can use violence to build a different world on the rubble of Babylon, or on the individual level they may choose a "counter-culture" that "maintains and develops a separateness from the Corrupt."

Jouvenel's De-sanctification of Violence

What advice can a "pure theory" offer to assist the magistrate in keeping violent instigations out of politics? Jouvenel's pure theory ends with two suggestions: one for narrowing the definition of faction so that the political magistrate focuses on violence, and the other emphasizing the role of manners or civility in maintaining the liberal order.

Jouvenel's understanding of faction entails a refinement of Madison's in Federalist #10. In that famous paper Madison says, "By faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion or interest, adverse to the rights of

citizens, or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." For Jouvenel, Madison's definition is too "equivocal" because the meaning of "adverse" is open to many subjective valuations. As we have discussed, the Attentive statesmen is at a rhetorical disadvantage when trying to explain to Instigators why they should check their intentions. Jouvenel shows how the very Instigators Madison wished to check can use his own words in defense of their subversive positions. The Instigator's rejoinder is so good that deserves to be quoted in full:

> *Say that I am a member of a group "united and accentuated by some common impulse. . .": I shall not grant that our action is directed against the "rights of other citizens" but only against rights abused or usurped, or which, while they may at this moment (under present law) be positive rights, have no basis in equity and should be rightly cut down by a change in the law. In a like manner, I shall not grant our actions are directed against the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community" but only against a caricature of these interests invoked by our opponents. A difference of opinion regarding what rights should be, and what are the aggregate interests, must then produce a difference in the denomination of our movement: a faction to those who disagree with us but not to ourselves.*[32]

What is so remarkable about this discussion is that Jouvenel introduces this "equivocal" assessment of

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[32] *Pure Theory*, p. 182, note 1.

Madison's definition by stating that this is Robert Dahl's assessment and agreeing with it. He thus exemplifies how people can agree about a problem yet understand it completely differently. Dahl is critical of Madison's definition of faction because those in public Authority could use such a standard too subjectively. An over-reaching public authority is the fundamental problem for Dahl. Jouvenel on the other hand is critical of Madison's definition for giving support to those very "adverse" groups that public Authority needs to find a way to limit.

Jouvenel's response to the subjectivity of Madison's definition is to redefine a faction in terms of groups "joined together in a bellicose spirit." In doing so Jouvenel reaffirms what he calls the "most ancient maxim of Politics," that "War is a condition which may obtain with foreigners, but peace is the condition which must be obtained between compatriots."[33] Now the attentive statesman has both a loud voice and a vision to accompany it.

Our attentive statesman is no longer tongue-tied when dealing with troublesome Instigation. In a loud voice he now says: "Your instigation undermines the spirit of amity and comity that is fundamental to our politics. By speaking and acting violently, you have disqualified yourself from

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[33] *Pure Theory*, p. 181.

the protection of a free political community. Political liberty is for groups that act with amity toward their compatriots." Jouvenel's position is the very opposite of the civil libertarian who judges political liberty by the freedom that the public Authority allows to those groups that are committed to its elimination. For Jouvenel, Nazis do not have the political right to march in Jewish neighborhoods and spew their enmity. In fact, groups that the ACLU habitually defends are the very groups that our Attentive Statesman must monitor. These are the "clouds, no bigger than a man's hand from which the tempest will come."[34]

Jouvenel understands the practical difficultly of trying to control or repress such groups. Once can easily picture--because life affords us with many examples--the public Authority taking action against a faction, only to find itself undermined because the subversive group casts the attack on its bellicose intention as an attack on political liberty itself. "Sure today it's the Nazi's in Stokie or the Branch Davidians in Texas--both of whom I detest--but if we say it is legitimate to go after them, what will stop them from one day coming after us." This is the slippery slope argument of civil libertarians who take

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[34] *Pure Theory*, p. 175.

the permanence of liberal democracy for granted and forget, or never learned, the lessons of Weimar.

For our attentive magistrates to be successful the population needs to internalize this "ancient maxim" in their manners. For Jouvenel, the manners associated with political civility are what keep the conflict that naturally surrounds politics within manageable limits.[35] Where civil manners rule competition for extensive and intensive assent, brutish and loutish language is pushed out. Social friendship thus accompanies and moderates electoral competition and partisan conflict. Certainly, there will always be harsh political disagreements and the occasional acts of violence, but the conflicts will be civil and when violence erupts the reaction is appropriately one of shame and condemnation. Certainly, the public Authority has an important role to play in fostering an environment conducive to civility, but the shaping of these manners is largely done outside of it. This is one of the responsibilities of a political philosophy that aims to "civilize power, to impress the brute, improve its manners, and harness it to salutary tasks."[36] Jouvenel suggests that it was the "subversion of civility in the French

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[35] *Pure Theory*, "The Manners of Politics," pp. 187-203.
[36] *Pure Theory*, p. 35.

Revolution" that was "the true explanation of so violent a reaction as Burke's."[37] That great English Whig was horrified by the "new expression on faces" and "new tones of voices" that accompanied the French revolutionary subversion of the old European order. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, "philosophers" sanctified inhuman violence and ignored the fragility of civilized order.

The Pure Theory of Politics is the work of a conservative liberal who has been chastened by his confrontation with "angry bellicose Politics." Jouvenel lived through an age of ideological, totalitarian violence and does not "underestimate" it.[38] His political science is an effort to convey the lessons of an age that witnessed the vulnerability of civilized politics to internal and external subversion. It is a meditation on the fragility but also the indispensability of the Political Good. It is an invaluable lesson for self-satisfied liberals who believe, against all experience, that we have somehow arrived at "the end of history."

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[37] *Pure Theory*, p. 194.
[38] *Pure Theory*, p. 203. On this point, also see Daniel J. Mahoney's "Foreword" to the Liberty fund edition of *Pure Theory*, p. xiii.

Conclusion:
Jouvenel and Modernity

Modernity cannot be adequately understood based on its own premises or self-understanding. Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* argues that the philosophic examination of modernity must transcend modern theory by taking into account those things which modernity leaves out of its "arbitrary simplification" of the human world.[1] This line of thinking is not unique to Jouvenel; it is found most notably in his great contemporary Leo Strauss.

Jouvenel's approach is in many ways similar to that of Strauss. Both thinkers identified and understood the "rationalist crisis" that threatened the western world. Both defended a normative understanding of human nature against philosophers who exalted the self-affirmation of the human will.[2] But their analyses finally point in different directions. Not surprisingly, their differences arise out of profound similarities or agreements. To begin with, both see the trajectory of modern thought as culminating if unchecked in nihilism and both are critics

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[1] In Jouvenel's view, philosophic modernity in its unadulterated form is based on a "destructive metaphysic" that "refused to see in society anything but the state and society. It disregarded the role of the spiritual authorities and of those intermediate authorities which empower, protect and control the life of man..." *Power*, p. 417.

[2] See Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: *University of Chicago Press*, 1953) and Jouvenel, *Sovereignty*, pp. 238-257.

of the historicism which marks almost every current of modern thought. Both think it impossible and irresponsible to escape the modern world in the name of some pre-modern arcadia. But Jouvenel goes further than Strauss in attempting to reconcile the many human goods that are linked to this modern project--goods that did not and could not exist in the pre-modern world--with what he sees to be enduring insights of pre-modern thought. Jouvenel is also more openly attached to what Benjamin Constant called the "liberty of the moderns." Jouvenel more clearly separates theory and practice: in his view, the goods of modernity have been inadequately theorized. Modern political philosophy cannot fully affirm or ground the goods of modern life because it cannot affirm or ground the human good. Daniel J. Mahoney suggestively remarks that Strauss, in contrast, radicalized the tension between the rationality and sociality of man in such a way that philosophy risks becoming disconnected from common life, or the "moral contents of life." [3] Jouvenel explicitly opposes any attempt to inaugurate a simple "return" to ancient practice (Rousseau) or philosophy (Strauss). Strauss shared

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[3] See Daniel J. Mahoney, "The Experience of Totalitarianism and the Recovery of Nature: Reflections on Philosophy and Community in the Thought of Solzhenitsyn, Havel and Strauss" in P. Lawler and D. McConkey ed., *Community and Political Thought Today* (Westport, Conn.: Prager, 1998), 220-223.

Jouvenel's reservations about ancient practice but he is an unabashed partisan of the activity he called "philosophy," finding its fullest and most self-conscious articulation in antiquity. For Jouvenel, the fundamental alternatives are neither "progress" nor "return" as Strauss suggested.[4] Jouvenel is not a chastened romantic of any kind.[5] Despite his important debts to classical political philosophy, he rejects the idealism or utopianism underlying the classical search for the "best regime" as well as an understanding of philosophy that radically demarcates the philosophic and moral realms.

Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* adopts another strategy: it turns the "effectual" route used so devastatingly by the early philosophical architects of modernity against modern theory. He shows that philosophic modernity cannot live up to the claims of "realism" that it ostentatiously makes for itself. But as we have seen, Jouvenel's use of effectual truth--his pure theory--is also a two way street. By turning the effectual truth against the utopianism or "imaginary principalities" inherent in modern thought,

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[4] See the essay of that name in Thomas L. Pangle ed. *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

[5] Obviously Jouvenel life was marked by romanticism, which was cured by the advent of the Second World War. By chastened romantic, we mean, one who sees a vision of the good, that he holds to be true, but which is beyond his reach. Because it is beyond his reach he resigns himself to a life marked by tragic imperfection.

Jouvenel opens a door that allows the "old gods" of classical and Christian thought to reenter the Modern city. But the factual ground that opens the modern door has a screen; these ancient "gods" are not allowed in whole.

Even more than Strauss, Jouvenel makes the study of this modern reaction, this intersection and mixture of modern and premodern thought and conceptions of man, a dialogic whole. To formulate this position in classical language, Jouvenel thinks and acts in a modern world or "cave" but in a cave that is illuminated by pre-modern images--and natures shaped by those images--competing with modern images and playing a part in shaping the modern soul. Jouvenel's enterprise includes both an understanding of Strauss's "three waves of modernity," waves of thought that relentlessly transform human life, as well as these points of stability or permanence within the truculent modern world, institutions such as the Catholic Church[6] and as well those permanent features of human nature. Jouvenel tries to do justice to both nature and history, to the

[6] Jouvenel was discrete in his affirmation of the Catholic faith. But he admired the Church's opposition to the "unregulated will." He also believed that Christianity beautifully confirmed the "affective" nature of man—the importance of the affections and human fellowship for a truly human life. See *Sovereignty* as well as our earlier discussions in Chapter 3.

progressive character of modern society and to the things that do not change.[7]

Jouvenel's dialectic understanding of man and modernity retains a place for the tragic while rejecting a debilitating pessimism. Modern man is not perilously trapped between the pounding waves of modern thought and a reactionary rejection of progress. Some contemporary thinkers present stark alternatives: man must choose between drowning in nihilism or being crushed by romantic restorations that have no solid roots in modern experience. A responsible view of liberty in the modern world is framed by these two negatives poles, and occupies and acts on the shifting space between them. It is from this perspective that the political philosopher undertakes his study of politics and the human good.

Jouvenel wants to restore the study of real politics and overcome the utopianism that marks both ancient and modern thought. It is not that there is no politics within modernity, or that man has ceased to be political. It is rather that modern political science no longer thinks clearly about political things. For example, individual

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[7] This understanding clearly distinguishes Jouvenel from Strauss's classical naturalism. On doing justice to nature and history see Pierre Manent, " On Historical Causality" in D. Mahoney and P. Seaton eds., *Modern Liberty and its Discontents*, Lanham,Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) 209-214.

liberty is an unquestionable good but the "theory" that articulates it undermines its successful exercise. The more we understand individual liberty from the purview of its theory, the more we see its positive fruits being replaced by self-destructive willfulness or pure licentiousness. The true view of individual liberty is more of a mixture. Certainly make men use of their freedom to pursue a "joyless quest for joy" (Leo Strauss) that ends only in exhaustion and death. But it is equally true that men make use of individual liberty for many elevated purposes--purposes marked by social friendship and vibrant civic life.

A true political science should be able to account for the amplitude and heterogeneity of human experience. Certainly, Hobbes' theory addresses the elevated uses of individual liberty to which we have referred. But his theory does not do justice to the complex social world that nourishes individual liberty. Calling vainglory all that transcends selfish but commodious preservation is certainly "rigorous." But rigor is not the same as a truly representative or scientific account of human society. In contrast, Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* offers a truly rigorous and representative theory of politics. He succeeds in bringing us further along in our quest for knowledge about

politics by remaining true to the spirit of his inquiry. Peace is certainly an object or desired fruit of his theory. But it is a peace made for man as he is and not on how philosophers would like him to be. He rejects pessimistic distortions of reality, which pose as realistic accounts of human nature and society.

Jouvenel constantly introduces the reader to the permanence of tragedy, to the limits of what can be expected from politics. He does this to make it clear to the reader that politics doesn't go away because one has articulated its basic building blocks. Science can never replace politics.[8] A pure theory can put forward the causes of the dangerous texture of politics and suggest some ways of making it civil. But the wise student of politics knows that there is no "solution" to the political problem.[9] There are no permanent solutions to problems, just better and worse, and always provisional, political "settlements." For Jouvenel, "what constitutes 'a political problem' is the clashing of terms, that is, its insolvability."[10] A "pure theory of politics" aims to provide a political grammar that is useful in showing areas where citizens and

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[8] On this point, see Jouvenel's Introduction to Hobbes' translation of Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1959) and the helpful discussion in Dennis Hale and Marc Landy's Introduction to *The Nature of Politics*, p.30.
[9] *Pure Theory*, pp. 204-212.
[10] *Pure Theory*, p. 212.

statesmen can make the worst better and what is better more so. It is a prerequisite for understanding the world as it exists in all its complexity. It is a necessary tool of political philosophy if it is to avoid being either irrelevant or pernicious. To study complex political relations well, the political scientist must at least provisionally break down the complex in terms of the simple, elemental laws basic to political behavior. He must know the possibilities and dangers inherent in the capacity of men to move men. The real world is an amalgam of theoretical and practical settlements, which are forever being renegotiated. Jouvenel's *Pure Theory* is an aid to the thoughtful participant in in political life. It encourages participants in this endless drama to take measures to obviate pressures that can make these negotiations turn violent or bellicose. It is a position that values the city and civility because it appreciates their fragility.

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Abstract

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GUARDIANS OF THE BODY POLITIC: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND HUMAN LIBERTY IN THE THOUGHT OF BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL

The wisdom and grace of the French political philosopher Bertrand Jouvenel (1903-1987) are on full display in his three masterworks of political reflection, *On Power* (1945), *Sovereignty (1957)*, and *The Pure Theory of Politics* (1963). Together, these works articulate a political science that effectively responds to what he called the modern "rationalist crisis." According to Jouvenel, modern political thought has freed Power--by which he meant political Authority--from the institutional and moral hedges that have traditionally limited, harnessed and moralized its practice. These three books, taken together, outline a political science that can effectively re-limit, re-harness, and re-moralize Power.

After exploring Jouvenel's treatment of political science and human liberty in his work as a whole, I present a critical commentary on *The Pure Theory of Politics*, the final installment of the "trilogy." My dissertation focuses on *Pure Theory* precisely because this work offers the phenomenological "grammar" that undergirds Jouvenel's earlier works on political authority and ethics. Every prescriptive sentence of

Power and *Sovereignty* builds upon the "elemental" grammar, or "pure theory" of man and politics, that is only fully articulated in the third volume. It is the thesis of the dissertation that *Pure Theory* is the key to unlocking and defending the depths of *Sovereignty's* dynamic notion of the common good, and for mitigating the tragedy that surrounds *Power's* presentation of the inexorable rise of the centralized state in modern times. *Pure Theory* articulates the elementary building block of politics: the capacity of "man to move man." This insight is conducive to many fruitful developments, which I explore in the dissertation. The dissertation examines Jouvenel's rich analysis of political "behavior" and establishes how any effort to moralize or humanize politics depends upon an understanding of political phenomena in their raw state. By doing so, Jouvenel's thought provides the means for bridging the chasm between ancient and modern political philosophy and empirical and normative political science.

Vita

David M. DesRosiers, son of Leon F. and Maureen DesRosiers, was born on April 19, 1967, in Worcester, Massachusetts. After graduating in 1984 from St. John's College Preparatory in Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, he entered Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1989, he received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Politics.

He entered Fordham University in 1990, and earned his Master of Arts degree in Political Science in 1992. During his time at Fordham, he was awarded a President's fellowship and was President of the Graduate Student Association. While working toward his doctoral degree in Political Science, under the mentorship of Dr. Mary P. Nichols, he worked for The Claremont Institute for Statesmanship and Political Philosophy and The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Inc., where he is presently a Vice President.